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I. INTRODUCTION
In Roper v. Simmons, six members of the Supreme Court agreed that
international law is relevant to determination of "society's evolving standards of
decency" under the Eighth Amendment.' Roper represented the culmination of a
battle over the use of international and foreign law in constitutional interpretation
that has raged on the Court since the late 1980s, and that has found expression
recently in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas,2 invalidating the Texas homosexual
sodomy statute; Grutter v. Bollinger,3 upholding affirmative action in higher
1. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) ("Our determination that the death
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty."). Although Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's identification of a national
consensus prohibiting the execution of juveniles, she agreed that international law was relevant to the
Court's analysis. Id at 1215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Over the course of nearly half a century, the
Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving
standards of decency.... At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.").
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invoking the European Court of Human Rights's opinion in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). The reference was the first time the European Court's
jurisprudence had been cited in a Supreme Court majority opinion. Justice Kennedy underscored the
significance of the citation by mentioning it when he announced the opinion from the bench.
3. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (citing the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, Annex, UN
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 21, UN Doe. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965), and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess.,
Supp. No. 46, UN Doc A/34/46 (Sept. 3, 1981)). The concurrence invoked the treaties for the
proposition that affirmative action must end, as a constitutional matter, when its goals are achieved.
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education; and Atkins v. Virginia,4 invalidating the death penalty for the
intellectually disabled.5 And in extrajudicial speeches and writings, Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and O'Connor, and at one point the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, all indicated that consideration of international and foreign law is
important to the jurisprudence of the modem Supreme Court.6
Reference to international and foreign sources in constitutional analysis has
provoked a sharp backlash from other members of the Court. Justice Scalia
condemned the Court's "discussion of ... foreign views" in Lawrence as
"dangerous" dicta,7 and invoked Justice Thomas for the proposition that "this
Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."8
Dissenting in Atkins, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's invocation
of "the views of other countries," emphasizing that under the Eighth Amendment,
"'American conceptions of decency .. .are dispositive."' 9 Likewise in Roper,
Justice Scalia argued that the majority's assumption "that American law should
conform to the law of the rest of the world.., ought to be rejected out of hand."'0
Indeed, in a recent address, Justice Scalia argued that "modem foreign legal
material can never be relevant to an interpretation of ... the meaning of ... the
U.S. Constitution."11
4. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting that the practice was "overwhelmingly disapproved"
within the world community, and citing Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in Support of the
Petitioner at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727)).
5. 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
6. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIuM 411,
412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address at the
American Society of International Law Proceedings (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 265 (2003); Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the American Society of International
Law Proceedings (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Ginsburg, A Decent Respect]; Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of
a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Aug. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Looking Beyond]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies
(Oct. 28, 2003) available at http://www.southemcenter.org/oconner-transcript.pdf [hereinafter
O'Connor, Remarks] ("[C]onclusions reached by other countries and by the international community,
although not formally binding upon our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in
American courts ... ").
7. 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari)).
9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989)); see also id at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he prize for the Court's Most
Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus' must go to its appeal... to the views of... the so-called
'world-community."').
10. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
Proceedings: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
(2004); see also Ann Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to High Court, Scalia Says, WASH. POST,
Apr. 3, 2004, at A07.
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Academic,' 2 press, 13 and particularly congressional14 criticisms have been
equally sharp. One proposed House resolution opposing the use of foreign
authority criticized the Lawrence and Atkins majorities for "employ[ing] a new
technique of interpretation called 'transjudicialism." ' 5 Congressman Tom
Feeney of Florida, who co-sponsored another proposed resolution, has argued that
"[t]he people of the United States have never authorized ... any federal court to
use foreign laws to essentially make new law or establish some rights or deny
rights here in the United States."' 16 At congressional hearings on the issue,
witnesses have referred to the judiciary's use of international and foreign sources
as impeachable and "subversive. '' 17 In his recent confirmation hearings, Chief
Justice John Roberts condemned the practice for expanding judicial discretion and
granting unaccountable foreign judges influence over American lawmaking.'8
And Attorney General Alberto Gonzales contends that "the use of foreign law
poses a direct threat to legitimacy, including to the legitimacy of the Court
itself."' 9
12. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Joan Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider
Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIo L.J. 1283 (2004) (discussing Lawrence as "potentially
revolutionary'); Richard Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV.
L. REv. 31, 90 (2005) (condemning Roper as "a naked political judgment"); Michael D. Ramsey,
International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
69 (2004); Ernest Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REv. 148, 149
(2005) (criticizing Roper for employing foreign authority to expand "the Eighth Amendment
denominator"); Peter Rubin, Remarks at American Constitution Society Supreme Court Roundup (July
1, 2003), available at http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/SCOTUStrans.pdf (describing the Lawrence citations
to the European Court of Human Rights as "remarkable" and "extraordinary").
13. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous Term,
Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (noting that the Court had
"displayed a new attentiveness to legal developments in the rest of the world and to the Court's role in keeping
the United States in step with them").
14. Various bills and resolutions have been introduced objecting to the use of foreign legal sources
in constitutional analysis. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (expressing the sense of the House
that "judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not
be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments,
laws or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United
States"). H.R. Res. 97 had 65 co-sponsors, including Judiciary Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner
and then-House Majority Leader Tom Delay. Accord S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); see also The
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2082, 108th Cong. §§ 201, 302 (2004) (threatening judges with
impeachment for, inter alia, considering foreign sources); H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004);
Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) ("[T]he Supreme Court should
base its decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States, and not on the law of any foreign
country or any international law or agreement not made under the authority of the United States.").
15. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. § 2(5) (2004).
16. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matters at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest
Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/.
17. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing
on HR. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2004); see also Hearing on HR. 97 and the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of American Law Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005).
18. Emily Bazelon, Moments of Truth: What John Roberts Really Thinks, SLATE, Sept. 15,
2005, http://www.slate.com/is/212631 1/?nav=navoa.
19. Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att'y General, Foreign Law and Constitutional Interpretation,
Address at the University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 9, 2005) (excerpts available at Washington
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Many participants in the debate over the Court's use of international and
foreign sources appear to share a common assumption: that the invocation of such
sources is new.20 The Justices' explanations for their new willingness to look
abroad are multiple: the post-World War II proliferation of foreign constitutional
courts that are adjudicating similar questions, 21 globalization,22  and the
universality of basic human rights.23 Justice Scalia identifies the Court's first use
of foreign sources "for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution" as the 1958
Eighth Amendment case of Trop v. Dulles and criticizes the recent Court for
expanding the practice "beyond the area of the Eighth Amendment." 24 Although
Justice Ginsburg traces the legitimacy of the enterprise to the Declaration of
Independence and the Framers' desire to comply with the law of nations,25 like
Justice Scalia, she attributes judicial invocation of foreign sources to the
"pathmarking" Trop plurality opinion.
26
The present controversy over resort to international and foreign sources has
focused on the Court's recent due process and death penalty jurisprudence. 27 A
Post: Campaign for the Supreme Court, http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/campaignforthecourt/ (Nov. 9,
2005, 17:08 EST)) [hereinafter Gonzales Address].
20. See, e.g., O'Connor, Remarks, supra note 6, at 4. (contending that the Court "historically.
[has] declined to consider international law and the law of other nations when interpreting our own
constitution" and seeing "the first indicia of change" in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)); Rehnquist,
supra note 6, at 412 ("For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of
judicial review [for constitutionality] had no precedents to look to save our own, because our courts
alone exercised this sort of authority.... But now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many
countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative process."). See also Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason
and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUBL. POL'Y 807, 819 (2000) (warning that consideration of foreign
authority would "expand" the "canon" of "authoritative materials" in constitutional decision making.)
21. See Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 412; Ginsburg, Looking Beyond, supra note 6, at 2.
22. See Breyer, supra note 6, at 266 (referring to "commercial, technological, and political
... 'globalization'); O'Connor, Remarks, supra note 6, at 1 ("The reason [why judges should
look to foreign sources], of course, is globalization. No institution of government can afford any longer
to ignore the rest of the world.").
23. See Breyer, supra note 6, at 2; Ginsburg, Looking Beyond, supra note 6, at 2-3
("National, multinational and international human rights characters and tribunals today play a key part in
a world with increasingly porous borders.").
24. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 307 (discussing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality
opinion)); see also Gearan, supra note 11, at A07 (containing remarks by Justice Scalia dating the resort
to foreign material at least to 1958 and describing the trend as "inconsistent").
25. See Ginsburg, Looking Beyond, supra note 6, at 5-7. Harold Koh and Gerald Neuman
have argued that resort to international law has original or historical roots. See Harold Hongju Koh,
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 43-45 (2004) (noting support for resort to
foreign authority from the founding era); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 83-84 (2004) (identifying the Court's historical
reliance on foreign and international sources in a variety of contexts); see also Steven Calabresi &
Stephanie Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice
and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109
(2005) (arguing that the use of foreign sources in Roper was a "return to traditional methods of
analysis"); cf Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: From Shelley v. Kraemer to CEDA W and Kyoto-
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2006) (noting the tension between invocations of international human rights and American
exceptionalism in nineteenth-century domestic movements).
26. Ginsburg, Looking Beyond, supra note 6, at 14.
27. Compare, for example, Justice Scalia's majority opinion upholding the constitutionality
of the death penalty for persons age 16 or older at the time of the crime, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 370 n.1 (1989) (emphasizing "that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"),
with Justice Stevens's plurality opinion invalidating the death penalty for persons age 15 at the time of the
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broader view of U.S. constitutional history, however, indicates that international
law has always played a substantial, even dominant, role in broad segments of
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.
Much less noticed after the flap over Atkins, Lawrence, and Grutter, for
example, was the Court's extensive resort to international law in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.28  Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi looked to the
international law of war regarding both the President's constitutional authority to
detain citizens as enemy combatants29 and the inherent limits on the scope of that
power.30 Although O'Connor also found that constitutional due process limited
the President's power to detain, even here her opinion gave a nod toward
international law by suggesting, without deciding, that due process might be
satisfied by a military tribunal procedure akin to that established pursuant to
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.31 Thus, the plurality considered
international standards in defining both the scope of executive power and
minimum individual rights protections established by the Constitution. The
plurality's approach was not uncontroversial, but few Justices questioned the
propriety of O'Connor's resort to international rules.32
One could seek to explain away the decision in Hamdi by arguing that
international law is relevant to constitutional provisions with obvious foreign
relations implications-clauses "that textually anticipate recourse to international
law," as Roger Alford has put it.33 This would not, however, explain the Hamdi
plurality's consideration of international standards in its due process analysis.
Moreover, as this Article demonstrates, the Court's historical resort to
crime, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) ("We have previously recognized the
relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual.") (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 & n.35 (1958), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n.10 (1977), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982)).
28. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). For further discussion, see infra notes 143-155 and accompanying
text.
29. Id. at 520.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 538; see Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5,
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 3322, 75 UNT.S. 135, 140.
32. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined O'Connor's opinion without comment. Justices Scalia and
Stevens would have held that the Constitution barred detaining U.S. citizens on U.S. soil pursuant to the
laws of war, but did not object to application of international law beyond that context. 542 U.S. at 565-
66 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)); see also id at 575 n.5 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("That captivity may be consistent with the principles of international law does not prove
that it also complies with the restrictions that the Constitution places on the American Government's
treatment of its own citizens."). Indeed, Scalia suggested that individuals outside U.S. territory could be
subject to such detentions. Id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg criticized the
Government's invocation of war powers by questioning whether the United States had even been
obeying the international laws of war it invoked. Id. at 549-50 (Souter, J., concurring part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas disapproved of the plurality's reliance upon the
Geneva Conventions to limit the president's powers, but otherwise found the executive's action
consistent with international rules. Id at 598 & n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. Alford, supra note 12, at 58 n.10; see also Ramsey, supra note 12, at 71 & n.14
(conceding that international sources are "relevant ... where the Constitution directly appeals to matters
of international relations such as declaring war, making treaties, and enforcing the law of nations").
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales also asserted this view in a recent address. See Gonzales Address,
supra note 19 (asserting that the Framers "imported into the Constitution certain terms and concepts
from international law-such as 'Offenses Against the Law of Nations,' 'Letters of Marque and
Reprisal,' 'Consuls,' and 'Treaties"' and that the use of international law in constitutional analysis
should be limited to these concepts).
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international sources has not been limited to the Constitution's foreign relations
clauses.
This Article seeks to challenge and redirect contemporary debate regarding
the role of international law in constitutional interpretation based upon an
examination of historical Supreme Court practice. The Article has three goals: It
first marshals the weight of evidence regarding the Supreme Court's historical use
of international law in constitutional analysis, to rebut the claim that the practice is
new. It then analyzes the ways that the Court has used international law from a
legitimacy perspective, and finally draws lessons from the historical practice to
offer preliminary suggestions- regarding the normatively appropriate use of
international law.
To some extent, the paper proceeds from the principle famously articulated
by Old Ezra, who, when asked if he believed in infant baptism, responded,
"'Believe in it? Why, man, I've seen it done!' 34 I do not contend that history and
usage resolve the current controversy over resort to international law. Historical
practice may become anachronistic or difficult to translate into new contexts, and,
Oliver Wendell Holmes's venerable observation notwithstanding, the life of the
law is not only experience. History and practice do, however, illuminate the issue.
In particular, I argue that the historical practice answers the legitimacy objection
that international law is "foreign" to the American constitutional tradition.
Part 1I accordingly offers a thorough, though not exhaustive, account of the
Supreme Court's approaches to considering international law in constitutional
analysis. The section focuses on the justifications that the Court has offered for
legitimating the practice. I argue that the Court traditionally has understood our
constitutional design as inviting consideration of international law in three
fundamental ways. First, in its strongest form, the Constitution directly invokes
international law or concepts of international law in clauses ranging from the
treaty and war powers to commerce and citizenship. Second, the Court has
employed international law as a background principle of constitutional
construction, invoking international legal principles to limit the Constitution's
territorial application, to define powers "inherent" in national sovereignty, and to
inform principles of federalism. Finally, the Court has looked to international law
to construe individual rights provisions, including in cases in which international
law establishes governmental interests implicating constitutional rights, and in
cases involving rights under the Just Compensation Clause, involuntary servitude,
"cruel and unusual punishments," and substantive and procedural due process,
which the Court has read as incorporating common values regarding the basic
rights of the person. Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper fall into this final category of
cases. Although the Court's invocation of international opinion in the due process
and Eighth Amendment cases has sparked the greatest controversy, Part H1 argues
that the use of international law in this context is fully consistent with the general
historical tradition. Indeed, international law has played a more robust role in a
number of other contexts, including the federalism and inherent powers cases.
34. Henry Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in
Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1967-68 (2003). Though of uncertain origins, Old
Ezra has taken on a life of his own in constitutional discourse. Richard Fallon is acquainted with Old
Ezra, and John Hart Ely inquired after his health. Id at 1967 n.241.
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Part III examines the insights that the cases offer for the current debate over
the legitimacy of resort to international law in constitutional analysis. As a
threshold matter, the cases flatly refute two current assumptions: that international
law has no role in constitutional analysis and that judicial resort to international
law is new. The cases demonstrate that since the nation's founding, the Court has
resorted to international law in constitutional analysis in a wide, and at times
surprising, array of contexts. The practice is sufficiently continuous over time and
broad in scope that it cannot be dismissed as episodic. The Court's frequent and
longstanding resort to international law clearly belies the suggestion that the
Constitution per se prohibits consideration of international norms. At a minimum,
those who assert international law's irrelevance to constitutional analysis must
confront and explain these cases. Even for those who concede international law's
relevance to constitutional analysis regarding certain subjects, such as foreign
relations, 36 the cases suggest that using subject matter to identify the contexts in
which international law is relevant is an elusive, if not impossible, task.
In contrast to the sharp rhetoric on today's Court, few jurists in the past have
adopted the absolutist view of American constitutional exceptionalism embraced
by Justices Scalia and Thomas. To be sure, justices at times have objected to the
use of international law, but their objections generally have derived from
interpretation of a particular constitutional provision or international rule, rather
than from a blanket prohibition against considering international law in
determining constitutional meaning. In other words, the Court's historical use of
international law has been instinctive and generally uncontroversial in a wide
range of contexts, including in the interpretation of individual rights. Indeed,
despite his stated opposition to the practice, even Justice Scalia has recognized
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is informed by "principles developed in
international conflicts law.",37 In other words, it is the critics of judicial resort to
international sources, not the proponents, who are the innovators here.
The cases further demonstrate that the Court generally has recognized
international law as an evolving concept and has applied contemporary rules of
international law rather than limiting its analysis to norms prevailing at the
nation's founding. International law also has not entered constitutional debate as a
new (and therefore potentially illegitimate) interpretive device, but through the
ordinary tools of constitutional interpretation-original understanding, text,
structure, history, doctrine, and prudential concerns.38
Equally notably, and contrary to the Court's use of international law as
merely persuasive authority in cases such as Roper and Lawrence, in some
contexts, international law has been applied as a result of the binding obligations it
imposes. For cases implicating foreign relations, cases where governmental
interests derive from international law, and in some cases involving national or
35. See Ramsey, supra note 12, at 72 n.17 (dismissing examples of historical resort to
international law as "(1) interpretations of structural provisions, (2) instances in which domestic rights
were denied, or (3) scattered and unexplained recent practice").
36. See supra note 33.
37. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
38. This discussion is informed by the work of my colleague Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP
BoBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (1982); PHILIP BOBBIrrT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11 -12 (1991) (identifying six modes of constitutional interpretation:
history, text, structure, doctrine, prudentialism, and ethos).
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state sovereign powers, the justification for using international law arises, at least
in part, from its binding legal character. This is not to say that the Court has
applied international law because it was bound to do so at the constitutional level.
Instead, the Court has recognized that the need to comply with the United States's
international legal obligations can justify giving weight to international rules.
On the other hand, the cases demonstrate that international law at times has
been used opportunistically and that resort to international law historically has
been a mixed bag for those who advocate its use to advance individual rights. In
many contexts, international law has been invoked to expand governmental power
at the expense of basic liberties. The cases also do not directly confront more
fundamental questions regarding the legitimate use of international law or attempt
to reconcile the use of international law with the nature of democratic governance.
In short, although the cases demonstrate the relevance of international law to
constitutional analysis, they leave unanswered the question of when resort to
international law is appropriate and how relevant international law principles
should be properly reconciled with the nature, structure, and terms of our
domestic Constitution. This neglect is also visible in the scholarly literature. In the
furor over whether international authority should be used at all, little scholarly
attention has been devoted to the question of how international authority may be
used well.
39
The latter part of the Article seeks to answer these difficult normative
questions. Part IV examines and rebuts objections to the use of international law
on the grounds that it is anti-democratic. The section argues that the democracy
deficit critique is based on a misunderstanding of both the nature of constitutional
analysis and the historical role of international law in our constitutional traditions.
In particular, the historical cases demonstrate the fallacy of a fundamental
legitimacy objection: that international law is foreign and thus not part of the
American constitutional tradition. Instead, international law traditionally has been
an accepted instrument for constitutional construction-it is not a foreign "other,"
but is part of our law, and part of our canon of constitutional authorities.
In light of the problems highlighted in Parts II through IV, Part V offers four
tentative principles for determining the appropriate relationship between
international law and constitutional analysis. The section asserts that international
law is neither presumptively relevant nor irrelevant to constitutional
construction,40 and that the propriety of applying international rules must be
resolved on a case-by-case basis, with due consideration of both the constitutional
provision at issue and the relevant international rule. Accordingly, the section
proposes that in addressing the role of international law in any particular
constitutional context, a Court first should consider the Constitution's
receptiveness to the international rule, using traditional approaches to
constitutional analysis. This requires examination of whether the particular
constitutional provision at issue poses some textual or interpretive barrier to
39. Frank I. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 241, 269 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (underscoring that political legitimacy in the use of
foreign authority will turn on "people's confidence in the objectivity of the processes of official decision
making").
40. On this point, I am in accord with Vicki Jackson. See Jackson, supra note 25 (advocating
a neutral, "engagement" approach to consideration of foreign sources).
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internalization of the international rule, and whether some other aspect of the
constitutional design-including structure, purpose, and operative individual
rights protections-partially limits or bars the rule's operation. A court then
should consider three questions relating to the nature of the international rule
itself: (1) how uniformly accepted and well defined the international norm is and
whether states have complied with it in practice; (2) the extent to which the norm
has been accepted or rejected by the United States; and (3) any limitations
imposed by international law itself on the operation of the international rule and
changes in the applicable norm as international law evolves. I argue that a focus
on these preconditions will encourage courts to apply international authorities in
an objective and normatively legitimate manner.
The scope of this Article is limited to contexts in which the Court has
invoked international law to provide substantive meaning to constitutional
provisions. The argument does not consider, or turn upon, the separate question of
whether international law is directly enforceable through the federal common
law,4 1 since international law is considered here only as an interpretive tool. The
Article does, however, recognize that international law has entered constitutional
analysis as a fellow traveler with the common law,42 as well as through its own
independent force.
The focus here is on resort to international law, in the form of either
treaties, customary international law,43 or general international or public law, 4
rather than on the comparative practices of individual foreign states. 45 To a
limited extent, the Article also includes consideration of cases invoking the
uniform practices of "civilized" states. This approach is due to both definitional
and methodological difficulties involved in isolating the Court's use of
international law. As Jeremy Waldron has eloquently observed, the law of
nations, which played a prominent role in many nineteenth-century cases and
from which modem customary international law derives, originally approximated
a "common law of mankind," combining principles now understood separately as
international law, common law, and natural law into "a body of law purporting to
represent what various domestic legal systems share in the way of common
41. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997) (arguing that
customary international law is not enforceable as federal common law).
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) ("[Tlorts in violation of the law of
nations were understood to be within the common law").
43. Customary international law is evidenced by widespread and consistent state practice,
taken under a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). See Bruno Simma, International Human Rights
and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in 4 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY
OF EUROPEAN LAW, bk. 2, at 153, 216-21 (1995) (discussing the nature of customary international law).
44. International law can be derived from the "general principles common to the major legal
systems of the world." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1987); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (recognizing as a source of international law "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations"); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 167-72 (1958) (discussing application of general international law by the
International Court of Justice); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 107 (1992) (arguing that
"general principles" of international law may be generated through acceptance by states at the
international level).
45. It also does not include cases invoking only British common law traditions, which have a
distinct authoritative pedigree in American constitutional analysis.
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answers to common problems. ' 46 The comprehensive law of nations (or jus
gentium, as Waldron portrays it) addressed not merely "issues between sovereigns
but... legal issues generally-[including] contract, property, crime, and tort.
'A7
This fact, combined with the recognition that evidence of state practice was, and
remains, a primary indicator of the rules of international law, that "general
principles" accepted by nations are an aspect of international law, and that the
Court itself frequently is unclear about whether it is invoking international or
comparative law, makes it extremely difficult to draw bright line rules between
invocations of international law and widespread comparative state practice. The
characteristic historically unifying these sources of norms, however, was the
consensus that they reflected as "law common to all nations.' a Today, where a
foreign or international law norm is not itself legally binding on the United States,
it is the consensus of states regarding shared common values that gives the norm
its persuasive force. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court is ambiguous about
whether it is relying on widespread state practice or a form of international law, I
identify the cases as relying on international "practice."
Resort to international law in constitutional analysis raises some of the
same questions implicated by use of individual comparative examples, 49 and to
that extent, the arguments herein can be analogized to the comparative context.
But use of the comparative practices of individual states for constitutional
analysis also raises additional difficulties, such as the potential for
misinterpretation of a culturally contingent foreign practice and legitimacy
concerns arising from selective and anecdotal use.50 These concerns are less
implicated by the use of widely accepted foreign practices and international
rules, such as customary and general international law and widely accepted
multilateral treaties.51
46. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Jus Gentiun, 119 HARv. L. REv. 129,
132-33 (2005); see also EMER DE VATITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at lvi (Joseph Chitty
ed., Lawbook Exchange 2005) (1854) (describing the law of nations as "the law of Nature applied to
Nations").
47. Waldron, supra note 46, at 132.
48. Id. at 133.
49. The role of comparativism in constitutional analysis has been well canvassed in recent
years. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L.
REv. 639 (2005); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era
and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative
Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 91 (2004); Vicki
C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REv. 15 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities
and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 271 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson,
Narratives]; Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the US Court:
Gender Equality, 51 DUKE L.J. 223 (2001); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499 (2000);
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
50. Rex Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 358 (2005) (setting forth a framework for identifying
appropriate comparative sources in constitutional analyis); see also Waldron, supra note 46, at 144-45
(distinguishing between consideration of the jus gentium "as a dense and mutually reinforced
consensus" and citation to the practice of an individual foreign state).
51. Consideration of regional international legal regimes and regional foreign consensus, as
the Court did in Lawrence, does raise selectivity concerns regarding which region's rules are relevant.
See discussion infra note 615 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, the focus is on situations where international law helps provide
the rule of decision in constitutional analysis. The analysis thus does not address
situations in which the Court looks to foreign usage to distinguish a domestic
rule52 or to test a likely policy outcome.53 The Article instead squarely confronts
the heart of the current controversy by examining contexts in which international
law is affirmatively invoked to inform the rule of decision in constitutional
construction. The thesis of the Article is that international law is an integral part of
our constitutional tradition, and when applied in a principled manner, it can
inform and enrich our constitutional analysis.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
This section examines the justifications that the Supreme Court has offered
for employing international law to inform constitutional analysis. I argue that the
Supreme Court has understood our constitutional design and traditions as inviting
consideration of international authorities in three contexts: (A) cases where the
Constitution expressly refers to international law or a concept of international law;
(B) cases where international law is used as a background principle to identify the
territorial scope of the Constitution, the sovereign powers of the national
government, or to delineate structural relationships within the federal system; and
(C) individual rights cases. The purpose of this section is primarily descriptive: It
explores the various contexts in which the Court has employed international law
in constitutional analysis, the methodological justifications offered for the
practice, and the practice's implications, to set up the examination of legitimacy in
the second half of the piece.
A. Express Reference to International Law or a Concept of International Law
In its strongest form, the Constitution textually commands consideration of
international law through Article I, § 8's grant to Congress of the power to define
and punish "Offenses against the Law of Nations,, 5 4 and through its mechanisms
for making and enforcing treaties.5 5 Both explicitly reference international law:
the law of nations references what is now loosely translated as customary
international law,56 while treaties are themselves positive repositories and
52. See Larsen, supra note 12, at 1288-89.
53. See Koh, supra note 25, at 45-46 (discussing resort to foreign rules to shed "empirical
light" on constitutional questions) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)); Larsen, supra note 12, at 1289-91.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
55. The Constitution gives the President power to make treaties with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 [hereinafter Treaty Clause]; prohibits states
from entering into treaties, id art. I, § 10, cl. 1; establishes federal judicial power over treaties, id. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1; and makes treaties supreme over state law, id art. VI, cl. 2.
56. Waldron, supra note 46, at 135 (discussing the relationship between the law of nations and
international law). As Louis Henkin has observed: "The Law of Nations ... included more than is now
subsumed in 'international law.' At that time, the term covered principles of maritime and international
commercial law and perhaps some rules applicable to international conflict of laws. In the intervening years,
these subjects have largely become domestic matters governed by domestic law, except to the extent that they
are the subject of international agreements.'). Louis"Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 853, 853 n.2 (1987); see also MARK WESTON JANis, THE AMEiCAN TRADmON OF INTERNATONAL
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instruments of international law. The Constitution also addresses concepts of
international law through terms that, while they do not themselves constitute
international law, are substantially defined by international rules. These include
references to "war," "admiralty," "citizenship," and in early cases, "commerce"
and "contract." The Supreme Court has construed each of these constitutional
concepts in light of international rules.
1. Direct References to International Law
a. Offenses Against the Law of Nations
The question whether Congress has properly exercised its authority to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations under the Offenses Clause
necessarily requires consideration of what constitutes an offense against the law of
nations. The Court has construed congressional power under the Clause in light of
international law to uphold military tribunals5 7 and laws regarding piracy,
58
counterfeiting, 59 and protecting embassies,6° among others.6 1 International law
plays a robust role in this context, supplying the substantive rule against which
Congress's constitutional authority is measured. International law, in other words,
is not merely persuasive in this context; it is controlling. From a legitimacy
perspective, however, this practice seems unproblematic, given the Constitution's
explicit textual invitation.
LAW: GREAT EXPECrATIONS 1789-1914, at 1-24 (2004) (discussing conceptual evolution from law of nations
to international law); Edwin Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26,26-33 (1952) (comparing the scope of the law of nations to modem public international
law).
57. Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) ("Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, of which the law of war is a part, has
recognized the 'military commission' appointed by military command... as an appropriate tribunal for
the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war."); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942);
see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 n.22 (1952); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199-
215 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
58. In United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of an 1819 federal statute authorizing the death penalty for any person who "shall, upon the high
seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations." Id. at 157. The statute was
challenged for failing to provide a more precise definition of piracy. Based on the writings of public law
scholars, the Court concluded that "the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable
certainty" to be enforced, without more, through the 1819 act. Id. at 160.
59. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
statute criminalizing the counterfeiting of foreign securities). The Court found that customary
international law protected foreign currency and securities from counterfeiting, and that "[a] right
secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people, is one the United States . . . are bound to
protect." Id. at 487.
60. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 323 (1988) (identifying the Offenses Clause as a basis
for congressional legislation regarding crimes against diplomats).
61. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (upholding Congress's power to criminalize
conduct of citizens on U.S. vessels in foreign waters). For further discussion, see Beth Stephens,
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define and Punish ... Offenses Against the
Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000).
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b. The Treaty Power
The Constitution's references to treaty making and enforcement necessarily
brought with them international rules governing treaties and treaty making,62 and
resort to international law in construing the treaty power has a lengthy history.
The Supreme Court has looked to international law to determine the appropriate
subjects for treaty making, at times with implications for individual rights
impacted by exercise of the treaty power. It also has looked to international law to
delineate the powers of the several states and the executive to enter international
instruments that are not treaties, such as compacts and sole executive agreements.
The Court has further recognized that international powers and obligations
relating to treaty making are structurally divided within the U.S. constitutional
system, and that the Constitution both incorporates international rules governing
treaties and imposes domestic limits on them. The Court occasionally has offered
comity63 as a justification for applying international rules in this context, in order
to avoid conflicts with other nations. But, as with the Offenses Clause,
international laws are not viewed as purely advisory or persuasive. The Court
instead has read the Treaty Clause as affirmatively incorporating international
rules to the extent allowed by the Constitution.
In addition to the implications of these decisions for individual rights, the
Court's approach of tying the treaty power to what the international community
considers an appropriate subject for treaty making grants significant influence to
international law, since the national government's constitutional authority under
the treaty power substantively expands (within the bounds allowable by the
Constitution) as the international community recognizes new areas as appropriate
for treaty making.64
i. Substantive Scope of the Treaty Power
In determining the scope of the treaty power, the Court has viewed the
Treaty Clause as a distinct grant of substantive power to the national government
to enter treaties on any subject generally recognized as appropriate by the
international community. In Ware v. Hylton, Justice Iredell recognized that "the
subject of treaties ... is to be determined by the law of nations" and construed a
treaty as terminating any pre-existing sovereign power of the states to confiscate
62. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840) (Taney, C.J.) (Constitution's
reference to a "treaty ... mean[s] an instrument written and executed with the formalities customary
among nations."); see also David Golove, Treaty Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 1075, 1133 (2000) (tracing the
origins of the Treaty Clause and observing that "its scope... was to be determined in accordance with
international practice and the law of nations").
63. "Comity" refers to "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
[legal] acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of... persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895). While not a legal obligation, principles of comity urge that U.S. laws be construed to avoid
conflicts with the laws of another state. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. g. (1987).
64. Cf. Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390,
454 (1998) ("What is considered 'international' will undoubtedly vary over time, as world conditions
and relationships between nations change."). David Golove has demonstrated that the Court in Missouri
v. Holland was fully aware of this implication. Golove, supra note 62, at 1076-79.
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the property of British nationals. 65 In the 1828 case of American Insurance
Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, Chief Justice Marshall applied "[tihe usage of
the world" to conclude that the treaty power included the power to acquire new
66 6territory. The 1840 case of Holmes v. Jennison 7 recognized that the federal
treaty power included power over international extradition. The case involved
Vermont's surrender of an individual for trial in Canada. Chief Justice Taney
asserted in a plurality opinion that:
The power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in general terms... and consequently,
it was designed to include all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of nations had
usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty; and which are consistent with the nature
of our institutions, and the distribution of powers between the general and state govermments.
6
Taney thus importantly acknowledged both that the treaty power was informed by
international rules and that the Constitution limited the operation of those rules in
a manner consistent with other domestic constitutional institutions. Taney
concluded that because "the rights and duties of nations [regarding extradition] are
a part of the law of nations, and have always been treated as such by the writers
upon public law," the power was necessarily included in the treaty power.
69
De Geofroy v. Riggs held that the protection of alien property was a "fitting
subject for" treaty making.7° Expanding upon Chief Justice Taney's observation
about the relationship between the treaty power and the Constitution, Justice Field
offered a sweeping role for international practice to inform the scope of the treaty
power, within constitutional constraints:
It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the
constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government, or in that of one of the
states, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent ... [But] with
these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be
adjudged touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country.
7 1
Finally, Missouri v. Holland suggested that the treaty power expanded the
substantive lawmaking powers otherwise available to the national government.
The Court declined to assume that "'a power which must belong to and
65. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.).
66. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) ("The Constitution confers absolutely on the government
of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that government
possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty."). The proposition was not as
obvious as it may seem, since Jefferson, at least, had disputed the government's constitutional authority
to acquire new territory at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. See Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1, 168-171 (2002). Jefferson's Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, on the
other hand, had argued that the treaty power incorporated "the power enjoyed by every nation of extending
their territory by treaties." Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1803), in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 211, 213-14 (E. James Ferguson ed., 1967).
67. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). Although there was no majority opinion for the Court,
Justices Story, McLean, and Wayne concurred in Chief Justice Taney's opinion.
68. Id. at 569.
69. Id.
70. 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890).
71. Id. at 267.
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somewhere reside in every civilized government' could not be found under the
Treaty Clause.72
The Court has not assumed that the U.S. treaty power doggedly follows
international practice, however, and has recognized that the constitutional
structure modified traditional international treaty practices to some extent. Thus,
in Foster v. Nielson, Chief Justice Marshall read the Supremacy Clause as
establishing a presumption that treaties were domestically self-executing.
International practice in the founding era generally did not recognize treaties as
establishing privately enforceable rights. But Marshall noted that the Supremacy
Clause established "a different _principle" that rendered treaties self-executing
under appropriate circumstances.
Haver v. Yaker similarly held that the U.S. constitutional system established
a different presumption about the domestic date of effectiveness of a treaty than
the prevailing international rule. "[A]s a principle of international law," the Court
observed, "a treaty is considered as concluded and binding from the date of its
signature . . . [and] the exchange of ratifications has a retroactive effect,
confirming the treaty from its date. 74 Under the Constitution, however, because
individual citizens had no means of knowing the content of a treaty while it was
pending before the Senate, "it would be wrong in principle to hold [the individual]
bound by it, as the law of the land, until it was ratified and proclaimed. 75
International law also has influenced the interpretation of individual rights
implicated by exercise of the treaty power. The 1891 case of In re Ross76 upheld
the establishment by treaty of U.S. consular courts overseas, based on the fact that
establishment of such tribunals historically had been an important function of the
treaty power internationally.77 In addition to considering international practice in
determining the scope of the treaty power, however, Justice Field also invoked
international norms to hold that Fifth and Sixth Amendment jury protections did
not apply in consular proceedings. Field's analysis relied in part on a principle of
strict territoriality-that the constitutional amendments did not apply abroad 7 8-
which itself derived from international law. But Field also directly invoked
international practice in construing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Citing "the
uniform practice of civilized governments for centuries to provide consular
tribunals in... [non-] Christian countries," 79 Field reasoned that the drafters of
72. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004)
(Treaties "authorize Congress to deal with 'matters' with which otherwise 'Congress could not deal.'")
(quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), and citing Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTrrTUION 72 (2d ed. 1996)).
73. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 259 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.); cf Taylor v. Morton,
23 F. Cas. 787 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) ("Ordinarily, treaties are not rules prescribed by
sovereigns for the conduct of their subjects, but contracts, by which they agree to regulate their own
conduct. [But] [t]his provision of our constitution [the Supremacy Clause] has made treaties part of our
municipal law.").
74. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 34 (1869).
75. Id. at 35.
76. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
77. Id. at 462-63.
78. Id. at 464. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing territoriality). The Ross holding was
abandoned in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1953), which held that Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
applied to the peacetime capital trial of a U.S. civilian abroad.
79. Id at 464. Field noted that the European practice of establishing consular tribunals for
seamen abroad predated the Middle Ages. Id. at 462-63.
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the Constitution must have intended to incorporate existing international practices
regarding consular tribunals, and that Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
accordingly must not have been intended to apply.80 Field viewed his approach as
protecting rights, because consular courts shielded Americans from barbaric
foreign legal proceedings.81 The net effect of his approach, however, was to
employ international practice to deny constitutional protections.
Downes v. Bidwell likewise looked to international rules of conquest to hold
that the acquisition of territory by treaty necessarily brought with it the power to
"prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what
their status shall be."82 The Court thus held that the United States's acquisition of
territory by treaty brought powers to govern colonies recognized under
international law that were only minimally constrained by other aspects of the
Constitution.
ii. Power To Enter Other International Agreements
The Court also has looked to international law to define constitutional
authority to enter into other forms of international agreements, such as agreements
by states under the Compact Clause and sole executive agreements.
The primary textual basis under the Constitution for allowing international
agreements that do not receive Senate advice and consent is the Compact Clause.
That provision, which was designed to deny the states certain rights enjoyed by
international sovereigns, flatly forbids states from entering any "Treaty, Alliance
or Confederation," but permits states, with congressional approval, to enter into
"agreements" or "compacts."8 3 The Clause thus appears to recognize the
possibility of international agreements under the Constitution other than Article II
"treaties." It raises the question of what types of international agreements are
absolutely denied to the states and what types are allowable with congressional
consent, as well as the question whether the national government can enter
international agreements that do not receive Senate advice and consent.
The Court has looked to international law to determine the scope of state
power under the Compact Clause. In Holmes v. Jennison, Chief Justice Taney
construed the Clause's language in light of Emmerich de Vattel's Law of
Nations,84 which had differentiated between "treaties" (which involved ongoing
relationships such as military alliances), and "agreements, conventions, and
pactions" (which involved individual discrete acts). 5 Taney used this analysis to
establish that extradition was an exclusively federal power. In Poole v. Fleeger's
Lessee, Justice Story looked to international law to hold that the Compact Clause
80. Id. at 464-65.
81. Id. at 465.
82. 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901); see infra notes 294-304 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
84. See VATTEL, supra note 46. Vattel was an eighteenth-century writer whose views were
influential on the Framers. David Armitage, The Declaration oflndependence and International Law, 59 WM.
& MARY Q. 1, 15 (2002). For a discussion of Vattel's influence on nineteenth-century Supreme Court
jurisprudence, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 9 & n.20 (1996).
85. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573 (1840); see also New Hampshire v.
Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); Wharton v. Wise, 153
U.S. 155 (1894).
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had preserved for the several states (with the consent of Congress) the
international law authority of sovereigns to resolve boundary disputes.' The
modem Supreme Court also has suggested that Vattel's "distinction[s] ... may
have informed the drafting of Art. I, § io." 87
Whatever refined international law distinctions may have been originally
invoked by the language of the Compact Clause, however, were lost during the
nineteenth century. In the 1893 case of Virginia v. Tennessee,89 Justice Field
crafted the Court's modem Compact Clause analysis, which relies on domestic
concerns to provide that an agreement by a state requires consent only if it
enhances the political power of the states vis-t-vis the federal government. The
Compact Clause is thus a constitutional provision that may well have incorporated
international law concepts at the time of the fiaming, but in which international
law has been supplanted by domestic concerns as both international and
constitutional law have evolved.
The Court also has looked to international law and constitutional text to
conclude that the Constitution contemplated sole executive agreements in some
circumstances. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., Justice Sutherland
proclaimed that while the Constitution did not recognize a power to enter
international agreements other than treaties, the power nevertheless existed as a
consequence of nationhood.90 In Weinberger v. Rossi, the Supreme Court
differentiated between the definition of a treaty under international law and under
the U.S. constitutional system.91 "Under principles of international law," Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "the word ordinarily refers to an international agreement
concluded between sovereigns, regardless of the manner in which the agreement
is brought into force." 92 By contrast, the Constitution only recognized as "treaties"
instruments that had been consented to by two-thirds of the Senate.93 Rehnquist
nevertheless assumed, in apparent reliance on the broader international practice,
that the President may enter into certain agreements without complying with the
formalities of the Treaty Clause." Finally, Dames & Moore v. Regan applied the
Court's test developed for identifying the scope of the treaty power to uphold a
86. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) ("It cannot be doubted, that it is a part of the general
right of sovereignty, belonging to independent nations, to establish and fix the disputed boundaries
between their respective territories; and the boundaries so established and fixed by compact between
nations, become conclusive upon all the subjects and citizens thereof.... This is a doctrine universally
recognized in the law and practice of nations. It is a right equally belonging to the states of this Union,
unless it has been surrendered under the constitution of the United States.").
87. In United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm 'n, 434 U.S. 452, 461-62 & n.12
(1978), the Court quoted Vattel at length and reasoned that "[t]he Framers clearly perceived compacts
and agreements as differing from treaties," and apparently viewed them as terms of art, which may have
reflected precisely defined categories under the contemporary literature of international law. The Court
noted that Blackstone's Commentaries relied on Vattel for a similar distinction. Id.at n. 13.
88. United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 464. Justice Story crafted his own theory about the
meaning of the Compact Clause in his Commentaries in 1833.
89. 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
90. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
91. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
92. Id at 29 & n.5 (citing article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and a
1980 draft of the RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, which stated
that "international law does not distinguish between agreements designated as 'treaties' and other
agreements").
93. Id. at 29-30.
94. Id. at 30 n.6.
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sole executive agreement. The Court reasoned that because agreements to settle
claims between citizens of one nation and a foreign government were an
"'established international practice reflecting traditional international theory,"' 95
the President should have power to enter such agreements without Senate advice
and consent.
In sum, the Court has read the Offenses, Treaty, and Compact Clauses as
incorporating international rules. The cases have recognized a fairly powerful role
for international law and practice in this context to grant or modify substantive
legislative powers of the national government. But they also have recognized that
constitutional structure limits the domestication of international rules.
2. Reference to Concepts ofInternational Law
A number of constitutional provisions reference concepts defined by
international law and have been understood as inviting consideration of
international rules. The most obvious and frequent candidates for this ayproach
are cases addressing such terms as "war," "admiralty," or "ambassador," 6 which
facially address concepts defined by international law and directly implicate
relations with foreign nations. The Court has read these provisions as broadly
invoking international rules and has justified its approach, in part, by the need to
promote harmony in the international system. The Court also, however, to some
extent has understood concepts such as "citizen," "commerce," and "contract" as
informed by international norms, based not on their implications for foreign
relations, but on their embodiment of universal concepts.
a. War Powers
The rules of warfare are among the oldest rules of international law, and
resort to international law to provide meaning to constitutional war powers97 has a
long historic pedigree. This section examines the practice in cases involving
wartime confiscations of enemy property, the establishment of military
commissions, and individual rights. But international law also has been used to
uphold the drat 98 and the suspension of statutes of limitations in wartime.99
95. 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981).
96. In re Bai, 135 U.S. 403, 419 (1890) ("Under section 2, art. II, of the Constitution, the
President is vested with the power to 'appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,' and by
section 3 it is provided that 'he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers.' These words are
descriptive of a class existing by the law of nations."); cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431
(1793) (Supreme Court enjoys all jurisdiction of suits against Ambassadors "as a court of law can have
or exercise consistently with the law of nations."); id. at 475 (noting that "Ambassadors, or other public
Ministers and Consuls ... are officers of foreign nations, whom this nation are bound to protect and
treat according to laws of nations").
97. A number of enumerated provisions in Articles I and II of the Constitution address the
authority to commence, regulate, and pursue military action. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (powers
to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and
water); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (raise and support armies); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (provide and maintain a
navy); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces); id
art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (call forth the militia); id art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (govern the militia when in service of the
United States); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (President's commander in chief power).
98. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 378 & n.1 (1918) (upholding the right to compel
military service under the powers to declare war and raise armies and citing Vattel and the practices of
thirty-six countries).
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i. Wartime Confiscations
In Brown v. United States, 100 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the executive's
power to seize enemy property during the War of 1812 on the grounds that the
"modem law of nations"'1 did not automatically confiscate enemy property in
wartime. Marshall urged that the War Declaration Clause should be construed to
comport with this international rule:
In expounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted which would
give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not possess elsewhere, and which
would fetter that exercise of entire discretion respecting enemyroperty, which may enable the
government to apply to the enemy the rule that he applies to us.
Marshall thus argued that concerns of international comity justified the resort to
international law: a declaration of war should not be read to automatically
authorize the confiscation of alien property where, under modem usage, other
states did not automatically do so. Marshall also suggested an originalist
explanation for the resort to international law-that the international rule being
applied had been "received throughout the civilized world" at the time of the
framing.
1°3
In dissent, Justice Story agreed that the Constitution gave the United States
all war powers "which, by the modem law of nations, are permitted and
approved."' 10 4 Story simply disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
international law, which he believed unqualifiedly recognized the right to seize
enemy property. 10 5 He also believed that Congress, by declaring war, had already
authorized the President to exercise those international powers.
The Court again looked to international law in upholding President
Lincoln's Civil War blockade in the Prize Cases.'0 7 All members of the Court
agreed that, once a legal state of war was established, the scope of presidential
power to wage war was governed by the international laws of war.108 The Justices
99. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1870) (holding that statute tolling the
statute of limitations in federal cases due to the Civil War was a constitutional exercise of the
international law principle that claims are suspended in wartime); cf Hanger v. Abbott 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 532 (1867) (relying on international law to hold that wartime suspends operation of statutes of
limitations).
100. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
101. Id at 128. Marshall's construction to some extent merged principles of international law (that
states may confiscate enemy property) with principles of modem practice. He contended that the modem usage
of states was not to confiscate such property immediately at the outbreak of the war, and that this usage had
mitigated the harshest operation of the international rule. Id at 122-25.
102. Id. at 125.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 133-34 (Story, J., dissenting) (citing Vattel); id at 140-44 (Story, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 147 (Story, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe war may be carried on according to the principles
of the modem law of nations .... "). Once Congress declared war, the President would "have a right to
employ all the usual and customary means acknowledged in war, to carry it into effect," including the
right to "authorize the capture of all enemies' property, wherever, by the law of nations, it may be
lawfully seized." Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting).
107. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
108. Id at 666 ("The right of prize and capture has its origin in the 'jus belli, 'and is governed
and adjudged under the law of nations.").
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looked to writings of Vattel and later publicists'0 9 for the substance of the laws of
war and to establish that inhabitants of rebellious states could be considered
",enemies."110 The four dissenting justices agreed that the national government's
war powers included those recognized by the law of nations, that these powers
applied to civil wars,' 11 and that a de facto war existed. 12 The dissenters simply
would have held that the international law powers of belligerency could only be
activated by Congress.
In short, all Justices on the Court in both Brown and the Prize Cases agreed
that the scope of the President's constitutional warmaking authority was defined
by the law of nations. The primary disagreement in both cases turned on whether
or not Congress had properly triggered that authority through a declaration of war
or other legislation.
Miller v. United States' relied on the international laws of war to uphold,
against a Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge, a Civil War statute authorizing
confiscation of rebel property. The parties conceded that if the statute were an
exercise of the war powers, Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal protections
would not apply. In concluding that most of the statute was a proper exercise of
Congress's war powers, Justice Strong observed that under international law "any
property which the enemy can use.., is a proper subject of confiscation." 114 This
"undoubted belligerent right" was confirmed by Congress's constitutional power
to make rules respecting captures on land and water.1 15 The Court cited
Wheaton's international law treatise and the Prize Cases to conclude that this
right of belligerency applied equally in a civil war, 1 6 and analogized from the law
of nations to hold that individuals who aided the enemy in a civil war "were
enemies within the laws and usages of war" whose propeity was subject to
confiscation. 1 7 The Court accordingly concluded that the legislation was a
constitutional exercise of the war powers and was not limited by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.
Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford in dissent, agreed that Congress's
war powers allowed it to confiscate rebel property pursuant to the international
laws of war," 8 but disagreed that the statutes were a legitimate exercise of that
109. Id at 668 (citing Lord Stavell's invocation of "the best writers on the law of nations");
see also id at 687 (Nelson, J., dissenting) ("The legal consequences resulting from a state of war
between two countries at this day are well understood, and will be found described in every approved
work on the subject of international law."); id. at 688 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Wheaton). The
litigants had cited historical and contemporary international law authorities. See id. at 650 (discussing
Wheaton, Phillimore, and Halleck); id. at 654 (discussing Wheaton and Grotius).
110. Id. at 670-74.
111. Id. at 688 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 689-90 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
113. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
114. Id. at 306.
115. Id. at 305.
116. Id. at307&n.49.
117. Id. at 313; see also id. at 312 ("[N]o recognized usage of nations excludes from the
category of enemies those who act with, or aid or abet and give comfort to enemies, whether foreign or
domestic, though they may not be residents of enemy's territory."). The Court bolstered this conclusion
with an originalist argument, observing that the states had adopted a similar practice during the
revolutionary war and that the practice had not been prohibited by the Framers. Id. at 313.
118. Id. at 315-16 (Field, J., dissenting) ("Whatever any independent civilized nation may do
in the prosecution of war, according to the law of nations, Congress, under the Constitution, may
authorize to be done, and nothing more.").
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authority. Field argued at length (and in disagreement with Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Brown v. United States) that the modem law of nations only
authorized the seizure of private property of permanent inhabitants of the enemy's
country." 9 Field concluded that the statutes at issue exceeded Congress's powers
under the international law of war and thus were criminal statutes triggering Fifth
and Sixth Amendment protections.
120
ii. Military Commissions
Like Miller, Supreme Court decisions examining the power to establish
military commissions indicate a Court struggling to reconcile the relationship
between international norms informing the constitutional war powers and the
competing protections of the Bill of Rights.
Ex parte Milligan12 1 famously rejected the government's efforts to rely on
the "laws and usages of war" to justify the trial of a U.S. citizen by military
commission during the Civil War. The Court found that the laws of war were
irrelevant to the question before it:
It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and usages are, whence they
originated, where found, and on whom they operate; they can never be applied to citizens in
states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and
their process unobstructed.
122
The Court concluded that the Constitution precluded resort to powers deduced
from international law to prosecute a citizen by military tribunal when the regular
courts were open.23
The World War II case of Ex parte Quinin,12 4 however, looked to
international law to uphold trials by military commission for persons charged with
violations of the laws of war, including U.S. citizens. The Quirin Court held that
"[f]rom the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the
law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals."' 25 Despite Milligan's conclusion that a civilian could not be tried by
military process when the ordinary courts were open, Quirin held that "the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the
119. Id. at 317-18.
120. ld at323.
121. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
122. Id.
123. A decade later in a statutory construction case, Justice Field relied on international rights of
belligerence and occupation to hold that U.S. military tribunals had exclusive jurisdiction to try military
personnel for violations of the laws of war when armies were in enemy territory. Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1878). Justice Clifford argued in dissent that state court jurisdiction should be
upheld under the international rule that soldiers were bound by the laws of the country where they are
found. Id. at 540 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
124. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The case arose under Congress's powers to make rules for the armed
forces, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, id art.
I, § 8, cl. 10; and the Commander in Chief power, id art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See 317 U.S. at 26.
125. 317 U.S. at 27-28. The Court also looked to treaties and customary international law rules
to define the substantive charges triable by military tribunal. Id at 31 n.8, 35 n.12 (citing laws of Great
Britain and treatises on international law and the laws of war).
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Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commission."
126
The Court awkwardly sidestepped Milligan on the grounds that the prior case had
not involved a prosecution for violations of the laws of war.127 Thus, Quirin and
its progeny 12 upheld the constitutionality of military trials pursuant to the laws of
war (at least where authorized by Congress) and found that constitutional
individual rights protections did not limit the operation of those international
norms.
iii. War Powers and Constitutional Limitations
International rules of warmaking have influenced the Court's interpretation,
not only of the scope of the enumerated war powers, but of constitutional
limitations that implicate exercise of the war powers. The result frequently,
though not invariably, has been to deny the protection of individual rights. As
discussed below, just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
has been construed in light of the laws of war, and just compensation has been
denied in some wartime contexts. 129 And in the territory cases, international rules
of war and conquest have been applied to limit the constitutional protections
afforded to newly-acquired territories.
130
To some extent, the Court's jurisprudence has attempted to avoid conflict
between constitutional rights and powers recognized under the international laws
of war by policing the boundaries of proper exercises of the war powers. As
indicated above, in Miller and Quirin, Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal
protections were found inapplicable to proper exercises of the war powers.' 3 1 In
Johnson v. Eisentrager,132 the Court relied in part on international law to conclude
that constitutional habeas corpus'33 did not extend to enemy aliens held overseas
pursuant to the judgment of a military tribunal and who had no territorial
connection to the United States. Justice Jackson contended that the practice
derived from "the common law and the law of nations"1 3 4 and that his ruling
126. Id at 45. The Court based this decision on the facts that the tribunals were not Article III
courts, the existence in the Fifth Amendment of a textual exception for "cases arising in the land and
naval forces" and prudential arguments.
127. Id at 45. The distinction was somewhat disingenuous, since Milligan had been
prosecuted for, inter alia, "conspiracy against the Government of the United States," "[i]nciting
insurrection," and "[v]iolation of the laws of war." Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 4.
128. See, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (looking to international law in part
to conclude that the government could conduct military trials after the cessation of hostilities); accord
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786, 787 & n.13 (1950) (citing the Treaty of Versailles for the
proposition that military officials have jurisdiction to punish offenses against the laws of war, as well as
international publicists regarding what constitutes a violation of the laws of war).
129. See, e.g., Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909) (invoking laws of war to
establish that presence of plaintiffs' property in Cuba made plaintiff an enemy whose property could be
destroyed without just compensation); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1877) (The United States,
"in passing the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, availed itself of its just rights as a belligerent, and at the
same time recognized to the fullest extent its duties under the enlightened principles of modem warfare."). See
infra Part ll.C.1 .b.
130. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing territories and individual rights).
131. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782-83 (1950) (Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections did not apply to trial by military commission).
132. Id.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
134. 339 U.S. at 776.
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preserved "inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world."' 3 5 He
invoked principles of comity in support of his interpretation, reasoning that enemy
foreign states were unlikely to grant habeas review to U.S. soldiers in equivalent
circumstances.1 36 He also argued from both originalism and contemporary
practice that extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution to active,
convicted enemy aliens was unsupported. It could not have been contemplated by
the Framers, and "[t]he practice of every modem government [was] opposed to
it."'
3 7
On the other hand, where belligerent rights have not been properly
exercised, the Court has found violations of constitutional rights. Thus, the Court
in Exparte Milligan 13 held that the military trial of a civilian on U.S. soil was not
a proper exercise of the war powers where the regular courts were open and that
Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal protections were therefore applicable. In
other cases, the Court found that improper exercise of belligerent rights during the
Civil War violated the Contract and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. 139 And
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez found that denationalization for evasion of military
service was a punishment covered by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
40
Resort to the international laws of war to construe both the scope of the
national government's warmaking authority and the constitutional limitations on
that authority has continued to this day. The current administration has looked to
the international laws of war to claim that the President has constitutional
authority to establish military tribunals and to detain enemy combatants, including
U.S. civilians, 141 while detainees in the United States and elsewhere have argued
that their rights under Fifth Amendment due process should include, at a
minimum, protections recognized under the Geneva Conventions. 
42
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,143 the Supreme Court plurality credited both
positions to some degree. The case presented the threshold statutory question of
whether Congress had authorized the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants in a manner that would overcome the prohibition against detaining
citizens set forth in the Non-Detention Act.144 Hamdi, however, also posed a
135. Id. at 769.
136. Id. at 779 (noting that granting habeas to enemy aliens overseas would produce no
corresponding benefit to U.S. soldiers, since outside the "English speaking peoples in whose practice
nothing has been cited to the contrary, the writ of habeas corpus is generally unknown"); id at 783 n.11
(citing Magna Carta for principle of comity in treatment of enemy aliens in wartime).
137. Id. at 785.
138. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
139. See, e.g., Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1878) (Miller, J.) (citing Wheaton, who in
turn cites Grotius and Puffendort) (confederate state law violated Contract Clause under international
rule that "[a]s to public debts.., a mere change in the form of the government ... does not affect their
obligation."); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877) (Field, J.) (invalidating confederate law under the
Privileges and Immunities and Contract Clauses because confederacy was not an independent sovereign
under international rules regarding sovereignty and belligerent rights).
140. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See also infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
141. Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting "the
weakness of the Government's mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory authority under a combination of
Article II of the Constitution and the usages of war").
142. See e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
143. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). The government contended that Congress had authorized the
detention of U.S. citizens through its September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
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latent constitutional question. The President claimed that even if Congress had not
authorized the detention, he had independent constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief to order Hamdi's detention. In rejecting this claim and
holding that Hamdi's detention was subject to constitutional due process, the
majority of the Court necessarily held both that the President lacked independent
constitutional power to detain Hamdi in the manner asserted, and that Congress
and the President, at least when acting in concert, had constitutional authority to
order the detention of enemy combatants.
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Stevens all found that Congress's
2001 Authorization of Military Force did not constitute authorization for the
military detention of alleged citizen enemy combatants, for reasons that are
overwhelmingly convincing. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, however,
found that the detention was statutorily authorized, and then looked to the
international laws of war to uphold the President's authority to detain citizens as
enemy combatants. The plurality opinion invoked treaties and customary
international law to find that "longstanding law-of-war principles"'145 recognized
the right to prevent enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield during the
duration of an armed conflict, and that the President's exercise of the power was
consistent with this rule. The detention of enemy combatants for this purpose was
"so fundamental and accepted an incident to war' '146 as to be implicitly authorized
by Congress.
O'Connor's opinion next recognized in principle that international law also
limited the scope of the President's detention power. At least for purposes of the
Hamdi case, O'Connor limited the power to detain enemy combatants to persons
who took up arms against the United States and were seized on the battlefield in
Afghanistan. 147 In other words, O'Connor defined the power to detain combatants
in terms of traditional principles of international armed conflict, rather than the
administration's more nebulous conception of a war on terror. She invoked the
Geneva and Hague Conventions for the propositions that "detention may last no
longer than active hostilities."'148 Furthermore, international law limited the power
to the purpose of preventing return to the battlefield. O'Connor's opinion
suggested that detention could not be utilized for purposes of punishment or
revenge, since these purposes were not authorized by the laws of war. 149 Finally,
"indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized."' 15 Justice
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force"
against "nations, organizations, or persons" associated with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
145. 542 U.S. at 519-20 (plurality opinion).
146. Id at 518-19 (plurality opinion). In interpreting the laws of war on this point, the plurality
looked to, inter alia, Exparte Quirin, case law of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, and the Lieber Code.
Id.
147. Id. at 516 (plurality opinion) ("[F]or purposes of this case," defining enemy combatant as
"an individual who . . . was 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners' in Afghanistan, and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States' there.").
148. Id. at 520 (plurality opinion).
149. Id. at 518 (plurality opinion) ("The purpose of detention is to prevent captured
individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again.").
150. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion). O'Connor's possible divergence from recognizing limits
imposed by international law was her failure to require explicitly that Hamdi be afforded a tribunal to
determine his status as a POW under Article V of the Third Geneva Convention, since Hamdi's claims
placed his status as an enemy combatant "in doubt." It appears, however, that Hamdi did not raise the
question of possible POW status before the Court. Hamdi simply raised the Geneva Convention process
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Thomas apparently also interpreted O'Connor's opinion as employing
international law limits to constrain the government's warmaking power.
15
Justice Souter's opinion would have gone further in enforcing international
law limits on any power to detain combatants deduced from international law.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointedly objected to the
administration's desire to claim powers to detain enemy combatants recognized
by the international law of armed conflict, without also accepting the protections
afforded Hamdi and other alleged Taliban fighters by those same rules (e.g., the
obligation to offer detainees a process to determine their POW status under
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention).152 The opinion is particularly
interesting because it not only recognizes the restraints imposed by international
law, but contends that the United States could not enjoy powers deduced from
international law unless it also complies with those limits.
Finally, the plurality gave a nod toward international standards in
determining the procedural protections afforded citizen enemy combatants. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi applied the traditional Mathews v.
Eldridge analysis to hold that the President was not entitled to detain alleged
enemy combatants based on conclusory and untested factual findings. Due
process instead granted citizen-detainees a constitutional right to notice and an
opportunity to rebut the factual basis for their detention. 153 Moreover, such
detainees "unquestionably" had the right to counsel on habeas. 154 O'Connor
suggested, however, without deciding, that the requirements of due process might
be satisfied by a military tribunal procedure akin to that afforded pursuant to
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention to determine whether an individual is a
prisoner of war.155 Thus, the plurality looked to an international standard as
setting forth the possible minimum individual rights protections required by the
Constitution.
to demonstrate that under international law, he would have been afforded an opportunity "to assert that
he was not a combatant at all." Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696). More detailed questions regarding Hamdi's status and its implications for the conditions
under which he might be detained were left for another day.
151. 542 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality for "diminish[ing] the
Federal Government's war powers by reference to a treaty").
152. Id at 551 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment) ("Thus, there [was] reason to question whether the United States [was] acting in accordance with
the laws of war it claim[ed] as authority.").
153. Id at 533 (plurality opinion).
154. Id at 539 (plurality opinion).
155. The plurality opinion stated: "There remains the possibility that the standards we have
articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.
Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related instances,
dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert
prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention. See Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, § 1-6 (1997)." Id at 538 (plurality
opinion); see also id at 550 (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (objecting to
the plurality's reliance on "the military regulation, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8, §§ 1-5, 1-6 (1997), adopted to implement the





The law maritime was another venerable field of the law of nations at the
founding that has thrived under the American constitutional system.'" 6 As early as
Chisholm v. Georgia, Chief Justice Jay observed in dicta that rights and privileges
under the Court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction were regulated by treaties
and the law of nations, a view that has been sustained in the Court's
jurisprudence. 15 7
The role of international law and practice in this area is particularly notable
since the Court early rejected the restrictive approach of the English courts to the
scope of admiralty jurisdiction in favor of the broader approach favored by the
majority of nations. Thus, in the 1847 case of Waring v. Clarke, the Court asserted
that "the grant of admiralty power to the courts of the United States was not
intended to be limited or to be interpreted by what were cases of admiralty
jurisdiction in England when the constitution was adopted." '58 Instead, the Clause
was to be read according to "the general admiralty law," even with respect to the
extension of admiralty jurisdiction to internal waters.'59
In the 1870 case of New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co. v. Dunham,
Justice Bradley held that a claim for marine insurance fell within the federal
courts' Article III admiralty jurisdiction, since marine insurance was "a part of the
general maritime law of the world" and foreign admiralty courts universally had
enforced such claims.' 60 The relationship between the Constitution's admiralty
jurisdiction and international law was perhaps best articulated by Chief Justice
Hughes in 1934. According to Hughes, the Constitution's grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction "presupposed a 'general system of maritime law' which was
familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country, and contemplated a body of
law with uniform operation . . . . The framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that the maritime law should remain unalterable," but recognized that
changes to the thelaw would necessarily occur "within a sphere restricted by the
concept of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' 6'
The admiralty cases are particularly interesting in that they explicitly reject
the proposition that constitutional admiralty jurisdiction should be tied to English
law at the time the Constitution was adopted, in favor of asserting the role of the
156. Edwin Dickinson,The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States II,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 792, 803-06 (1952); see also Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial
Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855,
877 (2005).
157. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793); accord Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S.
219, 228 (1924) (McReynolds, J.) ("[T]he Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of
maritime rights and obligations."); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816)
(describing admiralty jurisdiction as an area in which "the principles of the law and comity of nations
often form an essential inquiry").
158. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441,459(1847).
159. Id; see also The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851) (Taney, C.J.)
(upholding constitutionality of a federal statute regulating navigation in interstate waters as a proper
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant Bank, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 344, 392 (1848) (Nelson, J.) (rejecting English rule to uphold a contract for transport of goods by
sea as maritime, and recognizing the court as "a maritime court instituted for the purpose of
administering the law of the seas"); cf. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.
3,776) (Story, J.) (upholding admiralty jurisdiction over marine insurance).
160. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1,34(1870).
161. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42-43 (1934) (citations omitted).
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U.S. courts, in dialogue with other nations, as participants in the recognition and
development of an evolving general transnational jurisprudence of admiralty.
Under the terms of the Admiralty Clause, Congress could refine the domestic
meaning of admiralty. But judicial determinations of both the content of admiralty
law and the scope of the government's admiralty jurisdiction were to be made in
reliance upon the general practices of foreign states and the law of nations.
c. Citizenship
The Court at various times has looked to international law to define the
nature, rights, and obligations of citizenship, and the government's corresponding
authority to regulate citizenship. 162 Justice Story observed in an early (non-
constitutional) case that political rights deriving from national allegiance "do not
stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law... but stand upon the more
general principles of the law of nations." 163 In the 1852 case of Kennett v.
Chambers, Chief Justice Taney observed that the duty of a citizen to be at war
with its government's enemy was "universally acknowledged by the laws of
nations! '64
Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel invoked international practices in
Dred Scott v. Sandford to conclude that persons of African descent could not be
citizens of the United States within the meaning of Article Il jurisdiction. Taney
asserted that in "the state of public opinion... which prevailed in the civilized
and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of
Independence," persons of African descent were "an inferior race... [who] had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect."'165 Taney, however, viewed
the role of international practice as limited to informing original understanding,
and argued that any subsequent change in public or international opinion was
irrelevant:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling in relation to this
unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to
give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction... than they were intended to
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.
166
Because Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, Taney concluded, the Court
had no jurisdiction.1 67 In dissent, Justice McLean rebutted Taney's contention that
decedents of Africans could not be citizens by noting that United States treaties
had bestowed citizenship on persons of all races.
1 68
162. The Constitution addresses powers and rights regarding citizenship, inter alia, in
Congress's power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the Natural Born Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, id. amend. XIV, § 1.
163. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 248 (1830). The case resolved questions of
nationality resulting from the revolution.
164. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852).
165. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-08 (1857); see also id at 475-76 (Daniel, J., concurring)
("[T]he African nego race never have been acknowledged as belonging to the family of nations."). For
further discussion of the use of international law in the case, see Mark Janis, Dred Scott and
International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 763 (2005).
166. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426.
167. Id at 426-27.
168. Id at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, a majority of the Court rejected the
government's contention that the Fourteenth Amendment's natural born
citizenship provision should be read to apply a claimed international law principle
of jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood). 9 In Mackenzie v. Hare, however, the
Court upheld a statute denaturalizing women who married foreign nationals,
relying in part on international law principles. 70 The Court observed that the
arguments before the Court took "a wide range through the principles of the
common law and international law and their development and change," and based
its holding on the international and common law principle of merger resulting
from marriage and concerns about the potential for international conflict caused
by transnational marriage. 171 Blackmer v. United States172 upheld judicial power
to subpoena a U.S. citizen from abroad, citing both international law and English
cases for government's authority to regulate its citizens. Perkins v. Elg173 looked
to international law to conclude that transport of a minor to a foreign country did
not produce a renunciation of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief
Justice Hughes cited international writers both to recognize the possibility of dual
nationality and for the fact that expatriation required a voluntary renunciation of
allegiance, which was not present in the case.1 74 Perez v. Brownell,175 which was
decided the same day as the Eighth Amendment case of Trop v. Dulles, upheld
the constitutionality of an act of Congress denationalizing a citizen for voting in a
foreign election. Justice Frankfurter concluded that the act was necessary and
proper to Congress's undefined foreign relations powers, since, among other
things, international principles of state responsibility entitled a state to attribute a
foreign national's political interference to that person's government. 176 In dissent,
Chief Justice Warren invoked international practice for the consequences
accompanying statelessness, as he did in Trop,177 and noted that while "[n]early
all sovereignties recognize that acquisition of foreign nationality ordinarily shows
a renunciation of citizenship," voting in a foreign election did not reach this
level. 7 8 Finally, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez"9 found that denationalization
169. 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see also infra notes 745-748 and accompanying text.
170. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
171. Id. at 308-09 & n.1. The case upheld Congress's power to denationalize citizens as a
power derived from sovereignty. Id. at 311 ("As a government, the United States is invested with all the
attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially
those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before
limiting or embarrassing such powers."); see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 US. 44, 69 n.20 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (observing that MacKenzie "expressed the well-understood principle that a
wife's nationality 'merged' with that of her husband's" and citing Moore's and Hackworth's
international law treatises). The authority of MacKenzie was challenged by a series of later cases,
including Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958), and Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
172. 284 U.S. 421, 437 & nn.2, 4 (1932) ("Nor can it be doubted that the United States
possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident
elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it.").
173. 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939) (citing Oppenheim, Moore, Hyde, and Fenwick's international
law treatises).
174. Id. at 334. Hughes also noted that U.S. practice had long recognized that removal of a
minor did not constitute voluntary expatriation warranting loss of citizenship. Id. at 329.
175. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
176. Id. at 59.
177. Id. at 64.
178. Id. at 68 & n.17.
179. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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for evasion of military service was a punishment that required Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections. Justice Goldberg cited international authorities at length
to establish the adverse consequences of statelessness, 18 as well as comparative
authority going back to the Romans for the proposition that forfeiture of
citizenship historically was imposed as punishment.' 8 1
d. Commerce and Contract
At the time the Constitution was drafted, international law had long
regulated international commerce through the law merchant, which was
understood as substantially incorporated into the common law.' 82 Resort to
international law thus might be expected-and in fact appears-in judicial
interpretations of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 8 3 But references to international
rules also appear in early constructions of the interstate commerce power.'8 4 In
Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the commerce power
derived from international rules that predated the Constitution and had been
delegated by the sovereign states to Congress through the Commerce Clause:
[Imt has been said, that the constitution does not confer the right of intercourse between State
and State. That right derives its source from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by
civilized man throughout the world. This is true. The constitution found it an existing right, and
gave to Congress the power to regulate it.1
8 5
Marshall further argued that commerce among nations necessarily included power
over navigation, that the commerce power would have been so understood at the
Constitution's adoption, and applied this principle to interstate commerce.
18 6
In a separate opinion, Justice Johnson concluded that "the definition and
limits of [the power to regulate commerce] are to be sought among the features of
international law."' 8 7 Johnson reasoned that the international power over
180. Id. at 160-61 (quoting Oppenheim for the proposition that stateless individuals "enjoy, in
general, no protection whatever.... As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, there is... no restriction
whatever to cause a State to abstain from maltreating to any extent such stateless individuals"); see also
i d at 161 n.16 ("The drastic consequences of statelessness have led to reaffirmation in the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15, of the right of every individual to retain a
nationality.") (citing United Nations documents and various international law treatises).
181. Id. at 168; accord United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 270 (1905) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Vattel and domestic and English sources for the proposition that banishment is
punitive and that citizenship rights accordingly cannot be denied without a criminal trial).
182. Dickinson, supra note 156, at 795-96; see also William Fletcher, The General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1513, 1518-20 (1984) (discussing the role of the law merchant in early American law).
183. See, e.g., Japan Line v. Turner, 441 U.S. 434, 447, 449 (1979) (differentiating
interpretation of the Foreign Commerce Clause in light of U.S. treaty obligations and the "custom of
nations"); The Vessel 'Abby Dodge' v. United States, 223 U.S. 166, 176 (1912) (holding that foreign
commerce power applies to ships engaged in commercial activity "in the waters which, by the law of
nations, would be regarded as common property of all").
184. See Dickinson, supra note 156, at 803 (noting that "[t]he more learned of the lawyer-
delegates to the Constitutional Convention anticipated for [the law merchant] a continuing and uniform
progress in the United States as part of the national law"); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 316 (1992) ("'Commerce' in the eighteenth century had usually referred
exclusively to international trade. Now it was being equated with all the exchanges taking place within
the country ....").
185. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
186. Id. at 190.
187. Id at 227.
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commerce originally had been possessed by the several states, as international
sovereigns, and had been transferred to the national government by the
Constitution."' International law references also agear m other Antebellum
decisions construing the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Several early justices adopted a similar approach with respect to the Article
I, § 10 Contract Clause, prohibiting the states from impairing the freedom of
contract.' 9° And the former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court
observed in his 1801 treatise that the law of contracts depended on the 'jus
gentium (the general law of nations) for its origin and its expositions, rather than
on any municipal regulations of particular countries."'191
As Edwin Dickinson has demonstrated, the use of international law in such
cases reflects, in part, the era's conception of the law of nations as "universal
law."'192 In part, it presumably also reflects the absence at the nation's founding of
any alternative legal model for construing concepts such as interstate commerce.
At any rate, as the nation developed a thriving system of internal commerce and
domestic rules for regulating it, "the law of merchants ... fast slipp[ed] into the
limbo of forgotten history" in this context.19'
Both originalism and prudential concerns could justify the use of
international law in the Offenses Clause, treaty, war powers, admiralty, and other
foreign relations contexts. Where constitutional clauses implicate relations with
foreign governments in matters traditionally governed by international law,
playing by international rules helps both to avoid international conflict and to
ensure that the United States is not hobbled in its international relations.
Even here, however, it is not obviously appropriate to assume that powers
under the constitutional system are coterminous with those allowable under
international law, since other aspects of the constitutional system may limit those
powers. Much about the war and treaty powers under the Constitution, for
example, differentiates the United States from historical international practice.
Exercise of the U.S. war and treaty powers is limited structurally through the
188. Johnson concluded that "the sense of mankind, the practice of the world, the contemporaneous
assumption, and continued exercise of the power, and universal acquiescence" established that navigation was
"the essence of the power to regulate commerce." Id at 230-31.
189. See, e.g., Norris v. City of Boston (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 416
(1849) (The Framers "were familiar with the many valuable works upon trade and international law
which were written and published... [and] [t]heir knowledge... may well be invoked to measure the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce."); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 623, 628 (1847) (Woodbury, J., concurring) (citing international authorities for the proposition that
state power to tax alcohol is "justifiable on principles of international law" and not denied to states by
the Commerce Clause); Groves & Graham v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 512 (1841) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring) (looking to U.S. treaties to demonstrate that slaves were viewed at the framing as property subject
to the Commerce Clause).
190. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 258-59 (1827) (right to contract derives
from the law of nations but may be regulated by municipal law); id at 282 (Johnson, J.) (obligation to
perform a contract arises from a combination of moral law, universal law, and the laws of society).
191. Fletcher, supra note 182, at 1518-19 (quoting JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND
TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 337-38 (1801)).
192. Dickinson, supra note 156, at 803.
193. Id. at 799; see also Fletcher, supra note 182, at 1520 (noting that by 1810 the law
merchant was being supplanted by a uniquely American law).
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division of power between the President and legislature. Congress declares war,
raises armies, makes rules governing the land and naval forces, and grants letters
of marque and reprisal; the President is the Commander in Chief. The President
"makes" treaties, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Exercise
of these powers also is substantively limited by the Constitution's individual
rights provisions, such as habeas corpus and the Bill of Rights, as seen in Exparte
Milligan and Hamdi. 194 Thus, just because the power to take a particular action
would exist under international law does not necessarily mean that it is allowable
under the Constitution Nevertheless, reading constitutional provisions to
incorporate international norms at times has led the Court to decline recognizing
constitutional limits on the exercise of those powers, as it did in Ex parte Quirin,
In re Ross, and Miller v. United States.
195
The Court's approach to international law in these cases straddles the line
between law that is binding and persuasive. On the one hand, the Court recognizes
the Offenses and Treaty Clauses as directly referencing international rules that are
obligatory on the United States. On the other hand, it also recognizes those rules
as persuasive, since prudence supports construing the treaty power to comport
with those international rules where doing so is consistent with the constitutional
design, in order to allow the United States to function on an equal playing ground
with other nations.
Concern for avoiding conflict with other nations was an explicit motivation
behind Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the War Declaration Clause in
Brown v. United States. The Court's invocation of the laws of war is perhaps
more intriguing in Civil War cases, where the Court was addressing domestic
disputes. Although the confederacy held itself out as a separate nation, the Court
treated the war as an internal conflict and searched for authority for holding that
the international laws of war applied in this context. The justification here was not
that failing to abide by the laws of war would provoke international conflicts (at
least not in suits where foreign sovereign interests were not implicated). Instead,
the Court appeared to understand all the national government's delegated war
powers as inherently defined by the international laws of war. Moreover, as with
the cases discussed in the next section, the laws of war offered a set of proven and
workable rules for resolving disputes in analogous contexts that the Court found
persuasive.
The citizenship, commerce, and contract cases are particularly interesting
because although they involve concepts known to international law, they do not
necessarily implicate foreign relations. Unlike the immigration cases discussed
below, the question of the rights and duties of a citizen does not invariably
implicate relations with other governments (as in the cases addressing stripping of
citizenship as punishment for a crime). And matters of private contract and
interstate commerce involving domestic trade had no foreign relations
implications. The early contract and commerce cases offer a particularly
194. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (treaty power limited by Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
195. See Exparte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to trial by
military commission); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not limit
extraterritorial actions under the treaty power); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (10 Wall.) 268 (1870) (Fifth
and Sixth Amendment protections do not apply to wartime seizures).
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illuminating example of the fluidity with which early jurists understood the
general law and the law merchant to inform constitutional law. The citizenship,
commerce, and contract cases therefore reflect the extent to which the Court has
understood constitutional terms that do not directly implicate foreign affairs as
absorbing concepts of international law, particularly concepts of public or
universal law, which though not binding on anyone, were understood as
applicable to all.
B. International Law as a Background Principle for Constitutional Analysis
This section examines contexts in which the Supreme Court has understood
the Constitution as inviting consideration of international law as a background
principle in constitutional analysis. The cases do not involve construction of
constitutional terms directly known to international law. They instead involve
resort to international law for background concepts of territorial jurisdiction and
sovereignty that are not explicitly set forth in the constitutional text. These include
resort to international law in interpreting the territorial scope of the Constitution's
application, in construing the implied and inherent sovereign powers of the
national government, and in delineating horizontal and vertical relationships
between governments in the federal system.
The Court's resort to international law in these contexts proceeds from the
assumption that the constitutional system implicitly received and distributed
certain powers of government and rights of individuals that were recognized
under international law, and involves a mixture of resort to international law as
binding and persuasive authority. To some extent, international rules were applied
because they were binding as part and parcel of the rights of sovereignty. To some
extent, however, principles of territoriality and rules regarding the rights of, and
relations among, sovereigns, were imported from the general international law or
public law to define national and state powers because they were established and
workable rules that the Court found persuasive.
1. Territoriality
Background international rules regarding territorial jurisdiction have heavily
influenced the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Territorial principles appear in
cases defining U.S. international boundaries and the territorial jurisdiction of the
national government and the states, as well as cases imposing limits on the
extraterritorial application of constitutional provisions. To some extent, principles
of comity motivate the Court's use of international rules here, out of a desire to
avoid conflicts with the laws of other sovereigns.
Territorial sovereignty was a foundational nineteenth-century international
law concept, which established that the sovereign's legal jurisdiction to regulate
conduct was coterminous with its territory. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in
The Schooner Exchange, the "full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike
the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial
power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign
20061
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rights as its objects."' 9 6 The international rule could be distilled, in its most
simplistic form, to the principle that sovereigns enjoyed "absolute and complete
jurisdiction within their respective territor[y]" and absolutely no power outside of
it.197
The most straightforward application of international rules regarding
territoriality arises where the Constitution explicitly references territory. Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon,198 for example, applied international law principles to construe
the Eighteenth Amendment's textual prohibition on the movement of liquor in
"all territory subject to" U.S. jurisdiction. The Court concluded that both
international and domestic law supported the Amendment's application to foreign
vessels that were temporarily docked in U.S. ports, 199 but that these same rules
barred the Amendment's application to U.S. vessels, on the high seas.200 Justice
Sutherland dissented on the grounds that the majority had misconstrued the
international rule, but did not object to the relevance of that rule to the Eighteenth
Amendment.
20 1
In other contexts, the Court has employed international law as a background
principle to read territorial limitations into constitutional provisions that have no
202geographic limitation on their face. In particular, the Court has looked to
international law principles to deny extraterritorial reach to individual rights. In
this context, the relevance of international law generally derives, not from the
constitutional language used, but from the context in which a constitutional
question arises. When application of the Constitution implicates questions of
territorial jurisdiction and extraterritoriality, international rules have been injected
to determine the geographic scope of either a constitutional prohibition or
governmental power.
In In re Ross, the Treaty Clause was read to allow extraterritorial
prosecution of a U.S. citizen in U.S. consular courts, while Fifth and Sixth
Amendment procedural protections were construed as stopping at the water's
edge.203 Neely v. Henkel2°4 likewise held that Fifth and Sixth Amendment
196. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,137 (1812).
197. Id at 136.
198. 262 U.S. 100, 122-24 (1923).
199. The Cunard Court stated: "It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere
that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports,
harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from
the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles. 1 Moore International Law Digest § 145; 1
Hyde International Law §§ 141, 142, 154; Wilson International Law § 54 (8th ed.); Westlake International
Law 187 (2d ed.); Wheaton International Law 282 (5th Eng. ed.) (PhiUipson); 1 Oppenheirn International
Law §§ 185-189,252 (3rd ed.). This, we hold, is the territory which the Amendment designates as its field of
operation; and the designation is not of a part of this territory but of'all' of it." Id at 122-23 (citations to U.S.
government sources omitted).
200. Id at 123.
201. Sutherland urged that international law did not recognize jurisdiction over foreign ships
temporarily in port, and that under "principles of international comity," the Amendment should be read
to comport with this rule. Id. at 132 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland also suggested that the
Court's interpretation was inconsistent with original intent, since the drafters would not have
contemplated the Amendment's application to foreign vessels temporarily present. Id. at 133
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
202. Only a few provisions are facially limited to actions within the "States," the "United
States," or U.S. jurisdiction.
203. 140 U.S. 453, 363 (1891). See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
204. 180 U.S. 109 (1900).
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protections could not apply extraterritorially to a trial by the U.S. military in
occupied Cuba.2 5 United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. asserted a general, • •206
territorial restriction on the Constitution's application abroad, and Johnson v.
Eisentrager invoked territoriality to support the holding that constitutional habeas
corpus did not apply to enemy aliens abroad.20 7
A strict territoriality vision of the Constitution is difficult to reconcile with
the constitutional text. Few constitutional provisions impose any geographic
limitation on their operation, and international law accordingly has functioned
here to impose territorial restrictions on the Constitution's operation where no
textual restriction existed. The practice also reflects a misapplication (or abuse) of
principles of territoriality under international law. In The Schooner Exchange,
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the principle of strict territoriality had
been relaxed somewhat internationally, even at that date.208 Furthermore, even in
the heyday of rigid territorial understandings of state jurisdiction when
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a state's nationals was disputed, 20 9 nothing in
international law denied the power of states to impose duties on their own officials
outside their borders. Nevertheless, judicially-imposed territorial restrictions on
the Constitution's application to actions of U.S. officials abroad have persisted.
By recognizing the government's right to act extraterritorially but denying the
extraterritorial application of constitutional limits, the practice represents a
prominent example of the Court's use of international law to limit, rather than to
promote, individual rights.
2. Nationhood and Sovereignty
The word "sovereign" does not appear in the Constitution, and yet the
Supreme Court has applied international law in recognition of the fact that the
Founders self-consciously sought to establish a sovereign nation, and to bestow
on that nation many (though not all) of the rights and duties of sovereignty
recognized under the law of nations. International concepts of sovereignty thus
have formed a backdrop for constitutional analysis. The Court's approach has
manifested itself in various forms. At times, the Court has construed constitutional
text as implicitly referencing powers or duties of sovereigns recognized under
international law. And in the "inherent powers" cases, the Court, controversially,
has read international sovereign powers into the Constitution in the absence of, or
in lieu of, enumerated constitutional authority. Of all the cases discussed in this
article, international law plays the most forceful role in constitutional analysis in
the inherent powers cases. The most problematic feature of these cases, however,
is their abandonment of the enumerated powers doctrine and their willingness to
205. Id. at 122 (concluding that the Constitution's provisions "have no relation to crimes
committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country").
206. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of
it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . .
207. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.iii.
208. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("[A]I1 sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within
their respective territories which sovereignty confers.").
209. See Cleveland, supra note 66, at 23 n.106 (discussing extraterritorial authority over
citizens).
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employ international law to expand unenumerated governmental authority at the
expense of express individual rights.
a. Enumerated Powers
i. The Power to Borrow Money
The late nineteenth-century Court looked to international sovereign powers
to uphold Congress's power to borrow money through legal tender. Noting in
Juilliard v. Greenman that nothing in the Constitution expressly authorized
Congress to borrow money, Justice Gray looked to the general international
powers of sovereign states to inform the Constitution's provisions.210 Gray
suggested an originalist basis for considering international practice, arguing that
the power to borrow money and to designate legal tender had been "a power
universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the
time of the frarning.",211 But Gray also contended that this practice remained the
212contemporary norm. He concluded that since the power was "one of the powers
belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not expressly withheld
from Congress by the Constitution," it was reasonably implied from Congress's
213
enumerated powers over commerce, debts, and money.
Gray's methodology in identifying international practice was not
particularly rigorous. He limited his consideration of "universalo" practice to the
United States and Europe and cited only an English case enforcing the right of the
Austrian government. In dissent, Justice Field accordingly rejected the majority's
affirmation of a power to borrow money "[u]ntil some authority beyond the
alleged claim and practice of the sovereign governments of Europe be produced"
to support it.214
Peny v. United States,215 on the other hand, looked in part to international
law to impose limits on governmental authority. In holding that the constitutional
power to borrow money on credit2 16 prohibited the government from disavowing
its debts, Chief Justice Hughes cited the international law treatises of Oppenheim,
210. 110 U.S. 421,447 (1884). In the earlier legal tender case, Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457 (1872), the Court had observed in dicta that Congress's enumerated power to coin money and
regulate its value could be "intended to confer upon Congress that general power over the currency
which has always been an acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our
own," id. at 545, but had upheld the power simply as an emergency Civil War measure, id at 540-44. In
concurrence, Justice Bradley had asserted an even more forceful originalist argument based on
international sovereign powers. Bradley contended that the United States was "invested with all those
inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered
to belong to every government" and that at the time the Constitution was adopted, it had been the
longstanding practice of "most, if not all, civilized governments," to borrow funds "to meet the various
exigencies to which all nations are subject." Id. at 556 (Bradley, J., concurring). Bradley's analysis was
based on the concept of inherent powers, and was invoked in the two most significant inherent powers
decisions relating to immigration, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605 (1889), and Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06 (1893). See also infra Part II.B.2.b.1 (discussing
immigration cases).
211. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at447.
212. Id.
213. Id. at449-50.
214. Id. at 459; see also id. at 467.
215. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 2, 5.
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Hall, and Hyde for the proposition that the duty to honor debts "is recognized in
the field of international engagements." 217 He also noted that although contracts
with sovereigns might not be judicially enforced without their consent, they
nevertheless were enforceable before international tribunals. 218 Hughes viewed
the Fourteenth Amendment's public debt provision as confirming this
international principle. 19
ii. Foreign Taxation
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected claims that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause limited the authority of the national government
to tax assets that might also be subject to the taxation power of a foreign
government. Although the cases address the power to tax the assets of foreign
nationals, conflict with the powers of other sovereigns appears to have been only a
secondary concern in this context. Instead, like the inherent powers cases
discussed below, the Court's use of international rules appears motivated
primarily by a desire to ensure that the U.S. government enjoyed the full powers
possessed by other international sovereigns.
United States v. Bennett addressed U.S. taxation of foreign, but not
domestic, yachts owned by citizens. The Plaintiff argued that the law was "so in
conflict with obvious principles of justice, and so inconsistent with every
conception of representative and free government" as to violate the Due Process
Clause.22° Chief Justice White observed that the plaintiffs' argument rested on the
mistaken assumption that the Constitution "had the effect of destroying obvious
powers of government instead of preserving and distributing such powers."
221
White held that the rules imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on
extraterritorial taxation by states222 were motivated by the need to preserve
territorial relations within the constitutional system, and thus were inapplicable to
the national government, whose taxation power "embrace[s] all the attributes
which appertain to sovereignty in the fullest sense. ' 223 Nothing in the Fifth
Amendment denies to the government "the exertion of powers which inherently
belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty."
224
Burnet v. Brooks225 made the Court's reliance on international rules to
uphold foreign taxation even more explicit. In addressing a Fifth Amendment
challenge to taxation of the domestic assets of a foreign estate, Chief Justice
Hughes observed that "[w]e determine national power in relation to other
countries and their subjects by applying the principles of jurisdiction recognized
217. Perry, 294 U.S. at 353 n.3.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 354. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 4 cl. 1. ("The validity of the public debt... shall
not be questioned.").
220. 232 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1914).
221. Id. at 306.
222. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (forbidding
extraterritorial taxation by states under the Fourteenth Amendment).
223. 232 U.S. at 306.
224. Id. at 306.
225. 288 U.S. 378, 405-06 (1933) (rejecting due process challenge to U.S. estate tax on U.S.
financial assets of a foreign national who lived abroad).
2006]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
in international relations. ' 226 The U.S. could tax foreign assets consistent with
principles of international jurisdiction227 "unless [some] limitation is necessarily
found to be imposed by its own Constitution." 228 Hughes rejected the contention
that the Fifth Amendment imposed such a limit, reasoning, as in Bennett, that the
domestic rule prohibiting multiple taxation by the states was not applicable to
relations between the United States and other sovereigns.229
b. Inherent Powers
International law has played the most robust role in constitutional
interpretation in the inherent powers cases. In these cases, the Court has looked to
international powers of sovereignty as a source of governmental authority to act,
not in the process of interpreting an enumerated power, but as a substitute for
textual constitutional authority. The Court has accordingly derived government
power from powers it identifies as inherent in all sovereign states, based directly
on principles of international law. Many of the cases, including those involving
Native Americans and the rights of territorial inhabitants, do not directly involve
relations with other nations. The Court's primary justification for invoking
international rules in this context thus is less to avoid conflict with other nations
than to ensure that the U.S. government enjoys the powers of other sovereigns.
The most notorious articulation of the inherent powers approach is found in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,230 in which the Court held that a
joint resolution authorizing the President to criminalize foreign arms sales did not
violate the non-delegation doctrine.231 Justice Sutherland asserted for the Court
that the government's foreign affairs authority derived, not from the Constitution,
but from sovereignty and international law. "The powers to declare and wage war,
to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties," he wrote, "if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution,
would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality. 2 32 Curtiss-Wright accordingly purported to sever the relationship
between constitutional text and the foreign affairs powers, and to relegate
governance of U.S. operations in the international sphere entirely to "treaties,
international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international
law."
2 33
Much of the reasoning in Curtiss-Wright is dicta, and the opinion has been
appropriately condemned for resorting to international law in lieu of construing a
226. Id
227. Hughes observed at some length that both English and international practice supported
the existence of this power. Id. at 396-400. Because jurisdiction to tax could lie with more than one
sovereign, efforts had been made to negotiate a number of international agreements to avoid multiple
taxation among sovereigns, but these efforts themselves acknowledged a preexisting power of
sovereigns to tax under "recognized principles ofjurisdiction." Id at 400.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 405 ("The Constitution creates no such relation between the United States and
foreign countries as it creates between the states themselves.").
230. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).





constitutional provision.234 But the Court has also relied on inherent sovereign
powers derived from international law to establish national quasi-constitutional or
extra-constitutional authority in a variety of areas, including immigration and the
governance of Native American tribes and territorial inhabitants, as well as the
power of eminent domain (which is discussed with just compensation, infra). In
each of these contexts, the Court has looked to international law, not to inform
constitutional text, but to supplant it.
The cases in this category are distinctive for the robust role given to
international law, since in the absence of constitutional text, international law
frequently provides the entire rule of decision. But their international and
constitutional methodology is highly problematic. The Court has enforced powers
derived from international law without recognizing the limits inhering in the same
international rules. The Court also has given little thought to how the international
rules were received into the constitutional design and whether the Constitution
imposed some limits on the international rule. The inherent powers cases thus
reflect robust application of international law in disregard of protections under
both international law and the Constitution. The distinctive legitimacy problem
they raise, however, is not the use of international law, but the abandonment of the
enumerated powers doctrine.
i. Immigration
The inherent powers approach characterized the classical late nineteenth-
century decisions upholding governmental power to exclude or deport aliens. In
Chae Chan Ping v. United States,235 for example, the Court upheld the
constitutional authority of Congress to bar aliens from entering the United States.
Although the Court previously had held that Congress's power to regulate
immigration derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause,2 36 Justice Field now
held for the Court that the power derived from sovereignty: "That the government
of the United States... can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which
we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence.''237 Rather than attempt to locate this authority in the enumerated
powers of the national government, Field suggested a structural argument: the
Constitution had bestowed on the national government all the foreign relations
powers possessed by independent nations, and these necessarily included the
power to regulate aliens.238 In short, "the power of exclusion of foreigners [was]
234. See Cleveland, supra note 66, at 5-7.
235. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
236. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) ("[C]ongress [has] the power to pass a law
regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign nations."); New York v.
Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60 (1883); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280
(1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1875).
237. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04; see also id. at 606 (describing the right to defend
against foreign aggression as "the highest duty of every nation").
238. The Chae Chan Ping Court stated: "[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign
countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to
independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute
independence and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties,
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an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a
part of those sovereign powers delegated by the [C]onstitution. ''239 Field also
implicitly construed the authority as sufficiently powerful to override a returning
resident alien's claim that his exclusion violated due process.
240
Two later decisions, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States24' and Fong Yue Ting
v. United States,242 again asserted that Congress's immigration authority derived
from international law, with only the barest nod toward the Constitution. Ekiu
rejected an alien's due process challenge to her exclusion based on unreviewable
executive discretion. Justice Gray reaffirmed the power to exclude aliens with an
expansive invocation of Vattel and Phillimore's treatises on international law:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe. Vat. Law Nat. lib. 2 §§ 94, 100; 1 Phillim. It. Law, (3d Ed.) c. 10 § 220. In
the United States this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations.
243
Like Field, Gray employed a structural justification for the Constitution's receipt
of inherent power. He reasoned that because international law recognized the
authority of states to exclude aliens, and because the Constitution gave the
national government powers over foreign relations,24 the authority to exclude
aliens must be possessed by the national government.
Fong Yue Ting extended the government's power to exclude aliens to
uphold the deportation of long-term lawful residents. The decision both expanded
on the Court's reliance on international law and further distanced that analysis
from the Constitution. The opinion opened by quoting the international law
language from Ekiu and Chae Chan Ping, and then devoted three full pages to
international law sources, including the works of Vattel, Ortolan, Phillimore, and
Bar.245 Having established that authority to exclude aliens existed under
international law, the Court once again did not consider how, or whether, the
international rule had been received by the Constitution. Instead, it turned directly
to the question "whether the manner in which congress [had] exercised the right..
. [was] consistent with the Constitution., 246 Gray again invoked international
treatises and foreign decisions to assert that although resident aliens were entitled
to the protection of a nation's laws, they remained subject to a government's
authority to expel them.247 He found nothing in the Due Process Clause that
limited the exercise of the power.248 In short, the Court made no attempt to lodge
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, [and] regulate foreign commerce... are all sovereign powers." Id.
at 604.
239. Id. at 609.
240. Id; see also Cleveland, supra note 66, at 130.
241. 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
242. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
243. Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
244. Id.
245. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-09.
246. Id. at 711.
247. Id. at 724.
248. Id at 730.
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the power in constitutional text, and defined the power as sufficiently broad and
plenary to override the alien's claims of individual rights.
Fong Yue Ting provoked strenuous dissents from Justices Brewer and Field
and Chief Justice Fuller. The dissenters' objection was threefold. First, they
rejected the contention that international law allowed the arbitrary expulsion of
resident aliens, since it was not clear that international law actually recognized as
broad a sovereign authority over aliens as the Court asserted.249 Second, they
argued that even if the majority was correct in its interpretation of international
law, there was no reason to conclude that the government's limited, delegated
powers under the Constitution were intended to incorporate the practices of
despotic nations recognized by international law. As Justice Field put it, "even if
that power were exercised by every government of Europe, it would have no
bearing on these cases . . . . The government of the United States is one of
limited and delegated powers. It takes nothing from the usages or the former
action of European governments, nor does it take any power by any supposed
inherent sovereignty. '250 Finally, they argued that any power deduced from
international law must be limited by constitutional due process and other express
individual rights protections.25 l
Later cases nevertheless followed suit. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy253
rejected First Amendment and Due Process challenges to an act deporting aliens
for prior membership in the Communist Party. Justice Jackson reasoned that
protections available under international law correspondingly weakened the
254
constitutional protections afforded an alien. Jackson also concluded that
international law recognized the right of a sovereign to expel aliens after long
residence as "a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as
a power inherent in every sovereign state. 255 Jackson's opinion appeared to
acknowledge that international rules regarding the power to expel domiciled
249. Id. at 734-37 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (citing Vattel, Grotius, and Phillimore). In particular,
the Court's decision in Fong Yue Ting ignored limits that international law imposed on sovereign power over
denizens and other long term residents. For further discussion, see Cleveland, supra note 66, at 83-87
(discussing nineteenth-century international rules regarding regulation of aliens); James A.R. Nafziger,
The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 809 (1983)
(collecting views of international publicists and concluding that "[b]efore the late nineteenth century,
there was little, in principle, to support the absolute exclusion of aliens").
250. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 737-38 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting); id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
251. Id at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hatever rights a resident alien might have in any
other nation, here he is within the express protection of the constitution, especially in respect to those
guarantees which are declared in the original amendments."); id at 755-56 (Field, J., dissenting).
252. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904) (asserting
that "[w]hether rested on the accepted principle of international law ... or on the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations," an act prohibiting admission of an alien anarchist did not violate the
First Amendment); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
253. 342 U.S. 580 (1951) (Jackson, J.).
254. Jackson observed that an alien's dual status allowed him to "derive advantages from two
sources of law-American and international," and that international law and treaties provided
protections not afforded to citizens, such as the potential for diplomatic protection by his government,
protection from military service, and treaty privileges. Id. at 585-86 (citing to the 1907 Hague
Conventions, art. 23).
255. Id. at 587-88 & n.14 (citing to international law treatises by Oppenheim, Moore and
Wheaton, and Fong Yue Ting).
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256
aliens were becoming more protective. He nevertheless adhered to the Court's
existing rule, stating that "such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien
and we leave the law on the subject as we find it."'257 In other words, international
law had once recognized the power and nothing in the Constitution limited how
Congress now chose to exercise it.
ii. Native Americans
International law doctrines regarding the status of aboriginal peoples and
powers of discovery and conquest have played an important role in the
recognition of a plenary federal power over Native American tribes. Although not
itself a constitutional case, the 1823 case of Johnson v. M'Intosh258 rooted the
foundations of this doctrine squarely in international law principles of discovery.
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the United States had acquired sovereign
authority over Native Americans based on the principle of discovery: that a
discovering power had "the exclusive right.., to appropriate the lands occupied
by the Indians. 259 Marshall devoted approximately half of his 33-page opinion to
establishing Europe's "universal recognition"260 of this principle 2 6 and further
invoked the "principle of universal law" that treated Indian lands as "vacant, 262 to
justify a sovereign federal power over them.
By the time of the decision in M'Intosh, the legitimacy of the discovery
doctrine under international law had been severely questioned,263 and in
264Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall himself ridiculed the "extravagant and absurd
idea" that discovery gave European states power over Native American tribes.
265
Marshall instead relied on a different proposition from international law-Vattel's
discussion of the relationships between powerful and weak states26 -to conclude
that Native American sovereignty barred any intervention by the State of
256. In a footnote, Justice Jackson cited the 1920 edition of Oppenheim's International Law,
with a "but cf. " to the same discussion in the 1948 edition of Oppenheim's treatise. Harisiades, 342 U.S.
at 588 n.14. The relevant text of the two treatises differs. The 1920 edition provides that "in strict law, a
State can expel even domiciled aliens without so much as giving the reasons" and that "the refusal of the
expelling State to supply the reasons for expulsion to the home State of the expelled alien does not
constitute an illegal, but only a very unfriendly act" which nevertheless might warrant retorsion. 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 499 (3d ed. 1920). In notable contrast, the 1948 version
provided that "[allthough a State may exercise its right of expulsion according to discretion it must not
abuse its right by proceeding in an arbitrary manner." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 631-32 (7th ed. 1948).
257. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588.
258. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
259. Id at 584.
260. Id. at 574.
261. Id at 572-84.
262. Id at 595-96.
263. The discovery doctrine was disputed among legal publicists from its inception, and by the
1800s was not accepted as a basis for asserting a claim of territorial possession. See Cleveland, supra
note 66, at 29-30; see also Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal
History of the United States, 27 BUrF. L. REV. 637, 651-53 (1978). Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall's
manipulation of the discovery doctrine may have been orchestrated to reward land speculators and
Marshall's friends. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST By LAW (2005).
264. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
265. Id. at 544. Discovery "regulated the right given by discovery among the European
discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in possession... as aboriginal occupants."
Id. (citation omitted).
266. Id at 561.
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Georgia.267 Like the vertical federalism cases discussed below, Worcester thus is
notable for looking to international rules regarding relations among sovereigns to
limit state government authority.
Worcester, however, did not end the discovery doctrine's influence on U.S.-
Indian relations. In dicta in United States v. Rogers, 268 Chief Justice Taney
asserted that the discovery doctrine and the tribes' aboriginal status gave Congress
plenary authority to extend criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes.269 His
discussion ultimately received judicial sanction in United States v. Kagama,270
which upheld plenary congressional power to adopt a criminal code for tribes.
Writing for the Court in Kagama, Justice Miller expressly rejected reliance on any
enumerated constitutional clause.271 Instead, Justice Miller reasoned that federal
authority over Indian country derived from discovery, 272 and that as a result,
"Congress may by law punish any offense committed there."
2 73
After Kagama, the Court upheld, over Fifth Amendment due process and
takings objections, Congress's plenary authority to determine tribal citizenship, to
dissolve tribal jurisdiction, and to allot or lease tribal lands without tribal
consent.274 In 1955, the Court invoked the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and
"aboriginal" title275 to hold that the government could take lands held under
original Indian title without just compensation. The right of the tribes to occupy
territory after conquest, the Court reasoned, was merely "a right of occupancy
which . . . may be terminated . . .by the sovereign itself without any legally
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians., 276 The Court traced its analysis
directly to the international discovery doctrine:
This position of the Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory that discovery and
conquest gave the conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the lands thus obtained. 1
Wheaton's International Law, c. V. The great case of Johnson v. McIntosh... confirmed...
267. Id. ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory...
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter.").
268. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571-72 (1846).
269. Justice Taney wrote: "The native tribes who were found on this continent at the time of
its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European
governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they respectively occupied. On the contrary,
the whole continent was divided and parceled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it had
been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and treated as, subject to their
dominion and control." Accordingly, 'Congress may by law punish any offense committed there, no
matter whether the offender be a white man or an Indian."' Id. at 572; see also Martin v. Waddell, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409 (1842) (Taney, C.J.) ("[A]ccording to the principles of international law ... the
Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute
rights of property and dominion were held to belong to the European [discoverer].").
270. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
271. Id. at 378-79 (rejecting reliance on constitutional references to "Indians not taxed" and
the Indian Commerce Clause).
272. Id. at 380-82 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)).
273. 118 U.S. at 381.
274. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to
Congress's power to allot property without tribal consent); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294
(1902) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to Congress's authority to lease property without tribal
consent); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 446 (1899) (upholding Congress's authority to
determine tribal citizenship, subject tribes to federal jurisdiction, and dissolve tribes).
275. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
276. Id. at 279.
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that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest.
277
The Court concluded that "Indian occupation of land without government
recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by the
United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law., 278
iii. Territorial Governance and Individual Rights
A third significant grouping of inherent powers cases involves U.S.
authority to govern newly-acquired territories. Unlike the territorial jurisdiction
cases addressed above, these cases involved the government's substantive power
to legislate over territorial inhabitants. The Court, moreover, employed the
inherent powers approach less consistently in the territory cases than in the
imnigration and Native American contexts. Although all the territory cases
invoke international law, some apply international law through an inherent powers
approach, while others do so in construing the enumerated Treaty and Territory
Clauses.279
International law has been influential in establishing the relationship
between newly acquired territory and U.S. domestic law, and in particular in
determining the constitutional authority Congress exercised there and the
constitutional protections enjoyed by territorial inhabitants. In evaluating to what
extent the Constitution applied to the Florida territory in American Insurance Co.
v. 356 Bales of Cotton, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the international
principle of conquest-that laws regarding political allegiance transferred
immediately upon the transfer of sovereignty, while other laws continued in force
until altered by the new sovereign.281 Marshall ultimately found it unnecessary to
resolve whether this rule of international law governed the Constitution's
application to the Florida territory. Leitensdorfer v. Webb,28 2 however, later
upheld the authority of a territorial government to resolve property claims under
the principle of the law of nations that conquest did not terminate private rights.283
277. Id. at 279-80 (internal citation omitted).
278. Id. at 285; see also Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S.
335, 354 (1945) (differentiating between recognized and unrecognized Indian lands, and holding only
the latter compensable); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 340, 347 (1941) (discussing
Congress's "supreme" power to extinguish original Indian title).
279. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2. and art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
280. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
281. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "The usage of the world is... to consider the holding of
conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace.
If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the
nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new
master shall impose... The same Act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that
which regulates the intercourse, and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly created power of the state." Id. at 542.
282. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1857).
283. Id. at 177 (citing Vattel); accord New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387
(1874) (military government of New Orleans had authority under international laws of conquest to
execute lease effective after occupation terminated). But see id. at 402 (Field, J., dissenting) (lease
invalid under international law principle that agreements made by the conquerer continue only while he
retains control); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 225 (1845) (invoking international law to hold
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In Fleming V. Page,284 Chief Justice Taney determined that military
occupation alone did not make a territory part of the United States.285 The
plaintiffs contended that under the law of nations, military occupation transferred
full sovereignty to the conquering power, and that the territory thus was part of the
United States. 286 Chief Justice Taney agreed that the United States's military
occupation enjoyed the powers recognized by the international laws of war and
that under the rules of conquest the territory "[was] undoubtedly... subject to the
sovereignty and dominion of the United States." 281 But Taney also found that the
constitutional system had separated and distributed powers arising from
international law, and that only Congress had authority to extend the borders of
the United States to a new territory or to subject such a territory to U.S. laws. 288
And Congress, to date, had exercised only "the rights of war," not the right of
territorial acquisition. To Taney, the question accordingly "did not depend upon
the law of nations, but upon our own Constitution and acts of Congress. 289 Like
Marshall in American Insurance, Taney thus agreed that international rules
regarding conquest and territorial governance had been domesticated through the
Constitution. As in the war powers cases of Brown v. United States and the Prize
Cases, the controversy before the Court was reduced to the question of whether
the proper branch of the national government (the executive or Congress) had
exercised the international power.
In Jones v. United States,290 the Court invoked international rules regarding
discovery, and international publicists such as Vattel, Wheaton, Halleck,
Phillimore, and Calvo,291 to hold that the United States could acquire and adopt
criminal legislation for overseas possessions:
By the law of nations, recognized by all civilized States, dominion of new territory may be
acquired by discovery and occupation, as well as by cession or conquest; and when citizens or
that a conquering power holds new territory "subject to the constitution and laws of its own government,
and not according to those of the government ceding it").
284. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 608 (summarizing argument for plaintiffs).
287. Id. at 614.
288. Chief Justice Taney wrote: "[I]t is unnecessary to notice particularly the passages from
eminent writers on the laws of nations which were brought forward in the argument. They speak
altogether of the rights which a sovereign acquires, and the powers he may exercise in a conquered
country, and they do not bear upon the question we are considering. For in this country the sovereignty
of the United States resides in the people of the several States, and they act through their representatives,
according to the delegation and distribution of powers contained in the Constitution. And the constituted
authorities to whom the power of making war and concluding peace is confided, and of determining
whether a conquered country shall be permanently retained or not, neither claimed nor exercised any
rights or powers in relation to the territory in question but the rights of war." Id. at 617-18.
289. Id. at 615; cf Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16. How.) 164, 193 (1853) (upholding the
United State's power to impose tariffs on territory under military occupation as a "lawful exercise of a
belligerent right over conquered territory" under international law).
290. 137 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1890). The Court's opinion had methodological roots in
ambiguous language in American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828)
(upholding Congress's power to establish non-Article III territorial courts, in which judges did not hold
life tenure, either "in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government," or as a
result of the Territory Clause), and Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (upholding Congress's power to dissolve the Mormon Church,
over due process objections, as a power of "national sovereignty, [which] belong[s] to all independent
governments").
291. Jones, 137 U.S. at 212.
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subjects of one nation. . . [take possession of unoccupied] territory... the nation ... may
exercise such jurisdiction and for such period as it sees fit over territory so acquired. 292
The Court concluded that this international law principle "affords ample warrant
for the legislation of [C]ongress, ' '293 without relying on any enumerated provision.
Downes v. Bidwell,2 94 the most famous of the Insular Cases arising in the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War, addressed whether Puerto Rico was part
of the "United States" for purposes of the Uniformity Clause.295 The case,
however, had much more sweeping implications for the constitutional protections
that would be afforded to territorial inhabitants.
International law played an important role in the opinions of both Justices
Brown and White. Writing alone to announce the judgment of the Court, Justice
Brown asserted a pure inherent powers argument. Brown assumed that the United
States should have powers to acquire and govern territories as colonies
commensurate with those of other nations. "If it be once conceded that we are at
liberty to acquire foreign territory," he wrote, "a presumption arises that our
power with respect to such territories is the same power which other nations have
been accustomed to exercise. 296 Brown then found that nothing else in the
Constitution limited the exercise of that power.297
Justice White's plurality opinion differed from Justice Brown's by assuming
that federal power to govern territories derived from the Constitution.29 His
approach thus at least theoretically relied on international law to inform
enumerated provisions, rather than relying on inherent powers uncoupled from the
Constitution's text. But White also applied this approach extremely broadly.
White urged that international law recognized a sovereign authority to govern
conquered territories as it saw fite99 and then assumed that equivalent powers must
be possessed by the United States.
300
White also viewed operation of the international rules as constrained to
some extent by the Constitution. White proposed a theory of "incorporation" to
argue that territories "incorporated" into the United States by Congress would
enjoy full constitutional protections, while for "unincorporated" territories (like
Puerto Rico), only fundamental rights would apply.30' White did not, however,
292. Id. at 212. The Court also cited English and U.S. cases for the proposition that legal or de
facto sovereignty over a territory was a political question. Id. at 212, 215-16.
293. Id. at 212.
294. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("[A]II Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States").
296. Downes, 182 U.S. at 285.
297. Id. at 285-86. Having denied constitutional protection for the territories, Brown suggested that
"certain natural rights" might nevertheless restrain government action. They apparently would do so, however,
only through principles "inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character," not through legal obligation. Id at 280-83.
298. Id at 290 (White, J., concurring) (power derives from either the power to acquire
territory or the Territory Clause).
299. Id at 300, 302 (White, J., concurring) (citing American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)).
300. 182 U.S. at 302 (White, J., concurring). The contrary view that the Constitution
prevented the United States from acquiring territory that was not subject to full constitutional protections
rested "on the erroneous assumption that the United States under the Constitution is stripped of those
powers which are absolutely inherent in and essential to national existence." Id at 310-11 (White, J.,
concurring).
301. Id. at 288-91 (White, J., concurring). But see Christina Duffy Burnett, United States:
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CH. L. REv. 797, 855-60 (2005) (arguing that
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specify which provisions of the Constitution he considered fundamental. 30 2 Thus,
White conceived of Congress as enjoying a power over conquered peoples that
was essentially coterminous with that enjoyed by all sovereign nations and which
was limited, if at all, only by certain unidentified "fundamental" provisions of the
Constitution.
The four dissenters303 strenuously rejected the Court's resort to international
practice to determine basic constitutional rights. Chief Justice Fuller argued that
whatever the power of the United States to act internationally, the governance of a
U.S. territory was a matter of internal relations that the Constitution controlled:
[f]n all international relations, interests, and responsibilities the United States is a separate,
independent, and sovereign nation; but it does not derive its powers from international law....
The source of national power in this country is the Constitution of the United States; and the
government, as to our internal affairs, possesses no inherent sovereign power not derived from
that instrument, and inconsistent with its letter and spirit."'
The dissenters accordingly saw the majority Justices' reliance on international
rules-whether in interpreting U.S. constitutional authority or as a replacement
for it-as an impermissible attempt to undermine constitutional protections.
Justice White's incorporation theory was finally embraced by a majority of
the Court in Dorr v. United States,30 5 which held that the constitutional right to
jury trial was not fundamental and thus did not apply to the (unincorporated)
Philippines. The Dorr Court rejected Justice Brown's resort to inherent,
extraconstitutional sources of authority to acquire and govern territory, and
instead located the power in the enumerated War, Treaty, and Territory
Clauses.306 The Court nevertheless read these provisions as granting powers
largely equivalent to those of foreign sovereigns.30 7 The Dorr Court offered a
dubious originalist rationale for its construction of the Territory Clause, reasoning
that the Framers must have recognized a power to hold territory that was not
covered by all constitutional provisions.30 8
Thus, the Insular decisions ultimately reflected a compromise between the
extreme inherent powers position that the Constitution did not limit U.S. action at
all in the new possessions and the view that structural and substantive
the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated was not adopted to limit constitutional
protections to the insular territories, but to ensure that U.S. control over the territories could be
relinquished).
302. Fundamental constitutional rights did not include the right to grand or petit juries. See
Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (right to criminal jury trial did not apply to Puerto Rico);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (right to jury trial did not apply to Philippines); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to grand and petit jury did not apply
to Hawaii). Justices White, Brown, and McKenna apparently did not consider the prohibition against
double jeopardy fundamental. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the prohibition against double jeopardy should not apply to the Philippines,
despite its statutory application by Congress).
303. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham dissented.
304. Downes, 182 U.S. at 369 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); see also id at 386 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("[lit is said.., we may solve the question of the power of Congress under the Constitution
by referring to the powers that may be exercised by other nations. I cannot assent to this view.").
305. 195 U.S. 138, 144 (1904).
306. Id at 142. The Court has continued this practice. See, e.g., Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980) (deriving congressional power from the Territory Clause).
307. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 140, 146.
308. Id at 143.
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constitutional limitations applied in full. Nevertheless, the powers attributed to the
United States through the Territory Clause derived largely from international law.
The Court's ultimate solution was to infuse the Constitution with powers deduced
from international law, mediated by some limited constitutional protections.
The pure inherent powers approach, unhinged from constitutional text, is
disfavored today. The Court has "constitutionalized" the doctrine to some extent
by bringing the source of governmental authority back into the folds of
enumerated constitutional powers. Just as the power to govern territories
ultimately was lodged in the Territory Clause, federal power to regulate Native
American affairs has been attributed to the Territory,30 9 Treaty, and Indian
Commerce Clauses, 31° while the immigration power has been derived from the
Naturalization31' and Foreign Commerce Clauses.31 2 The "constitutionalization,"
however, remains incomplete. As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court identified
the federal Indian power as resting, in part, not on "affirmative grants of the
Constitution," but upon inherent powers that were "necessary concomitants of
nationality. 313 In immigration cases, the Court also has continued to seek
authority in unspecified "foreign affairs" powers314 and to invoke "ancient
principles of the international law of nation-states" to withhold constitutional
protection from aliens.
315
Moreover, the constitutionalization of the source of federal power has not
severed those powers' ties to international doctrine or significantly altered their
plenary scope. The international law source of governmental authority in these
areas has been relocated in constitutional text, and the harshest implications of the
international doctrines have been moderated somewhat. But rationales that
allowed the exercise of governmental power based on doctrines of inherent
powers and international law now simply parade as enumerated text. Modem
courts continue to apply these doctrines to deny other constitutional protections
and defer expansively to federal action, without any recognition of the
international law origins of the principles they are applying. The Court
consistently has failed to apply relevant international law limitations or to
acknowledge changes in international rules as international law evolves.
Constitutionalization also has not brought any searching reconsideration of the
Court's assumption that constitutional limitations operate much more weakly in
these contexts.
309. See, e.g., United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909) (relying on the Territory
Clause to hold that federal courts have jurisdiction to try crimes committed on Indian lands).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) ("This Court has traditionally
identified the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause as sources of [federal Indian] power.");
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (rejecting any extraconstitutional basis for the federal
Indian authority, locating the power in the Treaty and Indian Commerce Clauses, and holding that the
power was "drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself").
311. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1982) (relying on the Naturalization Clause).
312. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
313. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-
22 (1936)).
314. Toll, 458 U.S. at 10.
315. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
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From a legitimacy perspective, the inherent powers cases are the most
troubling of those considered in this Article. Even here, however, the legitimacy
concerns arise, not from the Court's consideration of international law, but from
its international and constitutional methodology. In both the immigration and
Indian cases, for example, the Court applied doctrines that were problematic as a
matter of international law. But it is the Court's abandonment of the concept of
enumerated and limited powers-its importation of international law while failing
to consider how the international rule was received and limited by the
constitutional system-that is both the most distinctive feature of these cases and
the most problematic.
3. Structural Analogy for the Federal System
National sovereignty is not the only area of the Constitution in which
international rules have been applied to define sovereign powers. The
constitutional system sought to divide sovereignty both horizontally and
vertically, and the contested place of sovereignty in the federal system has had
broad implications for the relationship between the Constitution and international
law. In construing horizontal federal relations among the states as well as
delineating vertical powers between the state and national governments, the Court
has looked to international rules governing relations among sovereign nations as a
background principle informing constitutional meaning. In this context,
international rules were applied either because the states were viewed as
independent bearers of certain sovereign rights and duties under international law,
or because international rules regarding sovereign relations were viewed as rules
from an analogous context-the loose association of nation states within the
global legal system---that the Court found persuasive. In either case, international
law has been seen as offering established and workable rules for governing
relations among sovereigns that seemed an appropriate model to inform the
federal system.
The approach is not uncontroversial. As Douglas Laycodk has noted in the
choice of law context, "[m]any constitutional provisions [were] designed to foster
national unity and to move interstate relations away from the international
model., 31 6 "With respect to all these matters the states were forbidden to treat
each other like foreign countries .... Relations among American states were a
new thing under the sun, and a choice-of-law system for those states must come
from the Constitution."317 On the other hand, Thomas Lee has argued that the
Constitution applies the rules of international relations to structural relations
316. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 259 (1992). These provisions include the
Privileges and Immunities, Full Faith and Credit, Extradition, Free Navigation, Supreme Court Original
Jurisdiction over Disputes Between States, the Prohibitions on State War Making and Import and Export
Taxes, and the Fugitive Slave Clauses.
317. Id. at260.
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among the states.3 18 Other scholars have simply overlooked the contributions of
international law in the federalism context.319
Nevertheless, the Court has employed international rules in cases involving
interstate relations under Fourteenth Amendment due process, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, as well as in a variety of cases governing vertical relations
between the states and the national government.
a. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Notable among the Court's international federalism cases is the first-year
civil procedure classic Pennoyer v. Neff,32 in which the Court invoked public law
international rules regarding territorial jurisdiction to interpret the reach of state
personal jurisdiction. Justice Field began his analysis by observing that although
the Constitution limited the sovereignty of states to some degree, in all other
respects the several states "possess and exercise the authority of independent
States, and the principles of public law . . . are applicable to them."32' Field
accordingly based his analysis of the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants on "two well-established principles of public law":
(1) "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory," and (2) that "no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. 322 These
principles, the Court concluded, precluded the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant absent personal service of process or appearance. Although the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause had not gone into effect at the time
the claim arose, Justice Field invoked the Amendment as consistent with his
views. 323 Pennoyer thus involved construction of what most would consider a
"domestic" constitutional clause and looked to international law to limit the state's
ability to infringe on individual rights. Indeed, although involving procedural
rather than substantive due process, Pennoyer addressed the same text for which
the Court's resort to international sources proved so controversial in Lawrence.
Justice Field authored Pennoyer in the aftermath of the Civil War, when the
modem implications of that conflict for the powers of the several states were not
fully understood. The propriety of the analogy to international rules therefore may
have been more obvious at that time. Nevertheless, while the rule in Pennoyer
318. Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State
Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027, 1051-61 (2002).
319. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 25, at 906-07 (arguing that the Supreme Court
historically has not cited foreign authority in federalism cases). The error may arise from failure to
recognize the unique contribution of international law in this area. Vicki Jackson has correctly observed
that, due to the distinctive nature of national federal relationships, comparative constitutional law may
be less helpful in the federalism context than for individual rights analysis. Jackson, Narratives, supra
note 49, at 272.
320. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
321. Id. at 722.
322. Id. (citing Justice Joseph Story on the international conflict of laws and Wheaton's
international law treatise); see also id. at 720 (describing "a principle of general, if not universal, law"
that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every
other forum... an illegitimate assumption of power ....
323. Id at 733.
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was later replaced by the minimum contacts doctrine, 324 the concept of state
territorial sovereignty laid down in that case continues to permeate (and plague)
modem U.S. personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.325
b. Full Faith and Credit
The language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is mandatory ("Full faith
and credit shall be given in each State.. ." absent congressional modification),326
and James Wilson persuasively argued at the Constitutional Convention that the
Clause was designed to require "more than what now takes place among all
Independent Nations. 327 Accordingly, resorting to background international rules
in this area has been controversial to the extent that the Clause has been read to
impose substantive limits on the state laws that are entitled to full faith and credit,
particularly in the application of a "public policy" exception. 328 Nevertheless, the
Clause is meaningless without an established system of conflict of law principles
to inform it, which the Founders arguably believed was provided by the law of
nations. 329 These include the principle that a judgment of a sister state shall not be
enforced if the sister state did not have jurisdiction. 330 Consistent with this
approach, the Court traditionally, though not invariably,331 has employed
324. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) ("The
sovereignty of each State ...implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a
limitation... in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment."). For a
critique of Pennoyer's reliance on international conflict of law rules, see Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112,
1115-16 (1981); see also Jay Conison, Wat Does Due Process Have To Do with Jurisdiction? 46
RUTGERS L. REv. 1071 (1994) (tracing the evolution of nineteenth-century conflicts doctrine leading to
Pennoyer).
325. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1031-
36 (1995) (noting that Chief Justice Stone's opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), "did not eschew the notion of territorial sovereignty" and that the Court in subsequent
decisions has remained "preoccupied with sovereignty on the one hand and fairness on the other.")
326. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Milwaukee County. v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) (asserting that "[t]he very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause
was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
obligations created under the laws ... of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation
throughout which" enforcement of an obligation "might be demanded as of right"); Mills v. Duryee, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause and implementing statute require
full recognition of sister state judgments).
327. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 489 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
328. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE. L.J. 1965, 1972 (1997) (noting that the public policy exception was
incorporated from a rule of customary international law).
329. Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 788-
89, 816 (1955); see also Laycock, supra note 316, at 297-98. Justice Story's writings on the conflict of
laws also addressed international and interstate questions interchangeably. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 8th ed. 1833).
330. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691,704-05 & n.10 (1982).
331. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) ("[T]he constitutional limitation imposed
by the full faith and credit clause abolished, in large measure, the general principle of international law
by which local policy is permitted to dominate rules of comity."); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180-82
(1895) (noting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was adopted to ensure uniform enforcement of
judgments among the several states, in contrast to international practice, where a foreign judgment
generally was only prima facie evidence of the claim).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
international law to supply the background principles informing the parameters of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Indeed, the decision in Pennoyer built upon a line of cases regarding the
sovereign powers of states developed under the Full Faith and Credit clause. 3 2 In
the early case of McElmoyle v. Cohen, Justice Wayne portrayed the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as an effort by the Framers to end the uncertainty in choice of law
rules that had prevailed both internationally and among the colonies. 333 Wayne
nevertheless invoked Story's Commentaries for the proposition that "'[t]he
Constitution did not mean to confer a new power of jurisdiction, but simply to
regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things
within the state."' 334 Wayne cited "the now well understood rights of nations to
organize their judicial tribunals according to their notions of policy," to uphold the
right of a state to apply its own statute of limitations in recognizing an out-of-state
judgment.3 35
In D'Arcy v. Ketchum,336 Justice Catron had held that one state court's
judgment against an out-of-state defendant who was not served with process was
not entitled to full faith and credit in another state, based on the "well-established
rules of international law" that foreign states disregard a judgment where the
person "has not been served with process nor had a day in court."337 "[N]ational
comity," Catron observed, "is never thus extended."33' The justification for this
approach was originalist: in implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Congress had legislated subject to "the international law as it existed among the
States in 1790."139 Given "the evil intended to be remedied by the Framers," the
language of full faith and credit had not intended to alter that existing rule.34°
Four years before Pennoyer, the Court elaborated on this approach in
Thompson v. Whitman.341 The case raised the question of whether a state was
required to grant full faith and credit to an out-of-state judgment where the sister
state had lacked jurisdiction. Justice Bradley recognized that in the absence of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, jurisdiction obviously could be raised as an
objection, since "as to a foreign judgment it is perfectly well settled that the
inquiry is always open, whether the court by which it was rendered had
jurisdiction.... 342 He concluded that despite the absolute obligation it imposed
to enforce out-of-state judgments, the Full Faith and Credit Clause preserved the
power to inquire into the jurisdiction of the sister court.343
The 1890 case of Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radclffe,34 in
turn, relied on Pennoyer to hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
require recognition of an out-of-state judgment based on the exercise of
332. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-33 (1877) (discussing Full Faith and Credit cases).
333. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 324-25 (1839) (emphasis added).
334. Id. at 327.
335. Id.
336. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
337. Id at 174.
338. Id.
339. Id at 176.
340. Id. at 176.
341. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
342. Id. at461.
343. Id. at 462-63.
344. 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction without notice to the defendant. Justice Fuller observed
that matters of state jurisdiction or sovereignty were "international" rather than
"municipal" questions, and that the principle that states did not enjoy
extraterritorial jurisdiction was "the familiar, reasonable, and just principle of the
law of nations. 345 The rationale again was based in part on an originalist
conception of state sovereignty: Fuller found it "scarce supposable that the
Framers of the Constitution designed to abrogate [the law of nations rule] between
States which were to remain as independent of each other, for all but national
purposes, as they were before the evolution., 346 Fuller also observed that
"international law" recognized constructive notice as binding upon persons
domiciled within a state, but ineffective beyond state limits. 34 7 He concluded that
a state court judgment based on such notice was not entitled to full faith and
credit.
348
Huntington v. Attril 349 addressed whether a judgment enforcing another
state's penal law was entitled to Full Faith and Credit. Justice Gray turned to
international law, noting that the case implicated "the fundamental maxim of
international law ... [that] 'The courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another."' 350 The definition of a penal law itself was "not [a question] of local, but
of international law." 351 Gray opined that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
concomitant U.S. laws giving it effect were not intended to authorize jurisdiction
of a penal suit that "cannot, on settled rules of public and international law, be
entertained by the judiciary of any other State... 352
The 1906 case of Haddock v. Haddock 53 applied international law and
practice to conclude that a state was not required to give Full Faith and Credit to a
divorce decree entered by another state with jurisdiction over only one marital
party. The question posed by the case was whether a state's inherent power over
the marriage of its own citizens created an exception to the Pennoyer rule.
3 54
Chief Justice White answered the question in the negative: Under "principles of
international law [a marriage] was entitled to obligatory extraterritorial effect.
' 355
The Full Faith and Credit Clause had not altered pre-constitutional practice, and
when the Constitution was adopted, it had never been suggested that a
government had power to dissolve a marriage solely because one party was
345. Id at 296 (relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Chief Justice Gibson
in Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447 (1844), and quoting Vattel, Burge, and Story).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 297 (quoting Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 255 (1873)).
348. Id. at 298.
349. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
350. Id. at 666 (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)). See id. at 670
(describing "the international rule which forbids such laws to be enforced in any other country"); id at
669 (quoting Blackstone's report of Chief Justice DeGrey's statement of the general rule of international
comity that "[c]rimes are in their nature local and the jurisdiction of crimes is local").
351. Id. at 683. Gray then looked mainly to U.S. and English law for examples of what should
be considered penal.
352. Id. at 685.
353. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
354. Id. at 572-73.
355. Id. at 582 (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 441, § 209
(3d ed. 1905)).
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domiciled within its borders.356 White observed that the practice in England and
continental Europe remained consistent with this rule.357
The Court's reliance on international law now provoked dissent from four
members of the court, who objected, inter alia, to the Court's return "to the old
doctrine of comity," which they believed the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
intended to supercede.358 The dissenters thus offered a view that, rather than
incorporating international rules regarding jurisdiction and conflicts of law, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause established distinct domestic rules for managing
interstate relations.
In the modem era, Justice Scalia's opinion in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman359
demonstrates the international law approach to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The case reaffirmed the holding in McElmoyle v. Cohen that a forum state could
constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations, despite the contrary approach
to diversity cases adopted under the Erie doctrine.36 ° Justice Scalia implied that
the statement by James Wilson at the Constitutional Convention "display[ed] an
expectation that [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] would be interpreted against
the background of principles developed in international conflicts law."'361 Scalia
observed that state cases immediately following ratification "show that courts
looked without hesitation to international law for guidance in resolving.., which
State's law governs the statute of limitations," and uniformly applied the statute
from the forum where the suit was pending.362 "Obviously, judges writing in the
era when the Constitution was framed and ratified thought the use of the forum
statute of limitations to be proper in the interstate context," Scalia reasoned.
"Their implicit understanding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
preclude reliance on the international law rule carries great weight. 3 63 The Court
accordingly rejected the suggestion that the contrary rule regarding application of
statutes of limitations in diversity cases should alter the full faith and credit
rule.3 4
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall all objected to the majority's
reliance on "tradition" rather than the Court's established "interest-contacts" test
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Like the dissenters in Haddock, they
argued that "[t]he very purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties. 365
356. Id at 576.
357. Id at 579 (quoting Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, (1895) A.C. 517, 527 (P.C.) ("When the
jurisdiction of the court is exercised according to the rules of international law," as when both parties are
domiciled there, "its decree dissolving their marriage ought to be respected by the tribunals of every
civilized country.... On the other hand, a decree of divorce [where jurisdiction is based solely on a rule
of municipal law peculiar to the forum] cannot, when it trenches upon the interests of any other country.
. .claim extraterritorial authority."). White observed that "[w]hile the continental and English authorities
were not alluded to in the argument," they nevertheless help illustrate the question before the Court. Id
at 581-82.
358. Id. at 627-28 (Brown, J., dissenting).
359. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
360. Id at 722 (citing McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327-28 (1839)).
361. Id at 723.
362. Id at 724; see also Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 365, 371 (Mass. 1820).
363. 486 U.S. at 725.
364. Id at 726-29.
365. Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. at 276-77 (1935)). Brennan further noted that the rule
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c. Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction
The grant of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over controversies
between states was a novel innovation which in essence established the Court as
an international tribunal with power to resolve disputes between sovereigns.
366
The Court accordingly has looked to international rules to determine whether
controversies between states, and between states and a citizen of another state, are
properly subject to the Court's Article Il, § 2 original jurisdiction.
In Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,367 the Court held that its original
jurisdiction did not include a state's effort to extraterritorially enforce its own
penal laws. As in the later Full Faith and Credit case Huntington v. Attrill, which
Justice Gray also authored, Gray reasoned that, despite the constitutional text's
apparently comprehensive grant of jurisdiction, the Constitution "was not
intended to confer ... jurisdiction of a suit or prosecution by the one State...
[that] could not, on the settled principles of public and international law, be
entertained by the judiciary of the other State at all."368 He cited international
treatises for the proposition that a state's penal laws cannot apply
extraterritorially, 369 asserted that this had always been the U.S. rule,3 70 and
concluded that the Framers could not have intended all cases enforcing a
judgment from another state to fall within the Court's original jurisdiction. 371
In Kansas v. Colorado,372 the Court upheld its exclusive original jurisdiction
to resolve water rights controversies between states and implied that the scope of
this jurisdiction was determined in part by international law. In a dispute with
Kansas over use of the Colorado river waters, Colorado claimed that the two
states enjoyed the same relationship as two foreign nations. Colorado further
proffered a test for original jurisdiction that "only those controversies are
justiciable in this court which, prior to the Union, would have been just cause for
reprisal by the complaining State... under international law.
3 73
The Court was sympathetic to Colorado's view of the Court's original
jurisdiction.374 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller observed that the
constitutional system had deprived states of certain rights that they would have
enjoyed as sovereigns under international law, such as the ability to enter treaties
rejected in Milwaukee was still the prevailing international conflicts rule. Id. at 740 n.3 (citing decisions
from the United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, and foreign statutes).
366. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 32 (1924) ("For the
first time, there now came into existence a permanent Court, which should have the power to summon
before it sovereign States in dispute and to determine their respective rights by a judgment which should
be enforceable against them.").
367. 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Accord Oklahoma ex rel. West v. Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry
Co., 220 U.S. 290 (1911) (relying on Pelican Insurance to reject original jurisdiction over claim by a
state seeking to enjoin a private party from violating state criminal laws).
368. Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 289.
369. Id. at 290-92 ("The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another
applies.., to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties.").
370. Id. at 293-94.
371. Id. at 300.
372. 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
373. Id. at 143 (claiming, on behalf of Colorado, that this test gives the state exclusive right to
use of the river waters as it chooses).
374. Id. at 144 (expressing the Court's concern over how to decide what would constitute a
just cause of war between two states).
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or to engage in warfare,3 75 and that in place of these rights, the Constitution had
substituted the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve such disputes.376
The Court concluded that because Kansas and Colorado could have freely entered
a treaty regarding the water dispute as international sovereigns but no longer
could do so, the Court should have original jurisdiction.377 The Court also
observed that in resolving disputes between states, it was "[s]itting . . . as an
international, as well as a domestic tribunal" and accordingly "appl[ied] Federal
law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case ...
demand[ed]. 378 When the case returned to the Court a few years later, Justice
Brewer reaffirmed that because the Constitution had eliminated the states' ability
to resort to either treaties or force, the Constitution gave the Court original
jurisdiction to resolve interstate disputes.379 Nor was the Court's jurisdiction
ousted, Brewer noted, "even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States sovereign
and independent in local matters, the relations between them depend in any
respect upon principles of international law. International law is no alien in this
tribunal." 
8
d. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
The immunity of states from suit has been another rich area for resort to
international law.381 The debate over the relevance of international law to thisquestion was joined early in Chisholm v. Georgia,382 the case that triggered the
375. Id. at 140-41 ("[A]s the remedies resorted to by independent states for the determination
of controversies raised by collision between them were withdrawn from the States by the Constitution, a
wide range of matters... was made justiciable by that instrument" (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 15 (1890)); id. at 142 ("If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must admit that she
could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make
war having been surrendered to the general government," the general government was expected to
provide a remedy and did so through the Constitution (quoting Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241
(1901)).
376. Id. at 141; see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1908) ("If the two States were
absolutely independent nations it would be settled by treaty or by force. Neither of these ways being
practicable, it must be settled by decision of this court.").
377. 185 U.S. at 145. For another explicit interpretation of the Court's jurisdiction as reaching
disputes likely to give rise to war between foreign states, see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 27 (1900)
(Brown, J., concurring in the result) (arguing that an embargo between states should give rise to original
Supreme Court jurisdiction, since "[a]n embargo, though not an act of war, is frequently resorted to as
preliminary to a declaration of war, and may be treated under certain circumstances as a sufficient casus
belli").
378. Id. at 146-47.
379. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 97 ("Force under our system of Government is
eliminated.").
380. Id. at 97 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
381. For a strong argument that the text of the Eleventh Amendment should be understood as
incorporating international rules regarding state immunity from suit, see Lee, supra note 318, at 1051-61
(2002).
382. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The controversy, in fact, arose before the Constitution was
adopted. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent .... Unless, therefore,
there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States .. ");
with 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CoNsInTTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 573
(Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1891) (statement of Edmund Randolph)
(arguing that the Constitution rejected the international rule, since "whatever the law of nations may say
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adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. In recognizing jurisdiction in Chisholm to
hear a suit between a state and a citizen of another state, the Court divided over
the relevance of international law to the question. The Attorney General for the
United States argued that the sovereignty of the several states had been
diminished by their obligations under the Constitution,383 and that they therefore
did not enjoy the rights of international sovereigns. Even if the states could be
considered the equivalents of independent nations, however, he invoked
Bynkershoek for the proposition that under the law of nations, a prince could be
sued in rem in the courts of another sovereign, and that this principle established
the state's amenability to suit.
38 4
Writing in favor of allowing the suit, Justice James Wilson likewise
reasoned that the rights of sovereigns under the law of nations were inapplicable
to the question, since the several states were not analogous to the society of
nations. Wilson did, however, look to Vattel for definition of a sovereign
(which he concluded the American states were not).386 Even if the states did enjoy
the rights of independent sovereigns, Wilson argued, their amenability to suit
within the constitutional system was necessary to enforce their rights under
international law and to maintain domestic peace.387 By thus submitting the states
to judicial authority, "the law of nations; the rule between contending States;
[would] be enforced among the several States, in the same manner as municipal
law.",38 Wilson thus viewed the constitutional system as creating special needs in
the relations among states that had warranted limiting or abolishing the
international sovereign immunity rule.
Justice Iredell recognized that the immunity of the sovereign was a principle
of natural law as well as the common law.389 He also recognized the possibility
that international law could serve as a backdrop to the question. With respect to
the Attorney General's argument that international law allowed suits against the
sovereign, however, he responded:
No part of the Law of Nations can apply to this case... but that part which is termed 'The
Conventional Law of Nations;' nor can this any otherwise apply than as furnishing rules of
interpretation, since unquestionably the people of the United States had a right to form what
kind of union, and upon what terms they pleased, without reference to any former examples. If
upon a fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, the power contended for really
exists, it undoubtedly may be exercised, though it be a power of the first impression. If it does
not exist, upon that authority, ten thousand examples of similar powers would not warrant its
assumption.
3 9 0
.. any doubt respecting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away
by the words where a state shall be a party.").
383. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 423.
384. Id. at 425-26 n.3.
385. Id. at 453 (Wilson, J.) ("From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can
be expected," since the countries forming the global community constitute "a society, not a NATION.").
386. Id. at 457 and n.9.
387. Id. at 465; see also id. at 474 (Jay, C.J.) ("There was danger that from this source
animosities would in time result; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the
history of independent States, a common tribunal for the termination of controversies became desirable,
from motives both ofjustice and of policy.").
388. Id. at 465 (Wilson, J.).
389. Id at 442 (Iredell, J.).
390. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
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This language has been misunderstood as a more general rejection of the
relevance of international law to constitutional interpretation. Read closely,
however, the passage recognizes that the law of nations could "furnish rules of
interpretation" for the Constitution, where consistent with the language of that
instrument. Iredell, however, viewed the states as "completely sovereign" and
protected from suit "in every instance where [their] sovereignty has not been
delegated to the United States .... ""9 Iredell found nothing in the language of the
Constitution or the Federal Judiciary Act that purported to obliterate the states'
preexisting rights, and thus found the Attorney General's argument from
international law irrelevant to the case.392
After the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, early decisions viewed the
Amendment as incorporating established principles of international law. New
Hampshire v. Louisiana393 looked to international law to hold that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal suits by one state on behalf of its citizens against
another state, where the citizens themselves had a remedy available in state court.
Justice Waite referenced Sir Robert Phillimore for the proposition that "no
principle of international law... makes it the duty of one nation to assume the
collection of the claims of its citizens against another nation, if the citizens
themselves have ample means of redress without the intervention of their
government."394 Reasoning from this principle, he noted that the Constitution
allowed citizens of one state to sue in state court to obtain relief, and concluded
that by affording a direct remedy to citizens, the Constitution "[took] away any
indirect remedy ... through the intervention of his state, upon any principle of the
law of nations."
Modem sovereign immunity cases obliquely continue to acknowledge the
international law roots of the doctrine. Although the major disagreement between
the majority and dissenters in Seminole Tribe turned on the majority's reliance on
practices under the common law, Chief Justice Rehnquist defended the Court's
prior Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as rooted "not solely in the common
law of England, but in the much more fundamental 'jurisprudence in all civilized
nations,' ' 396 and cited Hamilton in The Federalist for the proposition that
sovereign immunity "is the general sense and the general practice of mankind.
397
Justice Souter's dissent, in turn, criticized the approach.398 In Alden v. Maine,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion portrayed sovereign immunity as deriving
from the sovereignty enjoyed by states before the Constitution, and as confirmed,
rather than established, by the Eleventh Amendment. 399 Justice Souter and the
other dissenters again retorted that "[t]he doctrine that the sovereign could not be
391. Id at 435.
392. Id at 434-35.
393. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
394. Id. at 90.
395. Id. at 91.
396. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
397. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
398. Id. at 131.
399. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 728-29 (1999).
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sued by his subjects might have been thought by medieval civil lawyers to belong
tojus gentium, the law of nations, which was a type of natural law .'.. o
e. Tenth Amendment Reserved Powers
Despite the controversy in Printz v. United States4°' between Justices Scalia
and Breyer over the relevance of comparative examples to identifying the
essential independence of the states preserved by the Tenth Amendment,
international law has played some role in prior Tenth Amendment analysis.
United States v. Bekins,4° for example, looked to international law to conclude
that a state's consent constituted a sovereign act that eliminated any Tenth
Amendment objection to infringement on sovereignty. Citing the international
writings of Oppenheim and Hyde, Chief Justice Hughes observed that
It is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts and give consents bearing upon
the exertion of governmental power. This is constantly illustrated in treaties and conventions in
the international field by which governments yield their freedom of action in particular matters
in order to gain the benefits which accrue from international accord.... The reservation to the
States by the Tenth Amendment protected, and did not destroy, their right to make contracts
and give consents where that action would not contravene the provisions of the Federal
Constitution.4 3
Hughes' analysis thus recognized that to the extent that the rights of the states
under the Tenth Amendment derive from their residual character as sovereigns,
international rules regarding sovereign powers and relations could be relevant to
that analysis.
f. Vertical Federalism: Allocating Power Between State and
National Governments
The Court also has looked to international law as a background principle to
help determine the constitutional distribution of power between the state and
national governments. These include cases addressed above, such Holmes v.404 405
Jennison and Worcester v. Georgia, as well as cases addressing state versus
federal jurisdiction over territorial waters406 and cases involving the Commerce407 408 409
Clause, alien property and preemption under the foreign affairs power.
400. Id at 767 n.6.
401. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See infra notes 750-751 and accompanying text.
402. 304 U.S. 27(1938).
403. Id at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). The Court has also looked to international law in
construing other aspects of state immunity. See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529
(1857) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot
be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks
proper, waive this privilege" and exercise of this power to waive or reinstate immunity is not an
unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract.).
404. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
405. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
406. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (holding that Florida may constitutionally
criminalize the conduct of its citizens on the high seas, since no rule of international law prohibits a
government from regulating the conduct of its own citizens abroad); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139
U.S. 240, 264 (1891) ("The extent of the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea adjacent to
its coast is that of an independent nation; and, except so far as any right of control over this territory has
been granted to the United States, this control remains with the state."); Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. 610
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The Court, for example, has looked to international law to conclude that
Congress has primary authority over the regulation of aliens, to the exclusion of
contrary state acts. Thus, in Hines v. Davidowitz,410 Justice Black relied on the
existence of treaties and customary international rules regarding the treatment of
aliens, and the potential for conflict with other nations, as the explanation for
placing a strong preemptive authority over the regulation of aliens in the national
government.41 1 Given these international law and comity412 concerns, Black
concluded that where Congress had acted in the field, state law could not augment
or conflict with that action.
In determining whether the state or federal government exercised control
over territorial seas beyond the low tide mark in United States v. California,413 the
Court looked to the historical evolution of the international law of territorial seas
to conclude that the power lay with the federal government. California argued it
possessed title to three English miles of adjacent seas, since this had been the
entitlement of the thirteen original colonies, the boundary had been recognized by
the state constitution when California was admitted to the Union, and California
(1872) (recognizing the several states as sovereigns receiving international law and invoking
international law to define state's territorial jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas).
407. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891) (holding that a state's
proportionate taxation of railroad traffic within the state comports with the modem "general principles
of law" that "the legislative power of every state extends to all property within its borders," and thus
does not violate the Commerce Clause). The dissenters objected to applying the powers enjoyed by
independent nations to the states. They argued: "Amongst independent nations, it is true, persons and
property within the territory of a nation are subject to its laws, and it is responsible to other nations for
any injustice it may do to the persons or property of such other nations. This is a rule of international
law. But the states of this government are not independent nations. There is such a thing as a constitution
of the United States, and there is such a thing as a government of the United States. ... Id. at 30
(Bradley, J., dissenting with Field and Harlan, JJ.); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. 518, 582 (1851) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]very independent nation has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the navigable waters lying within its territorial limits .... This was the
situation of the old States prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Each was then an independent
sovereign State," and arguing that although the Commerce Clause delegated some of this power to
Congress, states retained control where Congress had not legislated).
408. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1879) (citing Vattel and noting that, absent a
treaty or federal law, the states possess the international law right of governments to give foreigners only
the rights to immovable property that they see fit).
409. American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that state law, which
required insurance companies that had operated in Europe during World War II to disclose certain
information, impermissibly interfered with presidential power to conduct foreign affairs); Zschemig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (overturning state law prohibiting inheritance by non-resident alien as
intruding into foreign affairs).
410. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
411. Justice Black observed that the U.S. and other countries had entered numerous treaties
promising broad rights and privileges to aliens, and "there has grown up in the field of international
relations a body of customs defining with more or less certainty the duties owing by all nations to alien
residents." Id. at 65. He concluded that "[i]n general, both treaties and international practices have been
aimed at preventing injurious discriminations against aliens." Id at 64-65. With respect to the rules of
custom, Black also pointed out that the State Department has "often successfully insisted foreign nations
must recognize [these] as to our nationals abroad." Id. at 65. Black cited Oppenheim, Moore, and other
writers for the proposition that "[e]very State is by the Law of Nations compelled to grant to aliens at
least equality before the law with its citizens, as far as safety of person and property is concerned." Id. at
65 n.14. He also observed that the U.S. government had often insisted that foreign governments comply
with these rules with respect to U.S. nationals abroad. Id. at 65.
412. The treatment of a nation's citizens abroad was "[o]ne of the most important and delicate
of all international relationships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government," and had
provoked grave international controversies. Id. at 64.
413. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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had been admitted on an "equal footing" with other states. The United States
government, in turn, claimed dominion over the three-mile territorial sea
recognized under modem international law.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black observed that the United States was
acting in two capacities in this context: as the protector of the nation, and as "a
member of the family of nations.' '414 Black observed that the lack of any
agreement regarding the reach of territorial seas at the time of the founding, and
the international rule's subsequent evolution, undermined the State's claim and
bolstered that of the national government. According to Black, a "multitude of
references" regarding the international law of territorial waters415 established that,
at the time of independence, "there was no settled international rule or custom
among nations recognizing that each nation owned a three-mile water belt along
its borders.' '416 Thus, it was not possible to say that the original colonies had
acquired separate ownership of a three-mile sea belt from the Crown.
International law now, however, recognized a three-mile territorial zone.
Justice Black noted that shortly after the nation's founding, the United States had
become interested in establishing a clear marginal zone to protect its neutrality,
and "[1]argely as a result of [U.S.] efforts," a three-mile territorial zone had been
"generally accepted throughout the world."417 The political branches of the
national government now claimed and exercised broad dominion over the three-
mile zone, an assertion of sovereign dominion that Black found "binding upon
this Court.'
' s
Black concluded that assertion of rights in the three-mile belt implicated
comity concerns under U.S. international law obligations, since the zone was
defined by international law, was subject to regulation by treaty and international
negotiation, and conduct within it could provoke international disputes. 4 9 All of
these were "paramount responsibilities of the nation, rather than an individual
state"420 and supported the Court's conclusion that dominion rested in the national
government.
The Court's use of international rules to delineate horizontal relationships
within the federal system is not based on a desire to uphold U.S. international
414. Id. at 29.
415. Id. at 31 & n.10.
416. Id. at 32 (noting that although England, Spain, and Portugal at one time made sweeping
claims over expanses of ocean, "when this nation was formed, the idea of a three-mile belt over which a
littoral nation could exercise rights of ownership was but a nebulous suggestion"). Black found that no
treaty or colonial charters with Great Britain or other documents indicated ownership of a three-mile
belt, and that no one at the time had laid claim to such title, although the Continental Congress had
regulated the capture of ships "within three leagues [about nine miles] of the coasts." Id. at 32 n.15.
Indeed, the question of ownership of the sea bed had only become important in the twentieth century,
when oil was discovered there. Id at 37.
417. Id. at 33. Black noted that as late as 1876 "there was still considerable doubt in England"
about the rule's scope or existence. Id.
418. Id at 33-34 & n.18.
419. Id. at 35.
420. Id. Justice Frankfurter noted in dissent that the Court did not accept the government's
argument that international law gave the government a proprietary ownership of the territory, but limited
its holding to recognition of national dominion. Id. at 42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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obligations or to preserve harmony in the international system. The focus instead
is on maintaining internal harmony. The early Court, to some extent, was
operating from the perspective that the several states were quasi-intemational
sovereigns, and that relations among the states should be governed by
international rules unless the Constitution provided to the contrary. Original
understanding thus played a more prominent role in justifying reliance on
international law in construing provisions such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause
than in other contexts considered in this article. By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, the claim that the states were analogous to international
sovereigns had begun to erode. 42' The Court nevertheless continued to apply
international rules to govern relations among states and with the national
government. This approach could have been simply the result of stare decisis
once the doctrine had been established. But the Court's practice of analogizing
interstate relations to relationships in the international sphere was also uneven.
The Court declined to apply international rules to interstate extraditions under
Article IV, § 2423 to the Fugitive Slave Clause,424 and to aspects of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, rejecting the suggestion in these contexts that relations among
the states were analogous to the international sphere. The Court also declined to
apply rules of international tax jurisdiction to interstate taxation.425
In some cases where the Court relied upon international law, the common
law offered an alternative model for resolving the dispute, but the Court rejected
that approach.426 Other cases had no common law analogue. The Court appears to
have continued to apply international rules to questions arising in the federal
relationship-particularly questions that had no parallel in the common law427 -
421. See Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 30 (1891) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting), discussed supra note 407. The view that the states remained the dominant instruments of
governance in domestic life, however, persisted well after the war and limited the impact of
Reconstruction. See BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC 735-41 (1977).
422. Compare Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 610, 623 (1872) ("[E]xcept for the purposes
and to the extent to which these attributes have been transferred to the United States, the State ...
possesses all the rights and powers of a sovereign State."), with New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76, 90 (1883) ("All the rights of the states as independent nations were surrendered to the United States.
The states are not nations, either as between themselves or towards foreign nations. They are sovereign
within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops short of nationality.").
423. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893) (citing international treaty rule that person
extradicted to stand trial for one offense cannot be tried for another offense does not apply to interstate
extradition); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 99-100 (1860) (holding that the Article IV, § 2
Extradition Clause did not incorporate the exception for political crimes recognized in international
extradition).
424. Prigg v. Pennslyvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). In invalidating a state law forbidding
the keeping of slaves, Justice Story observed that international law would have allowed Pennsylvania to
prohibit slavery, but that the Fugitive Slave Clause had been adopted to supercede the international rule.
Id. at 611-12 ("By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, as to
foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions .... It is manifest, from this consideration, that if
the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slave-holding state in the Union would have
been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves coming within its limits .... ).
425. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 326 (1932); supra note 222.
426. See, e.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 263-64 (1890) (rejecting common
law rules regarding the water rights of English counties as the appropriate analogy for the water rights of
states).
427. Cf Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141 (1901) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
15 (1889), and noting that the Constitution created justiciable problems, such as boundary conflicts
between states, that were unknown to the common law and to which the common law offered no
solution).
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because those rules were convenient, well-defined, had proven workable over
time, and addressed a problem that appeared roughly analogous to the one
confronting the Court. International law, and particularly principles of public law,
therefore, offered a ready model for addressing a set of problems that the Court
otherwise would have had to craft from whole cloth.428
C. Individual Rights
The Court's use of international law in construing individual rights has
already been considered in a number of contexts above, including the application
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal protections,42 9 habeas corpus,430
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, 431 freedom of contract,432 due process in the
personal jurisdiction433 and foreign taxation 434 contexts, the application of
individual rights in territories,43' and extraterritorial limits on the scope of
individual rights protections.436 All of those cases properly could be included in
this section, but are discussed above due to the contexts in which they arise. This
section considers additional individual rights cases, including just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, Thirteenth Amendment involuntary
servitude, cases in which international law creates a governmental interest
implicating an individual right, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, and substantive and procedural due process. International law in
these cases serves as a background principle informing the Court's search for the
fundamental values embodied in constitutional text. It thus functions much like
international law in the national sovereignty and federalism cases addressed
above. International law is binding to the extent that it creates governmental
interests and otherwise is persuasive as evidence of the considered opinion,
workable rules, and shared common values of the international community. The
individual rights cases also might be understood as reflecting, to some extent, the
Constitution's natural law tradition and concepts of universal law. At various
times in the nation's history, different individual rights provisions have been
recognized as embodying a preexisting sense of the entitlements every person
enjoys as a result of being human.4 37
428. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("[T]his expectation [that
international rules of comity would apply to the Full Faith and Credit Clause] was practically inevitable,
since there was no other developed body of conflicts law to which courts in our new Union could turn
for guidance."); see also id. at 727-28 ("If we abandon the currently applied, traditional notions. . . we
would embark upon the enterprise of constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules, with no compass to guide
us beyond our own perceptions of what seems desirable.").
429. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (denationalization); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (military commissions); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (trial of citizen by
consular court); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (10 Wail.) 268 (1870) (confiscation of enemy property).
430. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
431. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
432. See supra note 190.
433. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
434. Burner v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914).
435. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
436. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.b.iii.
437. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83, 291 (1901) (Brown, J. & White, J.)
(suggesting an extraconstitutional, natural law source for fundamental rights); see also Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 286-89 (1892) (discussing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553-54
(1875)) (asserting that certain rights recognized in the Constitution, such as the rights to peaceably
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1. Takings
The Supreme Court has looked to sovereign powers under international law
in construing the power of eminent domain and the duty to provide just
compensation. Eminent domain historically has been addressed as an inherent
power of both the national and state governments, while the resort to international
rules in the Fifth Amendment takings context essentially recognizes the Just
Compensation Clause as referencing preexisting concepts of international law and
438the common law. But due to their close relationship, the questions of eminentdomain and just compensation are addressed together here.
a. Eminent Domain
The Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause implicitly recognizes the
existence of the power of eminent domain,439 and eminent domain could be
viewed as necessary and proper to implement other enumerated governmental
powers. But the Court traditionally has treated eminent domain as an inherent
power, looking to international law and the common law as the source of an
inherent national authority to condemn private property for public use. The Just
Compensation Clause in turn has been understood as merely imposing an express
limitation on the exercise of eminent domain by the national government. As the
Court put it in United States v. Jones,
The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the right of eminent
domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty, and...
requires no constitutional recognition. The provision found in the Fifth Amendment to the
federal Constitution... for just compensation for the property taken, is merely a limitation
upon the use of the power. It is no part of the power itself, but a condition upon which the
power may be exercised.
440
Where state exercises of eminent domain have been challenged as infringing on
constitutional rights such as the freedom of contract, 441 the Court has looked to
international law to conclude that no constitutional right has been infringed. In
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, Justice Daniel contended that the right to contract
was qualified by the sovereign power of eminent domain," 2 which derived from
assemble, to bear arms, and to life and liberty were preexisting rights that were not granted by the
Constitution, but were natural and inalienable rights of man, which the Constitution simply recognized
and explicitly guaranteed against state encroachment); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 213, 266
(1827) (holding that Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws because "laws of this character are
oppressive, unjust, and tyrannical; and, as such, are condemned by the universal sentence of civilized
man"); cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 728-29 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity
preexisted the Constitution and was confirmed, rather than established, by the Eleventh Amendment).
438. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 15 (2002) (history of
the Just Compensation Clause suggests that drafters "were simply constitutionalizng the legal status
quo," including the understanding of publicists such as Pufenforf and Vattel).
439. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
440. 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845)
(citing Vattel) (The right of eminent domain "is, in certain cases, necessary to him who governs, and is,
consequently, a part of... sovereign power.").
441. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
442. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848) ("[I]n every political sovereign community there
inheres necessarily the right and the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting
the interests and welfare of the community at large.... This power, denominated the eminent domain of
the State, is, as its name imports, paramount to all private rights vested under the government.").
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the law of nations, and that its exercise accordingly did not violate the right to
contract protected by the Constitution.443 "[I]nto all contracts . . . there enter
conditions which... are superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of
the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong;
they are always presumed. '444 Justice McLean agreed with Daniel that the power
of a state to take private property was "an incident to sovereignty,'A45 which
McLean viewed as incorporated into the national government's powers through
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.446 Justice Woodbury looked to
international law publicists in support of the rule that all property in a state derives
from the government and is therefore subject to public uses,4 4 7 and cited Vattel for
the proposition that payment of compensation for public takings of property was
the prevailing modem practice.448
b. Just Compensation
International law also has been employed to inform various aspects of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Although it is unclear that the drafters of the
Takings Clause intended the concept of "public use" to impose a substantive
restriction on the power of eminent domain, in the early nineteenth century lower
courts began construing that language in light of the writings of Grotius,
Pufendorf, Vattel, and others in an attempt to restrain increased use of the eminent
domain power.449 The Supreme Court itself has looked to international law to
deny just compensation for the taking of Indian lands, as noted previously, 450 and
to inform construction of the Just Compensation Clause in cases implicating war
and conquest.
United States v. Pacific R.R.,451 for example, recognized that under
international law, the government was not obligated to pay compensation for
takings of private property resulting from extreme exigencies in wartime. Writing
for the Court, Justice Field observed that under the international laws of war, no
compensation could be claimed against a government for injuries and destruction
443. Id. at 532-33.
444. Id. at 532.
445. Id. at 536 (McLean, J., concurring).
446. Id at 538.
447. Id at 539 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (citing to Vattel and Grotius, as well as American
cases and other commentaries).
448. Id. at 540; accord Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 404
(1912) (upholding state power of eminent domain against impairment of contract challenge); cf Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 641-42 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (citing Vattel
for the definition and scope of state governmental power of eminent domain in impairment of contract
challenge).
449. Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
"Takings Clause, " 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248-55 (2002); see also Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use
Limitations and Natural Property Rights, MICH. ST. L. REv. 877, 892-94 (2004) (discussing the concept
of public use in the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, and Vattel). Gratitude is due to
Thomas Merrill for bringing this point to my attention.
450. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955); Nw. Bands of Shoshone
Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 354 (1945); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
347 (1941); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294
(1902). See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.ii.
451. 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
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that were the result of essential military operations.45 2 Field quoted Vattel's
distinction between wartime damages committed deliberately by the state and
those "caused by inevitable necessity, ' '4s 3 in which latter case, no compensation
was owed. The Court noted that Congress and the President had also recognized
this distinction in reliance on international law,454 and observed that although the
government had compensated some claims for takings arising from military
necessity in the past, such practices "may not be within the terms of the
constitutional clause. ''4ss In other words, international law and the Just
Compensation Clause did not mandate compensation, even if the government had
awarded it in practice.456
Juragua Iron Co. v. United States4 7 built upon this principle, looking to the
international laws of war to establish that the plaintiff was an enemy whose
property could be destroyed without just compensation in wartime. The litigant
owned mining operations in Cuba that were destroyed by the U.S. military during
the Spanish-American War.4 s8 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment just
compensation principle did not apply even to U.S.-owned property in the
"enemy's country," since such property was "subject under the laws of war to be
destroyed whenever [militarily necessary].,,459 The Court observed that the U.S.
military was obligated to "observe the rules governing the conduct of independent
nations when engaged in war," and that, having presumably done so, it owed no
460obligation to pay compensation under the Constitution.
Thus, at least in some circumstances, the Just Compensation Clause has
been understood as referencing concepts operative under international law, and
international rules have been employed to define the scope of both governmental
authority and individual rights under the Takings Clause. International law,
452. Id. at 234 ("For all injuries and destruction which followed necessarily .. . no
compensation could be claimed from the government. By the well-settled doctrines of public law it was
not responsible for them.").
453. Id at 234-35.
454. In vetoing a bill to compensate a loyal citizen whose house had been destroyed to prevent
its use by the enemy, the President observed that "[i]t is a general principle of both international and
municipal law that all property is held subject" to be used or destroyed "in times of great public danger,
when the public safety demands it; and in this latter case governments do not admit a legal obligation on
their part to compensate the owner." Id at 238. Congress subsequently declined to pay such claims,
leading the court to conclude that "[t]he principle that ... the government is not responsible [for private
damage arising from military necessity] is thus considered established." Id. at 239.
455. Id. The Court attempted to reconcile the international rule with its prior holdings by
providing that properties taken from loyal citizens to support and transport armies were not acts of
necessity and were entitled to compensation. Id. at 239-40.
456. The Court held that the actual conduct challenged was not an act of military necessity,
and thus the government must bear the cost. Id. at 240.
457. 212 U.S. 297 (1909).
458. Id. at 301.
459. Id. at 305-06. Juragua Iron quotes extensively from Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 268 (1870), Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1875), Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877),
and United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887), for the point that the laws of war do not require
compensation for destruction resulting from military necessity, and cites Vattel and Burlamaqui. 212
U.S. at 306-07. The Court also quotes Hall's International Law for the proposition that a person's
property in enemy territory may be treated as enemy property. Id. at 307-08. Furthermore, the Court
relied on the laws of war to establish that Cuba was enemy territory and all persons residing there were
enemies. Id. at 305-06.
460. Id. at 308.
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however, apparently has been utilized by the Court more frequently to deny
compensation than to grant it.
2. Involuntary Servitude
International law played a prominent role in constitutional debates over the
domestic abolition of slavery.4 1 Although Robertson v. Baldwin462 did not
explicitly invoke that heritage, the Court considered historical and contemporary
international practice to hold that the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on
involuntary servitude did not bar the forcible return of seamen to their vessel.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brown urged that the Amendment was intended
specifically to eliminate chattel slavery and should not be read to bar forms of
service that had been treated as exceptional "from time immemorial. ' '463 Brown
devoted four pages to discussion of foreign sources-both ancient and
contemporary-to argue that treatment of seamen constituted such an exception,
and that sailors had often been imprisoned or forced to pay fines for unauthorized
absence from their vessel.464
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the plain language of the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibited the coerced employment of seamen, and objected to the
Court's resort to foreign and historical usages to evade this clear constitutional
mandate.465 Harlan did not contend that use of international sources was
inappropriate per se in constitutional analysis; he instead challenged both the
majority's choice of sources and the application of those sources to alter plain
constitutional text. In particular, Harlan criticized the majority's invocation of
archaic practices, such as the laws of the ancient Rhodians, which involved the
conduct of despotic governments with no concept of modem individual rights.
466
Harlan further objected to the Court's reliance on the practices of modem states
whose laws did not prohibit involuntary servitude.46 7 In short, Harlan argued that
the constitutional protection should not be undermined by resort to foreign
examples from countries where involuntary servitude was legal. Baldwin thus
illustrates the importance of both appropriate methodology in identifying
international practice and the need to preserve respect for constitutional design in
applying international standards.
461. For a discussion of the role of international law regarding slavery and the slave trade in
the years leading to Dred Scott, see generally Janis, supra note 165; William M. Wiecek, Slavery and
Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978).
462. 165 U.S. 275, 283-86 (1897).
463. Id. at 282.
464. Id. at 282-86.
465. Id. at 297 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the Thirteenth Amendment forbid the
practice, the laws of other countries were "of no consequence whatever"); see also id. at 301 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
466. Id. at 293-94, 302 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan noted that some of the ancient laws cited
by the Court allowed imprisonment with only bread and water for one year, or for a person to be branded on
the face-acts which would not be tolerated in the modem United States. Id. at 294 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan also noted that the Massachusetts colonial law and the 1780 statute cited by the Court had been
in place at a time when slavery was lawful. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 296-97 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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3. Governmental Interests Created by International Law
A number of cases addressed above have involved international law in the
construction of individual rights. One distinct context in which international law
has been used in construing individual rights provisions of the Constitution,
however, involves cases in which the United States's own international law
obligations have been asserted as creating governmental interests warranting
infiingement, or protection, of civil liberties. The most prominent example of this
approach arose in Boos v. Barry,468 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
District of Columbia law prohibiting the display of signs near foreign embassies
that tended to bring the foreign government into "public disrepute." 469 The D.C.
Circuit had previously upheld the law, based on its conclusion that the United
States's international diplomatic obligations created a compelling governmental
interest.470 The Supreme Court declined to determine whether this interest was
compelling, finding instead that the law was not narrowly tailored.471 But the
Court recognized that U.S. obligations under treaties and customary international
law gave the United States a "vital national interest" in protecting the "dignity" of
foreign embassies. 472 The opinion appeared to assume that international
obligations could establish governmental interests under the First Amendment,
473
and raised, but did not answer, the question whether such an international interest
could warrant "adjust[ing]" First Amendment analysis. 474 Like constitutional due
process, the First Amendment does not textually invite consideration of
international sources. Yet Boos v. Barry suggests that in some contexts it would
be difficult to conduct even First Amendment analysis without considering
international law.
Nor is this approach novel. Although not itself a constitutional case, a case
currently pending before the Supreme Court, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal,475 involves an analogous effort to use U.S.
international law obligations to establish a compelling governmental interest in a
claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).476 The United
States, in 0 Centro, is arguing that U.S. drug trafficking treaties establish a
468. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
469. Id. at 334.
470. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
471. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329. The Court also noted that Congress had enacted a narrower statute
protecting embassies outside of the District of Columbia, and reasoned that this provision represented
the judgment of Congress, as "the body primarily responsible for implementing our [treaty] obligations,"
that the narrower provision fulfilled the United States's international obligations toward diplomats. Id. at
324-26 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)).
472. Id. at 322-23. The Boos opinion notes that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations imposes on host states a "special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of
the mission or impairment of its dignity." Id. at 322-23 (discussing treaty and customary international
law obligations toward diplomats and citing Vattel).
473. Id. at 324 (noting that recognition of an interest under international law does not
automatically make the interest "compelling" under the First Amendment).
474. Id ("We need not decide today whether, or to what extent, the dictates of international
law could ever require that First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate the interests of
foreign officials.").
475. 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1846 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2005) (No.
04-1084).
476. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-l (2000).
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compelling governmental interest in prohibiting drug use that justifies a generally
applicable statute that infringes on religious freedom.477
While Boos v. Barry invoked U.S. international law obligations to argue that
the Constitution should not prohibit a regulatory measure, U.S. international legal
obligations could also be offered as a justification for recognizing constitutional
rights. This approach was prominent in racial discrimination cases in the late
1940s and early 1950s, after the UN Charter was signed. In its briefs to the Court
on questions ranging from racially restrictive covenants to discrimination in
railroad dining cars, the government invoked its obligations under the Charter and
other international instruments in support of invalidating the legislation.478 The
Supreme Court usually did not specifically acknowle-dge the arguments from
international law in its opinions,4 79 other than in Oyama v. State of California,480
in which four concurring justices invoked U.S. obligations under the UN Charter
in support of the Court's finding that a California land law denied aliens equal
protection.48' Neither the Court nor the U.S. government were clear about how the
treaty obligations related to the constitutional questions before the Court, and by
Brown v. Board of Education the struggle over the Bricker Amendment appears
to have chilled the government's practice.482 But the cases stand as an example of
477. Brief for Petitioners at 41-44, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 125 S. Ct. 1846 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1084); cf Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258
(1 lth Cir. 2000) (finding, in RFRA case, that government has a compelling interest in fulfilling its treaty
commitments to Indian tribes).
478. The government's amicus brief supporting invalidation of racially restrictive covenants in
Shelley v. Kraemer, for example, invoked at length international agreements and resolutions to which
the U.S. was a party, including obligations set forth under the UN Charter, UN General Assembly
resolutions on racial discrimination, and resolutions on equal protection adopted by international
conferences. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 97-100, Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) (No. 72) (available on microfiche; also on file with author); see also Brief
of Respondent the United States at 62, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25).
479. But see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 28 n.4 (1948) (finding no reason to reach
petitioner's claim that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was contrary to U.S. treaty
obligations under the UN Charter).
480. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). As Mary Dudziak has noted, the Court also did not explicitly
acknowledge the Cold War foreign relations concerns advanced by the U.S. government, although those
concerns appear to have formed an important backdrop to the Court's decisions. Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 103-13 (1988). For additional discussion
of the role of international human rights in the post-World War II civil rights litigation, see generally
CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-55 (2003); Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United
States Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984); Resnik, supra note 25.
481. Justices Black and Douglas referenced the UN Charter as follows: "[W]e have recently
pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to 'promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.' How can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar
land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?" 332 U.S. at
649-50 & n.4 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted). Justices Murphy and Rutledge
likewise observed that "[i]ts inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by
the United States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned." Id at 673 (Murphy &
Rutledge, JJ., concurring).
482. Between 1950 and 1955, Senator Bricker. led an unsuccessful movement to amend the
Constitution to ensure that U.S. racial discrimination and segregation policies could not be eliminated
through international treaty. Louis Henkin, US. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348 (1995). In 1954, the amendment came within one vote of
passing the Senate. DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 180-81 (1988).
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the role that international legal obligations could play in informing governmental
interests implicated by constitutional rights.
4 3
Another recent case suggesting possibilities for the role of U.S. international
obligations in constitutional analysis is United States v. Balsys,484 which
addressed whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
protected an alien from making statements in a deportation proceeding that might
be used in a criminal prosecution by a foreign state. Although the majority, per
Justice Souter, rejected the claim, the Court noted that the United States had
"assumed an interest in foreign prosecution" through an international agreement
to cooperate in prosecuting war crimes, 485 and left open the possibility that a
deeper level of international cooperation in prosecution could result in application
of the Fifth Amendment to such cases in the future.486 In dissent, Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg found the United States's increasing international commitments for
combating crime sufficient to bring the case within the scope of the privilege.48 7
The role of international law in this constitutional context is relatively
undeveloped. Boos v. Barry's acknowledgment that international obligations
might create a compelling governmental interest justifying restrictions on
constitutional rights suggests that despite the well-established rule that treaties
cannot override express constitutional provisions, they might nevertheless inform
the analysis of a particular provision. Even this approach is not necessarily
problematic. Treaties are federal law, and like other forms of federal laws, they
may (but do not necessarily) serve important governmental interests. Indeed,
treaties may create stronger interests than many domestic laws, since their breach
implicates U.S. relations with other nations. On the other hand, the practice could
be subject to abuse, to the extent that the government merely entered a bilateral
treaty in order to increase its authority in relation to individual rights.
4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The precise meaning of the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is not established by either constitutional text or Supreme
488Court doctrine. The constitutional text, however, is reasonably read as inviting
consideration of international values. What is "cruel" under the Eighth
Amendment may warrant consideration of what practices have been outlawed
under international treaties and customary international law. What is "unusual" on
its face requires consideration of how common, or uncommon, a particular
483. See Richard Lillich, International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 1, 19-20 (1993) (discussing Oyama as a possible model for indirect incorporation of
international law into constitutional analysis).
484. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
485. Id at699&n.19.
486. Id. at 698-99. The Court also noted, in a footnote, the possibility that the existence of an
international law obligation on the foreign state analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination
could warrant application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in this context. Id. at 695 n.16.
487. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 714-15 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
488. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The exact scope of
the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court.").
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practice is,489 and the Court has understood practices in both the United States and
the global community to be relevant to this inquiry.
The Court's established approach to construing the clause also is open to
being informed by international norms. In the 1910 case of Weems v. United
States, the Court recognized that the scope of the Clause was not limited to
eighteenth-century conceptions of cruelty, but "may be... progressive, and...
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. ' '49°
Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles accordingly asserted
that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' , 91 Thus the
Court's modem Eighth Amendment analysis examines any particular punishment
"in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment.' '492 The question is
what punishments are disproportionate-"barbaric" or "excessive in relation to
the crime committed"A93 -based on the "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency" that the Amendment embodies.
These touchstones for analyzing the Eighth Amendment focus on the values of "a
maturing society,' '495 not this society, and on the principles of "humane
justice. ''496 The scope of this inquiry may be limited to core human rights and the
comparative values of liberal democratic societies, as Justice Scalia noted in
dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma.497 But nothing on its face limits the inquiry to
potentially parochial American views, to the exclusion of more universal
international values.
Of all the Eighth Amendment cases discussed here, the Trop plurality
placed the greatest reliance on international perspectives. In concluding that the
Eighth Amendment barred Congress from denationalizing citizens as punishment
for a crime, the Trop plurality looked to the consequences of denationalization,
observing that statelessness was "a condition deplored in the international
community of democracies, ''498 and that statelessness may lead to banishment, "a
fate universally decried by civilized people. ' 499 The plurality noted that "[t]he
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be
489. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (indicating the Court's approach to
the Clause is dictated by textual requirement that punishments be "both 'cruel and unusual"');
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988) (plurality opinion) (noting that reference to
contemporary standards as an index of constitutional value "lies in the very language of the construed
clause: whether an action is 'unusual' depends, in common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence
or the magnitude of its acceptance"); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion) ("If the word
,unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel' . .. the meaning should be the ordinary
one, signifying something different from that which is generally done." (emphasis added).
490. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
491. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
492. Id. at 100 n.32.
493. Coker v. Georgia, 433 US. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
494. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579
(8th Cit. 1968)); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (invalidating execution of the
insane and invoking "the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to
come to grips with his own conscience or deity").
495. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion).
496. Id. at 127 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 378).
497. See 487 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
498. 356 U.S. at 102.
499. Id.
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imposed as a punishment for a crime," and that of eighty-four countries surveyed
by the United Nations, only two imposed denationalization as a penalty for
desertion.50 0 "In this country," the opinion concluded, "the Eighth Amendment
forbids this to be done."5 0' The case involved an exclusive federal power, and the
Court did not consider jury practices or the practices of the several states.
Trop's extensive reliance on international practice recently has been
dismissed as the view of a minority of the Court. °2 The dissenting Justices,
however, did not condemn the majority's consideration of international practice.
Justice Frankfurter, who authored the dissent, elsewhere had condoned
interpreting the Eighth Amendment in light of "standards of decency more or less
universally accepted. 50 3 The dissent instead disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of international opinion. Citing the same authorities as the plurality,
the dissent asserted that "[m]any civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for
indulgence in designated prohibited activities" and that some countries had made
wartime desertion the basis for denationalization.50 4 The dissent concluded that
denationalization could not "be deemed so at variance with enlightened concepts
of 'humane justice' as to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.05
Thus, it appears that at least eight of the nine Justices in Trop agreed that
international opinion was relevant to the constitutional analysis.
Subsequent Eighth Amendment cases have granted a weaker role to
international law. In holding that imposition of the death penalty for rape violated
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the plurality in Coker v. Georgia
observed that Eighth Amendment judgments "should be informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent. 50 6 These included attention "to the
public attitudes... history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of
juries.507 The plurality accordingly observed that state practice and jury verdicts
rarely imposed the sentence of death for rape. 08 The opinion limited its
consideration of international practice to a footnote, which noted Trop's reliance
on international opinion and concluded that "[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that out
of 60 major nations in the world. . . only 3 retained the death penalty for rape
where death did not ensue. 50 9 The plurality also looked to international opinion
to rebut the state's claim of a compelling interest in imposing the death penalty for
rape: "[1]n light of the legislative decisions in almost all of the States and in most
of the countries around the world, it would be difficult to support a claim that the
500. Id. at 102-03 & nn.37, 38.
501. Id at 103.
502. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 546-547 and accompanying text.
503. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
504. Trop, 356 U.S. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
505. Id. at 126-27 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
506. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
507. Id at 592.
508. Id. at 596.
509. Id. at 596 n.10 (citing UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968)); see also Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing, based on "the trend both in this country and
throughout the world," that the Court should consider whether imposition of the death penalty for rape
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the States' criminal justice
system. ,51°  51
Enmund v. Florida, the Court's first majority opinion in this line of cases,
invalidated the death penalty for vicarious felony murder. Following the
methodology suggested in Coker, the Court engaged in an extensive survey of
practices of state legislatures, juries, and prosecutors, and concluded that at least
the first two of these sources weighed heavily in favor of rejecting the penalty at
issue.512 In a footnote, and relying on Coker, the majority also observed that
[' t]he climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular
punishment' is an additional consideration which is 'not irrelevant' to the Eighth
Amendment analysis.513 The Court noted that "the doctrine of felony murder has
been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number
of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe."
514
Thompson v. Oklahoma515 made clear that the relevance of foreign authority
to the Eighth Amendment cases was dependent on the justices' underlying
philosophy regarding the meaning and construction of the Eighth Amendment. In
invalidating the death penalty for persons under sixteen at the time of the crime in
that case, five members of the Court appeared to consider both international
treaties and widespread comparative practice relevant to the Eighth Amendment
inquiry.516 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion began by observing that the Court
should consider the actions of legislatures and juries, as well as "the reasons why
a civilized society may accept or reject" the practice.517 Stevens concluded that
state statutes and the behavior of juries, as well as the reduced culpability of
juveniles, supported the finding that it would offend "civilized standards of
decency '518 to execute Thompson. Invoking the Trop line of cases for the
relevance of international opinion, Stevens then observed that the Court's
conclusion was consistent with the views held by "other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community. ' 519 He also noted that the juvenile death penalty was prohibited by
three major human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Fourth
510. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4.
511. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
512. Id at 788-96.
513. Id at 796-97 n.22 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10).
514. Id. The Court also observed that death sentences for such murders were frequently
commuted (citing Marvin Wolfgang et al., Comparison of the Executed and Commuted Among
Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 301, 310 (1962)).
515. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
516. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 46-47
(1994) (noting that "[b]oth the plurality and Justice O'Connor's concurrence found it significant that three
major international human rights treaties explicitly prohibited juvenile death penalties and that one of these
instruments-Article 68 of the Geneva Convention-had been ratified by the United States").
517. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 (plurality opinion).
518. Id at 830.
519. Id The opinion observed that the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, West Germany,
France, Portugal, the Netherlands, all Scandinavian countries, Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the
Soviet Union either prohibited juvenile executions or had abolished the death penalty altogether. Justice
Stevens also found relevant the views of professional organizations.
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Geneva Convention, the latter of which had been ratified by the United States.
520
Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment also cited these treaties.521
For the first time in the Eighth Amendment cases examined here, the
dissenters objected to the reliance on international law. Joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White, Justice Scalia's dissent disagreed sharply with the
plurality's finding of a U.S. consensus prohibiting the execution of juveniles. In a
footnote, Scalia also condemned as "totally inappropriate" the plurality's resort to
international sources.522 Scalia maintained that
The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but,
text permitting, in our Constitution as well.... But where there is notfirst a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other nations... cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution..23
Justice Scalia's apparent acceptance in Thompson of a role for international
values in confirming an identified national consensus is significant because that is
generally the manner in which the Court has considered international sources in
the Eighth Amendment context. With the notable exception of Trop, cases
looking to an international consensus have first found a national consensus, based
on an exhaustive inquiry. The plurality opinion in Thompson was no different.
The Justices had not looked to international practice to override, or contradict, the
perceived national position, contrary to Scalia's suggestion. They simply had
disagreed with Scalia by finding that a national consensus was present. In this
context, the plurality's resort to international practice was perfectly consistent
with Scalia's own statement regarding when resort to foreign opinion was
appropriate. Justice Scalia's complaint with the plurality accordingly should have
been with its analysis of domestic, rather than foreign, attitudes.524
The following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority to reject the claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibited capital
punishment for persons aged sixteen or older at the time of the crime. Scalia
found no national consensus prohibiting the practice and took the opportunity to
reaffirm, in a footnote, his assertion from Thompson regarding the irrelevance of
international practice. 525 The relevant standards of decency, he argued, were those
of "modem American society.
526
520. Id. at 831 n.34.
521. Id. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing the Fourth Geneva Convention's
prohibition on the execution of juveniles and other treaties cited by the majority as evidence that the U.S.
Congress had not authorized the practice). Justice O'Connor would have invalidated the death sentence on
the narrower grounds that Oklahoma had not specified a minimum age and may not have carefully
considered the death eligibility ofjuveniles.
522. Id at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("That 40% of our States do not rule out capital
punishment for 1 5-year-old felons is determinative of the question before us here, even if that position
contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We must never forget that it is a Constitution for
the United States of America that we are expounding.")
523. Id (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (emphasis added).
524. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
525. Id at 369 n.1 ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive.... While [t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to
determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely an historical accident, but rather
so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but text
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Stanford made clear that Justice Scalia's position that international practice
could not be used to establish an "American" consensus formed part of a broader
attack on the Court's approach to Eighth Amendment cases. While facially
accepting Trop's "evolving standards of decency" test, Scalia sought to limit the
relevant judicial inquiry to the actions of juries and state legislatures. This
approach, he suggested, was dictated both by the text of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and by the deference owed state legislatures under the federal
system.527 Any broader inquiry under the Eighth Amendment would leave
judgments under the Amendment to the "subjective views of individual
judges. 528
Justice Brennan dissented for the four members of the Thompson plurality.
Brennan challenged the majority's "revisionist view" of the Eighth
Amendment 529 arguing that while the opinions of legislatures and juries informed
the Court's analysis, the accepted constitutional inquiry was much more wide-
ranging. This included consideration of "the choices of governments elsewhere in
the world,, 530 and an independent judicial inquiry into whether a punishment was
proportionate and satisfied its acceptable penal goals.53' Justice Scalia's contrary
approach, Brennan argued, would abandon the Eighth Amendment's protective
role as a check on political majorities.532
With respect to foreign opinion, Justice Brennan urged that "objective
indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis." After finding
that abolition of the juvenile death penalty was supported by trends among state
legislatures and juries and by the views of professional organizations,5 4 Brennan
additionally observed that "[w]ithin the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.' 535
In the previous decade, only eight executions of juvenile offenders had been
recorded worldwide, three of them in the United States. And like Justice Stevens
in Thompson, Brennan acknowledged that three major human rights treaties, as
well as UN resolutions, prohibited the juvenile death penalty.536
Atkins v. Virginia537 resurrected the Thompson Court's overall approach to
Eighth Amendment analysis, including restoring the relevance of international
practice. In holding that execution of the intellectually disabled constituted cruel
permitting, in our Constitution as well,.. . they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.").
526. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
527. Id. at 369-70.
528. Id at 369 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 384, 592 (1977)).
529. Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
530. Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
531. Id. at 390-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
532. Id. at 391-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
533. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
534. Id at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
535. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan noted that over fifty countries had abolished the
death penalty entirely; twenty-seven no longer imposed it in practice, and among the world's retentionist
countries, sixty-five prohibited the execution of juveniles. In addition, some of the sixty-one countries
that retained the death penalty and had provisions exempting juveniles had ratified international treaties
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.
536. Id. at 389-90 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
537. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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and unusual punishment, Justice Stevens noted that the "clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures. 538 Such evidence was not conclusive, however, since the
Constitution also obligated the Court to independently examine "whether there is
reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators.,
539
Applying this approach, the majority found a consistent trend among state
legislatures toward abolishing the execution of the mentally disabled. In a
footnote that also discussed the views of professional and religious organizations
and public opinion polls, Justice Stevens noted that "within the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally disabled
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved., 540 The opinion urged that while such
"[a]dditional evidence" lent "further support" to the conclusion that the legislative
trend reflected "a much broader social and professional consensus," such evidence
was "by no means dispositive.",
541
Despite the relatively inconsequential role of international practice in the
majority's analysis, that invocation provoked an exasperated rebuke from the
three dissenters. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
strenuously disagreed with the majority's finding of a national legislative trend
toward abolishing the execution of the mentally disabled. Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote to criticize "the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws" and other
sources, which he viewed as unsupported by precedent and antithetical to
principles of federalism.542 Rehnquist reiterated Scalia's view from Stanford that
the opinions of state legislatures and juries were the only relevant
considerations.543 In particular, Rehnquist wrote, "I fail to see.., how the views
of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support
for the Court's ultimate determination." 54 The Chief Justice viewed Stanford as a
"sound rejection" of the idea that such information was relevant to establishing a
national consensus.5 45 Rehnquist also challenged the doctrinal pedigree of resort
to international practice. The decisions in Thompson, Enmund, and Coker had
relied "only on the bare citation of international laws by the Trop plurality," and
the Trop plurality "represent[ed] the view of only a minority of the Court [and]
offered no explanation for its own citation."54  "[T]here [was] no reason to
resurrect this view" given the Court's rejection of it in Stanford.5 47
Justice Scalia dissented separately, condemning the majority decision as
lacking support in either the text or history of the Eighth Amendment or in current
public attitudes.5 48 "Seldom," he criticized, "has the opinion of this Court rested
538. Id. at 312 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
539. Id. at313.
540. Id. at 316-17 n.21 (citing Brief for the European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727)).
541. Id.
542. Id at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
543. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
544. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
545. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
546. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
547. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
548. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members." 549 After
attacking various aspects of the Court's "embarrassingly feeble evidence of
'consensus,"' Scalia concluded that "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort
to fabricate 'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a
footnote) to the views of ... members of the so-called 'world community.' 550
"Equally irrelevant," he wrote, "are the practices of the 'world community,'
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people. 551
The dissenters' vehemence over the citation to international practice is
surprising for at least three reasons. First, as in Thompson, the Atkins majority
appeared to agree substantially with Justice Scalia's stated view in Thompson that
international practice should not determine the existence of a national consensus,
but could help establish that that consensus reflects fundamental values.
55 2
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist's attack on the doctrinal provenance of resort to
international practice was unfounded. As noted above, although Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Trop was a plurality, the dissenters in that case also accepted
the relevance of international opinion and resorted to such opinion in their own
analysis.
Finally, all members of the Court claimed to accept that the relevant test
under the Eighth Amendment was the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society" and fundamental views of "humane
justice. '' 53 Nothing in this test appears to limit the appropriate judicial inquiry to
American views on this subject, and no opponent of resort to international
practice on the current Court has ever attempted to justify their view (other than
simply by stating their own personal opinions) that this Eighth Amendment test is
limited to exclusively American conceptions.554
In Roper v. Simmons,5 55 the majority finally robustly recommitted itself to
consideration of international law and simultaneously reaffirmed a role for an
independent judicial determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Roper addressed the constitutionality of executing juveniles who
549. Id at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
550. Id at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
551. Id. at 347-8 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
552. See supra notes 525-526 and accompanying text.
553. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
554. Perhaps not surprisingly, the battle over the relevance of foreign practice has extended to the
Court's recent denials of certiorari. In Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), Justice Breyer argued that the
Court should grant certiorari to consider the claim that a delay of two decades or more on death row, due to
the State's own failure to comply with constitutional requirements, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Justice Breyer noted that a growing number of courts outside the United States had concluded
that long delays on death row could render a death sentence unlawful. Id at 995-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) (citing decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Courts of India and Zimbabwe, and
the European Court of Human Rights). Justice Breyer conceded that there was no foreign consensus on this
question, and that "[o]bviously... foreign authority does not bind us." Id. at 996. He nevertheless urged that
"this Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances." Id
at 997. Justice Breyer reasserted this view in objecting to the Court's denial of certiorari in Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990 (2002), and noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had now joined the list of foreign courts
expressing concern over the issue. Id. at 992-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Justice Thomas,
in turn, chastised Breyer for failing to rely on any "American" authority, and argued that "this Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."
Id. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).
555. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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were under eighteen at the time of the crime. Consistent with the approach in
Atkins, the Court first identified a national consensus toward abolishing the
juvenile death penalty, noting that only a minority of states kept the penalty on the
books and that the punishment was imposed with even less frequency. In this
analysis, the Court rejected the suggestion that the United States's entry of a
reservation to Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which prohibits the execution of juveniles, constituted meaningful
evidence of a lack of national consensus on the question. The Court noted that
since the treaty was ratified, five U.S. states had abandoned the practice, and
Congress had declined to extend the federal death penalty to juveniles.556 The
Court also identified a number of characteristics of youth that rendered young
people ineligible for the death penalty. Only then did the Court find
"confirmation" of its conclusion that imposition of the death penalty on juveniles
was a disproportionate punishment in "the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty. 557 The Court relied on both international law and
comparative state practice to support its analysis. The penalty was prohibited
under international law by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every
nation in the world had accepted except for the United States and Somalia.5 8
Foreign state practice also supported the finding, since only seven countries other
than the United States had imposed the penalty in the prior fifteen years. The
Court finally offered a detailed consideration of developments in the United
Kingdom, since the language of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
derived from the 1689 English Declaration of Rights.559
The Court noted that "the opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation of
our own conclusions" 560 and concluded: "[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation
of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.' 561
As in Atkins, the majority's use of international views to "confirm" the
fundamental character of an American consensus was consistent with Justice
Scalia's approach in Thompson.562 Justice Scalia in dissent (joined by Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist) nevertheless accused the majority of
supplanting the views of U.S. citizens with foreign and international law. Scalia
first criticized the majority's use of international law on the merits, arguing that
556. Id. at 1189.
557. Id at 1198.
558. Id. at 1199.
559. Id. at 1199-1200.
560. Id. at 1200.
561. Id. at 1200.
562. Compare Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (majority opinion) (stating that the Court's analysis
of domestic practices "finds confirmation" in international opinion, though that opinion is "not
controlling"), with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]here
there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations ... cannot be
imposed on Americans through the Constitution.") (emphasis added). Here, as in Thompson, Justice
Scalia's criticism is more pertinent to the other Justices' analysis of domestic attitudes. The Court
accordingly did not purport to use foreign practice to "expand the denominator" in identifying a national
consensus. Contra Young, supra note 12, at 153-56.
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the international instruments considered by the Court refuted the existence of a
national consensus on the issue. "That the Senate and the President . . .have
declined to join and ratify treaties prohibiting execution of under-18 offenders,"
Scalia wrote, "can only suggest that our country has either not reached a national
consensus on the question, or has reached a consensus contrary to what the Court
announces." 563 Scalia questioned whether foreign states actually complied with
the international prohibition on the execution of juveniles, but did not offer data to
contradict the majority's evidence. He then contended that comparative foreign
practice was irrelevant since the U.S. death penalty system allows consideration
of mitigating circumstances such as youth, while some other countries do not.
564
Having concluded that the international sources did not support the
majority's holding, Scalia then urged that "the basic premise of the Court's
argument-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world-ought to be rejected out of hand. '5 65 Without differentiating international
law from foreign practice, Scalia criticized the Court for selectively relying on
foreign examples that supported positions it liked, while ignoring foreign
practices in such areas as the exclusionary rule, the establishment of religion,
abortion, double jeopardy, and the right to jury trial, which Scalia portrayed as
much less protective than America's own.
56 6
Cases such as Roper, where international law has clearly and uniformly
articulated a position regarding the acceptability of punishment contrary to U.S.
law, and where that international rule is supported by near-universal state practice,
are extraordinarily rare. It is unusual for the international rule to be so brightly
defined and so uniformly accepted, through both treaty ratifications and actual
practice. Likewise, it thankfully is equally rare for United States penal practices to
be so flatly out of step with an international rule.567 Thus, cases where a widely
established norm of international law, as opposed to selective foreign state
practice, is both on all fours with the constitutional question and overwhelmingly
persuasive, should be extraordinary. But where, as in Roper, such an international
consensus exists, considering that consensus seems entirely consistent with the
search for what is "cruel and unusual."
Where an international rule directly contrary to U.S. punishment practice
does exist, international law could play a much more robust role in Eighth
Amendment analysis, given the standard the Court has articulated. Under the
Atkins/Roper test, rather than serve as evidence supporting a national consensus,
international law could be considered in the "independent" judgment that the
Court recognizes that judges should bring to bear in Eighth Amendment analysis.
An overwhelming international consensus could reasonably constitute one
"reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
563. Id. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
564. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
565. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
566. Id. at 1226-28 & n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
567. But as Justice Scalia noted in Roper, the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child also prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without parole. Id at 1226; see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR CHILD OFFENDERS
(2005).
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legislators., 568 This is what Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper accused the Court of
doing, and what the Trop plurality approached.
But the Roper majority's view of the role of international law is much more
modest. While Roper solidly confirmed a fifty-year tradition of resort to
international law in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis, like Thompson and
Atkins before it, the decision also firmly relegated the use of international law to
the secondary role of reaffirming a perceived national consensus-an approach,
as noted before, that should be entirely consistent with Justice Scalia's stated
views. Thus, it appears that the provocative question regarding the role of
international law in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is not whether it is
appropriate for international law to support a national consensus, although that is
the question that has preoccupied the Court. The deeper question is whether the
Trop Court's approach, which gave a more robust role to international practice to
invalidate a federal statute, is fundamentally illegitimate.
5. "Liberty ": Substantive Due Process
The "liberty" protected by substantive due process is both "the least specific
and most comprehensive protection of liberties" in the Constitution.569 Judicial
decisions construing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
accordingly have looked to principles "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty ' 57° to define the substantive limits that due process imposes on
government action. The Court's substantive due process analysis has resorted to
international opinion for common standards of liberty both in determining what
provisions of the Bill of Rights are sufficiently fundamental to "principles of
ordered liberty" to warrant incorporation against the states and in prohibiting
arbitrary and conscience-shocking government behavior. Traditionally, however,
the Court has made greater use of comparative examples from Western
democracies than from international law.
The Court's analysis has taken two approaches to the question of whose
conception of liberty is relevant. In some cases, the Court has invoked Anglo-
American traditions, while in others the Court has considered traditions
fundamental to all free societies. And at times the Court has appeared to equate
568. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
569. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). As Justice Story observed, "The Ninth
Amendment acknowledges that the 'Bill of Rights presumes the existence of a substantial body of rights
not specifically enumerated but easily perceived in the broad concept of liberty and so numerous and so
obvious as to preclude listing them."' 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
2000) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 715-16
(1883)). The Court at times has located the unenumerated liberty protected by the Constitution in the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (invoking the Ninth Amendment
as recognizing a "concept of liberty" protected by the Constitution); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment) (noting that the Constitution protects "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty'). Other possible loci are the Privileges and Immunities Clause and equal protection, though the
Court most consistently has lodged the protection of unenumerated fundamental rights in the "liberty"
protected by due process.
570. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not incorporate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy against the states).
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the two.571 Laurence Tribe accordingly has observed that "[t]he effort to identify
the 'indispensable conditions of an open society"' under substantive due process
"proves inseparable from the much larger enterprise of identifying the elements of
being human" and requires "a wider conception of what human beings
require. 572 The search for substantive due process, in short, is a search for
fundamental "human rights. 573 Like the Court's inquiry under the Eighth
Amendment, this approach invites consideration of international values-at least
those of "free" societies-and the Court has invoked such authorities.
a. The Incorporation Doctrine
The doctrine of substantive due process has roots in the nation's early
natural law tradition.574 In Loan Association v. Topeka, the Court invalidated a
municipal ordinance on the grounds that "[t]here are such rights in every free
government beyond the control of the State" and "limitations on such [state]
power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments., 575 By the
latter 1800s, the Court began looking to common law principles for the limits on
state authority imposed by substantive due process.
576
Hurtado v. California57 7 expressly recognized the relevance of foreign
practices to this constitutional inquiry. Hurtado addressed whether Fourteenth
Amendment due process encompassed the Fifth Amendment's requirement of
grand jury indictment in capital cases.578 The majority rejected this claim based on
both text and history.579 The Court defined due process as embodying the limits of
"original justice"5 0 on "arbitrary power.' 1 Due process, in other words,
constituted not "a particular mode of procedure in judicial proceedings" but "the
571. Id. at 325 (equating principles "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental" with principles more generally "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"); see also id
at 326 (stating that due process is "dictated ... [by] the essential implications, of liberty itself'). Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), later modified this approach, noting that while it might be
appropriate to consider whether "a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the
particular protection," a court must also examine whether a procedure was nevertheless fundamental to
the particular system of justice established in the United States. Id. at 150 n.14; see also Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 & n. 12 (1977) (applying Duncan approach to substantive due process).
572. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 778-79 (2d ed. 1988).
573. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
574. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (holding that state law
divesting church property violated "principles of natural justice, . . . the fundamental laws of every free
government, . . . [and] the spirit and the letter of the [C]onstitution"); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (finding state law invalid "either by general principles which are
common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution") (emphasis added).
For further discussion, see TRIBE, supra note 572, at 1338.
575. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874).
576. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (holding that the Due Process
Clause protects against arbitrary deprivations of common law liberty).
577. 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding that murder prosecution by information rather than
indictment does not violate due process). See Neuman, supra note 25, at 83.
578. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....).
579. Textually, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment's consideration of "due process
of law" and grand jury indictment indicated that the former did not itself embrace the latter requirement.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534-35. The Court also concluded that trial by information had been recognized at
common law. Id.
580. Id at 532.
581. Id. at 536.
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general principles of public liberty and private right, which lie at the foundation of
all free government."'582 While common law traditions were relevant to identifying
these principles, so were the fundamental practices of other societies:
The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen,
who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and
expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of many
tongues. And while we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we
are not to forget that in lands where other systems ofjurisprudence prevail, the ideas and
processes of civiljustice are also not unknown. Due process of law.., is not alien to that code
which survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of modem civilization in Europe, and
which has given us that fundamental maxim of distributive justice suum cuique tribuere. There
is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law, which
ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain ofJustice, we are not to
assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted 5 8 3
Thus, the Court recognized that "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" were properly
informed by "the best ideas of all systems and of every age. 584
Palko v. Connecticut 81 expanded upon Hurtado's recognition of the
relevance of foreign sources in the due process inquiry. Justice Cardozo
acknowledged that liberty was an evolving concept 586 and viewed foundational
American principles as informed by those of other free societies. Thus, Cardozo
equated those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions ' 587 with principles so fundamental "that a
fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them., 588 Due
process barred only practices that reasonable people believed were "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind., 589 Cardozo invoked comparative foreign practice in
support of this analysis, 590 but did not rely on intemational law.
b. Protection Against Arbitrary Government Action
The Court has followed a similar approach in determining the inherent
limits that due process imposes on all "arbitrary... and purposeless restraints. 59
1
Such fundamental rights cannot be infiinged by governmental action absent a
compelling state interest. In Rochin v. California, for example, Justice Frankfurter
582. Id at 520-1 (emphasis added); see also id at 536 ("[Tlhere are such rights in every free
government beyond the control of the State.") (citation omitted).
583. Id at 530-31 (emphasis added).
584. Id. at 531. Justice Harlan argued in dissent that the question should be answered based on
"settled usages" of the common law and concluded that the right to grand jury indictment had always
been a fundamental component of due process. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
585. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
586. 302 U.S. at 324-25 (discussing the evolution of freedom of thought and speech protected
through the Fourteenth Amendment).
587. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
588. 302 U.S. at 325.
589. Id. at 323.
590. "Double jeopardy ... is not everywhere forbidden." Id. at 326 n.3 (noting that compulsory
self-incrimination was a routine practice in continental Europe and the practices of France, Roman law
traditions, and treatises).
591. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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famously defined due process as prohibiting "conduct that shocks the
conscience." 592 But whose conscience?
Although principles "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" could be
identified through resort to international law, and particularly international human
rights law, the Court has rarely utilized these sources. As discussed below, the
Court instead tends to limit its consideration to comparative foreign examples or
to generic assertions that a practice is accepted by all free countries or throughout
Western Civilization. But the analysis is open to the use of international law in
appropriate cases.
International legal sources can also play a variety of roles in these cases.
They may be used to support or reject a claim that a right is implicit in ordered
liberty or to support or rebut a claim of a compelling state regulatory interest. In
Block v. Hirsh,59 3 for example, Justice Holmes rejected a claim that emergency
rent control legislation imposed during World War I constituted an arbitrary
taking of property without due process of law by invoking uniform foreign
practice to support the reasonableness of the governmental action. Without
identifying his international sources, Holmes observed that in declaring a public
emergency, "Congress stated a publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact....
[Thus,] the question is whether Congress was incompetent to meet it in the way in
which it has been met by most of the civilized countries of the world. 594 Holmes
found that the Court had no basis for concluding "that legislation that has been
resorted to for the same purpose all over the world," was unreasonable. 595 A
similar approach scrutinizing foreign (European) practice for the reasonableness
of a policy subject to due process challenge was offered by Justice John Marshall
Harlan's dissent in Lochner v. New York,596 and by the majority in Muller v.
Oregon.597 The foreign taxation cases addressed previously also looked to
international law to reject a claim that a governmental action was unreasonable.5 98
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick 99 is an example
of resort to foreign practice to deny a claim of fundamental right. Burger asserted
that state regulation of sodomy had "very ancient roots" throughout the history of
Western civilization, was "firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
• 600
standards," and that homosexuality had been a capital crime under Roman law.
On the other hand, the Court in Roe v. Wade6°1 looked to foreign practice to
support the claim that conduct should be protected. Justice Blackmun engaged in
a lengthy analysis of foreign historical abortion practices, ranging from the Greeks
592. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47
(1998) ("[jE]xecutive abuse of power . . . which shocks the conscience . . . is 'arbitrary . . . in a
constitutional sense."' (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)).
593. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). I am grateful to Thomas Merrill for bringing this case to my
attention.
594. Id. at 154-55.
595. Id. at 158.
596. 198 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
597. 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908); see Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 25.
598. See supra Part II.B.2.a.ii.
599. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that substantive due process does not provide a
fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy).
600. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (2001),
the Texas appellate court likewise justified its reaffirmation of Bowers with references to Roman law
and Blackstone; see Koh, supra note 25, at 51.
601. 410U.S. 113, 130-38 (1973).
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and Romans through English and American practice, to conclude that "at
common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the
major portion of the 19th century... a woman enjoyed a substantially broader
right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. '602 The claim
was not that foreign practice established that reproductive choice was a
fundamental liberty. Instead, historical and foreign practice were used to reject the
contention that these matters were inherently subject to state regulation.
Lawrence v. Texas6° 3 invoked international practice for two purposes: to
rebut the suggestion in Bowers that criminalization of homosexual sodomy was
supported by Western civilization and Anglo-American tradition, and to reject the
state's claim of a compelling state interest. Justice Kennedy observed that Chief
Justice Burger's reliance in his Bowers concurrence on the practices of Western
civilization had failed to consider "other authorities pointing in an opposite
direction,"604 including Britain's repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct,
and the European Court of Human Rights's invalidation of a law proscribing
homosexual conduct under the European Convention on Human Rights. 60
"Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21
nations then, 45 nations now)," Kennedy wrote, "the [Dudgeon] decision is at
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in
our Western civilization."'6 6 These international examples supported Kennedy's
assertion of an "emerging awareness" even when Bowers was decided that liberty
protected fundamental decisions about private consensual sexual conduct.60 7
Justice Kennedy again looked to international practice to assert that the
reasoning of Bowers subsequently had been rejected both domestically and
abroad. Kennedy noted that the European Court of Human Rights in later cases
had followed its reasoning in Dudgeon60 8 and that "[o]ther nations... ha[d] taken
action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct., 60 9 Based on this information,
Kennedy concluded that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has
been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. ' 610 Accordingly, Kennedy
concluded that the state had demonstrated no legitimate interest that would justify
its intrusion into individual privacy.61'
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia condemned the majority generally for
relying on an "emerging awareness" to find a right "deeply rooted" in the nation's
traditions, and in particular for relying on 'foreign nations[']" decriminali[zation
of the] conduct. 62Scalia concluded that "[t]he Court's discussion of these foreign
602. Id. at 140.
603. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
604. Id. at 572.
605. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. see. A, para. 52 (1981)).
606. Id.
607. Id. at 572.
608. Id at 576.
609. Id. at 576-77 (citing Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae at 11-12, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (No. 02-102)).
610. Id. at 577.
611. Id. at 578.
612. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal
prohibitions on sodomy) is ...meaningless [and dangerous] dicta., 613 Even
Scalia, however, ultimately could not resist resort to foreign examples, and
warned that the Court's decision would result in "judicial imposition of
homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada.,
6 14
The Lawrence decision in some ways falls into a grey area between resort to
international law and resort to comparative law, since the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights may be viewed as those of a regional
international court, or as the equivalent of a comparative constitutional authority.
Reliance on regional international norms does raise some of the selectivity
concerns in the choice of foreign authorities that are not present with invocations
of more universally applicable international rules. 615 But regardless whether the
citation to the European Court of Human Rights constitutes the use of
international or comparative law, the consideration of European practice is
appropriate, given the Court's long tradition of looking to European practice as
paradigmatic of "free" societies, and its explicit invocation of Western civilization
in the Bowers case.
The use of international law to identify a compelling governmental interest
is different here than in Boos v. Barry,616 where the United States's own
international obligations were invoked as establishing a governmental interest.
Here international law is considered, not due to its legally binding character, but
due to the persuasive force of the common understandings of other states. If the
international democratic community does not recognize a governmental interest in
criminalizing sodomy, or some other claimed governmental interest, the burden is
that much greater on the U.S. government or the several states to demonstrate that
their own interest is compelling. International law in this context is relevant both
for what it prohibits, and for what it allows. International rules allowing
derogation from, or suspension of, a protected right under certain circumstances
would also be relevant to identifying a compelling governmental interest.617 Thus,
Louis Henkin has suggested that treaty exceptions allowing governments to
override human rights protections in contexts of public emergency might be
relevant to determining the existence of a governmental interest.
6 8
In short, international law (as distinguished from comparative practice from
the Western European tradition) has played a limited role in substantive due
process analysis, to date. This likely is due, at least in part, to the fact that the
international human rights regime is a relatively recent development. 619 But as in
the Eighth Amendment context, its role could be more robust. To the extent that
the substantive due process inquiry attempts to discern values of liberty
fundamental to all free societies, the terms of widely ratified international treaties
613. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
614. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
615. See discussion infra Part V.B.
616. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
617. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 695 n.16 (1998) (noting that the concept of an
international privilege against self-incrimination is derogable under certain conditions).
618. Louis Henkin, International Human Rights Standards in National Law: The
Jurisprudence of the United States, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC
COURTS 189, 198 & n.39 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).
619. See infra note 684.
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establishing basic rules for governmental treatment of people, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Torture, Genocide,
and Geneva Conventions, should be an appropriate sounding board. Widely
ratified human rights conventions reflect a baseline of acceptable behavior for
liberal and non-liberal states alike. Conversely, the circumstances in which such
international treaties recognize exceptions to limits on governmental conduct
should also be relevant to identifying the existence of governmental interests. But
in neither case would international law be determinative of the question.
Furthermore, controversy over the Court's substantive due process analysis
reaches far beyond the citation of foreign authority. As with the Eighth
Amendment cases, to a large extent, the dispute over resort to foreign sources is
simply one element in a larger dispute over the appropriate judicial role in these
contexts. The Supreme Court recently reiterated its "reluctan[ce] to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended. 6 20 This Article
does not urge an expansion of the Court's resort to substantive due process
analysis. The point is simply that to the extent that the Court attempts to resolve
whether a particular form of conduct "shocks the conscience" or is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," international human rights norms regarding the most
basic obligations of the state toward the individual should be relevant to
determining both what liberties the Constitution protects and what may constitute
a compelling state interest.
6. Procedural Due Process
Finally, procedural protections-and especially the question of what process
is "due" in both civil and criminal law contexts 2-have also been informed by
international rules and uniform foreign practice. We already have seen this in
decisions addressing the procedural due process rights of immigrants, where the
Court looked to sovereign power over aliens under international law to conclude
that summary and unreviewable immigration determinations satisfied
constitutional due process.622 Dissents in two recent immigration cases suggest
that at least some members of the Court continue to view international rules, and
even "soft law" international norms, as relevant to the question of what process is
due in the immigration context.623 The Court has also looked to international rules
regarding consular courts6 24 and war powers625 to reject claims of constitutional
620. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (holding that substantive due
process does not obligate government to provide a safe workplace).
621. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908) (observing that jurisdiction and
notice were the "two fundamental conditions [of due process], which seem to be universally prescribed
in all systems of law established by civilized countries").
622. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.i.
623. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 555 n.10 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (invoking the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees detention guidelines to argue that aliens were entitled
a "minimum procedural guarantee"); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721-22 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citing guidelines for detention by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to
conclude that the procedural safeguards afforded by Congress went "far toward th[e] objective" of
satisfying procedural due process).
624. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
625. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.iii.
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procedural protection in those contexts. The approach also was considered in the
recent enemy combatant detention cases. The Hamdi plurality suggested that the
due process right of an alleged citizen enemy combatant might be satisfied
through a process akin to that provided for determining prisoner of war status
under the Third Geneva Convention. In oral argument in Rasul v. Bush, Justice
Breyer suggested a similar approach to the relationship between the basic Geneva
Convention requirements and procedural due process.
From the perspective of legitimacy, the Court's approach to the individual
rights cases is consistent with the other uses of international law considered in this
Article. The Court's approach in these cases comports with both constitutional
text and the Court's longstanding interpretation of that text. Its willingness to look
to international standards in this context is somewhat analogous to that of the
"background principle" cases discussed in Part ll.B; the Court reads constitutional
terms ('just compensation," "involuntary servitude," "due process," or "liberty")
as embodying, in part, a background international conception regarding the basic
rights of human beings which is either universal, or is keyed to understandings of
liberty in other mature liberal democracies. The Court's reliance on international
law as an evolving standard in the Eighth Amendment and substantive due
process cases is also consistent with its interpretive tests for those provisions,
which are themselves evolutionary, as well as with its evolutionary approach to
international law in other areas.
The Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases are the most
controversial in current scholarly debates regarding the relationship between
international law and constitutional interpretation, and include Roper, Atkins, and
Lawrence. However, unlike many of the cases addressed above, including the
federalism and inherent powers cases, in which international law provided a
significant part, if not all, of the rule of decision, international law in these cases is
generally invoked secondarily to bolster a conclusion that the Court already finds
wananted based on a domestic consensus. Comparative law is employed more
frequently, at least in the due process cases, and with the possible exception of
Trop v. Dulles,6" the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases have
looked to international and comparative law as a very supplemental source of
authority. Far from providing the rule of decision, international authority in both
contexts largely has been limited to supporting a perceived domestic consensus.
This practice appears to be consistent with Justice Scalia's stated views on the
subject, as discussed above. Thus, ironically, it is the context in which
international law plays perhaps the weakest role in constitutional analysis that has
provoked the greatest present controversy.
626. Transcript of Oral Argument at *14, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334
and 03-343), 2004 WL 943637 (Breyer, J.) (suggesting that the due process protections available to persons
detained as enemy combatants should be informed by the tribunal proceedings for determining POW status
contemplated by the Geneva Conventions). Thus, he reasoned, "the Geneva Convention comes in to
inform the content of that due process." Id.
627. See supra Part ILC.4.
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IH. LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CASES
This Part considers the implications of the cases examined above for the
legitimacy of the use of international law in constitutional interpretation. As set
forth more fully below, I argue as a threshold matter that the cases demonstrate a
longstanding tradition of resort to international law to provide substantive
meaning to constitutional provisions. The Court has looked to international law in
various contexts throughout the nation's history. The cases firmly rebut the recent
assertions that international law has nothing to say in constitutional interpretation
and that resort to international law in this area is "new." They also indicate that
international law has entered constitutional law through the traditional tools of
constitutional analysis.
The cases also offer some guidelines regarding the relationship between
international law and constitutional interpretation. They refute, for example, the
contention of some scholars that resort to international law can be meaningfully
limited by the subject matter of particular constitutional provisions. They indicate
that the Court at times has looked to international law as binding, rather than
merely persuasive, authority. The Court has also generally viewed international
law as an evolving concept and often has applied contemporary rules of
international law, rather than limiting the role of international law to norms
prevailing at the nation's founding.
However, the cases pose a number of difficulties for current advocates of
international law in constitutional analysis. The cases do not reveal any particular
conscious methodology regarding when resort to international law is appropriate,
and the Court's application of international law is, at times, sloppy or
opportunistic. Furthermore, and contrary to the views of some proponents of the
practice, resort to international law in constitutional analysis does not invariably
promote individual rights. The Court frequently has invoked international law to
expand governmental power and at times has employed international law to
distort or deny constitutional protections. The cases, in short, underscore the
relevance of international law while raising significant questions about its
appropriate use.
A. Longstanding Resort to International Law
The cases considered in Part II demonstrate a longstanding tradition of
relying on international law to inform constitutional meaning. Throughout the
nation's history, Supreme Court majorities have resorted to international law as a
source of constitutional authority and have found that enterprise legitimate, even
if not entirely without controversy. Justices prior to those on the current Court
who have resorted to international law include John Marshall, Joseph Story,
Roger Taney, Stephen Field, Samuel Miller, Joseph Bradley, John Marshall
Harlan, Horace Gray, Melville Fuller, Henry Brown, Edward White, George
Sutherland, Charles Evans Hughes, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix
Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, Earl Warren, and William Brennan. The Court has
invoked international law in contexts ranging far beyond those Eighth
Amendment and substantive due process cases that have been the focus of current
debates-including cases limiting the extraterritorial scope of constitutional
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protections, as well as those involving the treaty and war powers, citizenship,
immigration, authority over Native Americans, the powers to borrow money, to
tax, and to exercise eminent domain, the definition of involuntary servitude, and
state sovereign immunity, personal jurisdiction and full faith and credit.
1. Modes of Constitutional Interpretation
The Court's invocation of international norms does not appear to turn on
any particular approach to constitutional interpretation. Nor is the use of
international law some newly developed additional tool of constitutional analysis,
such as "transjudicialism."62 Instead, international authority has entered
constitutional analysis through the ordinary modes of constitutional construction:
original understanding, text, structure, history, doctrine, and prudentialism. Each
of these methodologies has led the Court to look to international law in certain
cases, but no particular constitutional approach is predominant. In other words,
international law has functioned in constitutional analysis much like the use of
history or the common law.
Thus, at times, original understanding may suggest resort to a particular
international rule, as the Court implied in upholding prosecution before consular
courts abroad in In re ROSS629 or in invoking public law choice of law principles in
the full faith and credit context.630 Structure appeared to play a role in the Court's
approach in deriving an inherent national power to exclude aliens in Chae Chan
Ping,631 since the Court concluded that the national government's possession of
"all" the constitutional foreign affairs powers necessarily implied that the
government would also enjoy immigration powers recognized by international
law. The Court invoked both text and doctrine in the Eighth Amendment and
substantive due process cases to invite consideration of international standards in
identifying protected normative values of cruel and unusual punishment and
liberty. Prudential considerations and originalism supported resort to the laws of
war in construing the President's power to seize enemy property in Brown v.
United States, 632 as did history in the decision upholding the use of military
tribunals in Ex parte Quirin. On other occasions, the Court does not attempt to
justify its resort to international authority through any traditional mode of
constitutional analysis, but appears to take for granted the legitimacy of the
enterprise.
2. Subject Matter
The cases demonstrate that the subject matter of constitutional provisions
does not offer a meaningful basis for determining when resort to international law
is legitimate. Some participants in the current debate have suggested that
international and foreign authority may be relevant only where a constitutional
provision textually invites consideration of international law or where the Court is
628. See supra note 15.
629. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
630. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
631. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
632. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
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construing a "foreign," rather than "domestic" constitutional clause. 633 This
approach is unsatisfactory for several reasons.
First, "textual invitation" has been a justification for all the Court's
applications of international law other than in the inherent powers cases. Whether
the text directly references a concept of international law, or invites consideration
of international law as a background interpretive tool, as in the federalism cases,
text has formed part of the justification for considering international rules.
Concepts such as "liberty" and "cruel and unusual" punishment likewise
reasonably invite consideration of fundamental values of the international
community, particularly given the Framers' natural law orientation. Resort to
international law in interpreting individual rights provisions is consistent with the
conception of the Constitution as a depository for fundamental rights. Thus,
overtly "foreign" clauses are not the only constitutional provisions that invite
reference to international law, and the relevance of international law is not limited
to such contexts.
Second, it is not obvious from the text and purpose of the Constitution that
even foreign affairs clauses invariably should be construed in light of international
rules. The treaty power is an obvious candidate for application of international
rules, since treaties are themselves principal instruments and repositories of
international law and necessarily address U.S. interaction with foreign nations. It
would be more than odd, therefore, to approach questions relating to the treaty
power with domestic rules utterly uninformed by international standards, and such
an approach could raise diplomatic conflicts with other nations. Because wars
generally involve conflicts with foreign states, the war powers also are an area
where resort to international rules might seem particularly appropriate to ensure
that the U.S. warmaking authority comports with that of other nations.
Even with respect to the treaty and war powers, however, resort to
international standards is not invariably appropriate, given the Framers' overt
desire to constrain foreign relations powers recognized under then-existing
standards of international and public law. As noted above, provisions such as the
Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering of
soldiers in peacetime 634 were designed to limit sovereign prerogatives in
warmaking, as were structural distributions of authority between the President,
Congress, and the courts. Likewise, constitutional structural and individual rights
provisions may limit the substantive scope of the U.S. treaty making and war
powers to some subset of the areas allowable under international law. An
interpretive approach that presumes that U.S. governmental authority in
warmaking and elsewhere comports with powers allowable under international
law and exercised by other nations thus could employ international law to
systematically bias constitutional interpretation in favor of governmental power at
the expense of individual rights.
633. See supra note 33.
634. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."). The
amendment may have pushed forward an evolving international norm. See VATTEL supra note 46, at 296
("When the soldier is not in the field, he must necessarily be provided with quarters. The burden, in such
case, naturally falls on housekeepers: but as that is with many inconveniences, and proves very
distressing to the citizen, it becomes... a wise and equitable government, to ease them of it as far as
possible."); Lee, supra note 318, at 1065.
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Third, efforts to limit the application of international law to "foreign"
clauses also can be questioned on their face, given the longstanding debate over
whether constitutional authorities can be meaningfully categorized as "domestic"
or "foreign." 635 Many "local" actions may be informed by international norms
636
or may have significant foreign affairs implications, as the Court's recent
jurisprudence suggests.637
Finally, the Supreme Court has not confined its resort to international law to
clauses that overtly reference foreign relations. To the contrary, in addition to the
Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases, the Court has looked to
international law in construing provisions such as the First Amendment in Boos v.
Barry, the Thirteenth Amendment in Robertson v. Baldwin, and the Just
Compensation Clause, none of which facially invite resort to international law.
The decisions in Juilliard v. Greenman and Kohl v. United States638 looked to the
sovereign authority of states for a power to borrow money and the power of
eminent domain.63 The most interesting line of decisions for this discussion may
be the federalism cases, in which the Court analogized from international rules
regarding relations among sovereigns to define structural relationships among the
several states and with the national government.
One would not have to agree with the use of international law in all the
areas addressed in the Court's cases to acknowledge that in at least some
unpredictable areas, the approach seemed appropriate. Nevertheless,
constitutional provisions that do not implicate foreign relations but have been
construed in light of international law raise provocative questions regarding
appropriate use. How is one to determine whether a particular constitutional
provision invites consideration of international law or establishes a distinctly
domestic rule? Determining the relationship between international law and
constitutional text becomes even more complex as both international law and
constitutional traditions evolve. The cases suggest that in the early nineteenth
635. Ernest Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 139, 184 (2001) (discussing potential impact of state activities for
foreign relations). The question also was of concern to the Framers. Alexander Hamilton observed "the
immense difficulty, if not impossibility" of distinguishing "between cases arising upon treaties and the
laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the footing of municipal law." THE FEDERALIST
No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
636. See generally Resnik, supra note 25 (examining the "domestication" of international and
foreign norms in local U.S. policies and movements).
637. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (invalidating California
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act as infringing on U.S. foreign relations); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating Massachusetts's law regarding Burma as infringing on
foreign relations); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (invalidating Oregon inheritance law as
infringing on foreign relations). Certain U.S. death penalty practices, for example, have significant
foreign relations implications. Foreign states consistently have objected to certain death penalty
practices, such as the execution of juveniles, and have refused to share intelligence, cooperate with U.S.
anti-terrorism operations, and extradite individuals facing capital charges to the United States. U.S.
treatment of foreign nationals on death row has resulted in three suits against the United States in the
International Court of Justice. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10). On the other hand,
the Court has downplayed the foreign affairs implications of some local actions that directly impact
foreign relations, such as State taxation of foreign corporations. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
638. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
639. Id. at 371-72.
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century the Commerce and Contract Clauses were understood as embodying
concepts of international law, but that tradition faded as domestic concerns
became predominant in these areas. Longstanding international law rules
nevertheless continue to address questions such as territoriality, international
commercial relations, war and treaty powers, the rights of aliens and indigenous
peoples, and slavery. Moreover, international law has evolved to address new
areas of domestic economic, social, and political life. Louis Henkin has argued
that international human rights law may be relevant to determining the meaning of
a wide range of constitutional rights, including equal protection, unreasonable
searches and seizures, due process and fair trials, as well as to determining the
permissible limitations that governments may impose on such principles and the
possible scope of governmental interests.640 Thus, international law now is
arguably relevant to more, and different, constitutional questions than in the past.
There will, of course, be many constitutional issues on which international law
does not speak, particularly those regulating the internal processes of the national
government. But where it does, subject matter does not provide simple categorical
answers to the question of when resort to international law is appropriate, and
determining whether a constitutional provision addresses a concept of
international law or "invites" consideration of international law is an increasingly
elusive task.
In short, the cases indicate that resort to international law in constitutional
interpretation has a lengthy doctrinal pedigree. The cases firmly rebut two
arguments predominant in contemporary debates: that international law has
nothing to say about constitutional analysis, and that resort to international law is
new. They also demonstrate, at a minimum, that the Constitution is not a per se
barrier to consideration of international law and that resort to international law
historically has not been limited either to particular subject matters or to any
particular mode of constitutional analysis. Instead, the cases affirm that
international law is part of our constitutional canon, and may properly inform our
founding document in a variety of circumstances, based on the range of traditional
modes of constitutional construction.
B. International Law as Binding
One striking aspect of the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation is
the extent to which the Court has based its consideration of international law on
the binding character of that law. Most modem commentators who support
consideration of international law in constitutional analysis underscore that the
relevance of international law does not depend on that law's character as
imposing binding legal obligations on the United States. The authority of
international law derives instead from its persuasive force.641 Certainly, this has
been true in the Court's most recent decisions in Roper, Lawrence, and Atkins and
the plurality in Grutter. The Court's historical practice, however, demonstrates
that one justification for looking to international law has been the binding legal
obligations international law imposes. This is most explicitly the situation in cases
640. Henkin, supra note 618, at 198.
641. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 25, at 114.
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where international law creates a governmental interest-where international law
is implicated because of the obligations it imposes on domestic governmental
actors, as in Boos v. Barry.642 Cases involving the Offenses, Treaty, and War
Clauses also are motivated in part by the facts that the United States is party to
mutually obligatory rules in the international community, and that failure to
respect those legal obligations can provoke trauma and strife in the international
system. The role of international law as binding is more ambiguous in the inherent
powers and federalism cases, which are motivated in part by the assumption that
the national and state governments are bearers of sovereign rights and duties. The
inherent powers cases could also be understood, however, as looking to
international rules and practices as purely persuasive authority regarding the
powers of nation-states, and the more lasting justification for consideration of
international law in the federalism cases appears to proceed from a similar
analogy: international rules and particularly non-binding principles of public law
are employed to the extent that they are a persuasive model for organizing
interstate relations. Finally, most of the individual rights cases look to
international law and foreign practice as purely persuasive evidence of
fundamental human values.
C. International Law as Evolving
The cases also are notable for applying international law as an evolving
body of doctrine, rather than simply looking to international rules prevailing at the
nation's founding. The Court often appears to view contemporary international
rules as the appropriate normative reference and purports to adopt those prevailing
international rules. 643 Trop v. Dulles and the other Eighth Amendment cases read
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as establishing an evolving standard
that requires consideration of contemporary norms. But the Court consistently
applies international law as an evolving body of doctrine in other contexts as well.
Cases addressing the government's war powers, for example, reliably invoke the
contemporary rules of war.6 " The inherent powers immigration and territory
cases applied late nineteenth-century principles regarding authority over aliens
645
and acquired territories, 64 6 and in United States v. California,647 Justice Black
expressly applied modem international rules regarding the three-mile territorial
sea zone, which had evolved after the Constitution was drafted.
642. 485 U.S. 312 (1988); see supra Part II.C.3.
643. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923) ("[The definition of territorial
jurisdiction] now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere .... ) (emphasis added).
644. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). Justices at times
have expressly recognized the evolving nature of the international norm being applied. In Brown v.
United States, for example, Chief Justice Marshall argued that modem international law had "mitigated"
the traditional rule of wartime seizures, and that the power under the Constitution should be construed to
comport with this evolving standard. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122 (1814)
(relying on "mitigations" of the laws of war); accord id at 145-47 (Story, J., dissenting) (applying "the
modem law of nations").
645. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.,
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
646. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
647. 332 U.S. 19, 32-35 (1947).
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Treating international law as an evolving concept is consistent with the fact
that the Court has not consistently relied on strict originalist justifications for its
resort to international law. An originalist approach would contend that the
Framers understood a particular constitutional provision to incorporate
international norms. This argument has appeared, with greater or less force, in
many decisions, including those involving the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.648 A static originalist approach might
also seek to confine the constitutional doctrine to whatever international rule
existed at the founding. In one of the few explicit examples of this approach to
international law in the Court's decisions, Chief Justice Taney argued in Dred
Scott that at the framing, slaves and their descendents had been understood
throughout the civilized world as persons who could not be citizens of any
sovereign. He further maintained that the role of international opinion was fixed at
the founding: no subsequent change in values, either in the United States or
abroad, could alter the constitutional rule.
6 49
An alternative, organic originalist conception, however, would view the
Framers as having understood that the United States would be a member of the
international community and governed by its rules, that the Constitution and other
U.S. laws should be construed against a backdrop of international law (either
generally or with respect to particular clauses), and that those international norms
would evolve as international law developed. In other words, an organic
originalism would view the Framers as understanding that the Constitution should
be interpreted in light of an evolving body of international law.65°
To the extent that the Court is inspired by an originalist conception in its
invocation of international law, it appears to have adopted the latter, organic
approach. The Court has made almost no effort to limit its analysis to the
international rules that prevailed at the framing. Even when the Court has
expressly offered an originalist justification for looking to international law, as it
did in cases ranging from the power to establish consular courts abroad in In re
Ross651 and the power to issue legal tender in Juilliard v. Greenman,652 the Court
generally appears to assume that international law has carried the rule forward
648. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (addressing habeas corpus rights);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (addressing the Territory Clause); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U.S. 421 (1884) (addressing the power to borrow money); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540
(1840) (addressing the Compact Clause); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814)
(addressing the War Declaration Clause).
649. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857); see supra Part II.A.2.c. Justice
Ginsburg has criticized this approach as "frozen-in-time." Ginsburg, A Decent Respect, supra note 6, at
14.
650. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (recognizing international law as
evolving); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934) ("The framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that the maritime law should remain unalterable."); cf Discussion of
William Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME CoURT AND SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond Calm ed.,
1954) (statement of Paul A. Freund) (observing that constitutional interpretation should recognize that
institutions such as habeas corpus involve an evolutionary or "dynamic element which itself was
adopted by the framers"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 37-38
(2004) (recognizing, in the common law context, the evolutionary nature of the common law and noting
that accordingly "[e]ven a strict form of originalism . . . must acknowledge that the original
understanding of some clauses could be fairly read to have included a background assumption of further
judicial development").
651. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
652. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
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unchanged to the date of the case, and may cite contemporary practice in support
of this point.653 The older Full Faith and Credit Clause cases likewise purport to
apply the rule prevailing at the time of the framing, but the Court also assumes
this remains the established international rule. In other cases, the Court simply
invokes the modem international law rule, as it did in HamdP 54 and other war
powers cases, treaty cases, admiralty cases, and the original jurisdiction case of
United States v. California.655
Gerald Neuman has observed that citations to Vattel in the Court's
jurisprudence could suggest an originalist basis for invoking international law,
since Vattel was the most influential international law publicist during the
founding era.656 The Court generally accompanies citations to Vattel with
citations to more contemporary international law writers, however, as it did in
Jones v. United States, 657 Ekiu,65s and Fong Yue Ting.659 In upholding the draft in
Arver v. United States,66 ° for example, the Court cited Vattel for the proposition
that the right to compel military service lay at "the very conception of a just
government," 661 but also concluded that this remained the contemporary rule, as
indicated by nearly universal modem practice.
662
Moreover, the Court has not consistently attempted to justify its practice in
terms of original understanding with respect to the specific constitutional clause at
issue. As frequently, the Court appears to have operated against a general
background understanding that international norms can inform constitutional
meaning unless some aspect of the constitutional design (text, longstanding
interpretation, etc.) clearly differentiates the United States from international
norms.
In other words, the Court consistently has resorted to contemporary
international rules when it looks to international law in cases across the
constitutional spectrum. This tradition suggests that the Court's approach in the
individual rights cases is consistent both with its understanding of those particular
constitutional provisions as embodying evolving norms, and with its overall
approach to international law. It suggests that the Court's use of contemporary
international rules in the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases
does not reflect so much a peculiar effort by certain Justices to remake American
society according to their particular social vision, as it reflects more deeply rooted
assumptions about the propriety of resort to contemporary international rules.
653. See also, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
654. 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
655. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
656. See Neuman, supra note 25, at 83.
657. 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (citing Vattel, Wheaton, Halleck, Phillimore, and Calvo for the
authority to govern acquired territory).
658. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
659. 149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-372 (1875) (citing
Vattel for the proposition that "[tihe right [of eminent domain] is the offspring of political necessity; and
it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law").
660. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The case construed the powers to declare war and raise armies. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12.
661. 245 U.S. at 378.
662. Id. at 378 n.1 (citing the practices of thirty-six countries). For other cases citing both
Vattel and later writers, see Grover & Baker Sewing Maching Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890);
United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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D. Opportunistic Use ofinternational Law
Even if one accepts the general proposition that international law can and
should legitimately inform constitutional analysis in appropriate circumstances,
aspects of the Court's approach to international law raise cautionary flags. The use
of international law can be sloppy, misguided, and even opportunistic. At times,
the Court's identification of the international rule simply has been incorrect. A
number of commentators, for example, have noted that the strongest version of
the discovery doctrine asserted by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v.
M'Intosh663 was no longer recognized as legitimate when that case was decided
(if acquisition of territory by discovery alone was ever clearly accepted under
international law).664 It is unclear whether the Court properly invoked
international law in the immigration cases, since a number of international writers
recognized greater protections for denizens and long term residents that the Court
failed to acknowledge.665 Commentators also have noted that the principle of
strict territorial limits applied in Pennoyer666 had eroded by the time of that
667decision.
At other times, the Court's methodology in identifying relevant international
authority appears flawed. Here, perhaps, the most egregious example is Justice
Brown's analysis of whether coercing work from seamen constituted a
longstanding exception to the Thirteenth Amendment. Brown did not err in
considering international standards. There is nothing patently incorrect about
examining international practice in determining the meaning of involuntary
servitude. Indeed, because the prohibitions on slavery and the slave trade largely
developed first as norms of international law, such consideration could be
particularly appropriate. Justice Brown may even have been correct in concluding
that, due to the peculiar necessities of employment at sea, restrictions on sailors'
ability to terminate their employment might constitute a legitimate exception to
involuntary servitude. Instead, Brown failed by looking to the practices of states
where slavery was lawful to try to identify a commonly held exception to
involuntary servitude. He failed in his choice of sources. The proper inquiry
should have focused on the extent to which countries with analogous prohibitions
on involuntary servitude recognized an exception for coercing labor from seamen.
Even Brown's modem examples suggested that foreign countries did not
recognize the exception that he sought.6  The case thus illustrates the importance
of determining what constitutes valid international authority, and what authority is
appropriate for consideration regarding any particular question. Just as prior U.S.
practice may not be relevant to the construction of a constitutional rule that was
663. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
664. See supra note 263.
665. See supra note 249.
666. 95 U.S. 174 (1877).
667. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (plurality opinion); Albert
A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Geoffrey C. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 253-60; Juenger, supra note 325, at 1029 (noting that "long before
Justice Field decided Pennoyer, the English . . . had already given up on requiring service in the
forum").
668. Some of the states offered as modem examples, such as France, no longer allowed
seamen who abandoned ship to be imprisoned, or only allowed for imposition of damages.
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adopted to alter that practice, a constitutional provision that was intended to
establish a rule contrary to practices commonly pursued by despotic states should
not be read to comply with those practices.
The Court's methodology for identifying international norms is also deeply
flawed to the extent that it selectively invokes the practices of individual foreign
states as reflecting an international or universal consensus, as it did in upholding
the power to borrow money in Juilliard v. Greenman.669 To the extent that the
Court finds a norm persuasive as embodying a uniform international consensus, it
should make reasonable efforts to substantiate that claim. Likewise, to the extent
that the Court invokes the views of some subset of the international community as
international or comparative law, it should acknowledge the geographic limits of
that consensus, as the Lawrence Court did when it invoked the law in force within
the Council of Europe.
670
Finally, at times it appears that although the Court may have properly
construed the international rule, its constitutional methodology in applying the
rule is problematic. The Court's assumption in the later Insular Cases that the
Framers intended the Territory Clause to allow territories to be governed as
colonies under international law,671 for example, seems improbable given the
Founders' desire to reject the authoritarian colonialism of England672 and the
decades of contrary doctrine.673 Nor is it clear that international and public law
principles were always the appropriate model for the personal jurisdiction and
other federalism cases.
The fact that international law can be abused in constitutional analysis does
not distinguish it from other tools of constitutional interpretation. But, here, as
with other interpretive mechanisms, it should go without saying that legitimate
resort to international standards in constitutional analysis should involve a
determined effort to accurately construe and apply international law and to
meaningfully validate claims of widespread state practice.
E. International Law and Limiting Individual Rights
In sharp contrast to the assumptions of both supporters and opponents of
using international law in constitutional analysis, international law has played a
decidedly mixed role with respect to advancing individual rights. Certainly,
international law does not invariably promote individual rights. To the contrary,
international law has been applied both to enhance governmental authority and to
limit the scope of individual constitutional protections.
The Court's jurisprudence has undermined individual rights in four ways.
First, at times international principles of territorial jurisdiction have been read into
669. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
670. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 573 (2003).
671. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1904).
672. Gouvemeur Morris did later express such an opinion, but noted that his view was not
necessarily shared by the other drafters. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston
(Dec. 4, 1803), in 2 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MOR is 192 (1832); see also Cleveland,
supra note 66, at 167 n.1148.
673. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446 (1857) ("There is certainly no
power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies .... [N]o
power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character.").
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the Constitution to limit the extraterritorial application of individual rights, while
not limiting the extraterritorial operation of governmental powers. Such a practice
systematically employs international law to skew the Constitution against
protection of rights when the government acts abroad.
6 74
Second, in cases in which the Court has looked to international law to define
the scope of governmental power, the Court on occasion has failed to recognize
and apply limits that international law also imposed. This approach particularly
characterized the inherent powers cases. In holding that the government had
absolute authority under international law to exclude or deport aliens in Chae
Chan Ping075 and Fong Yue Ting,676 for example, the Court refused to
acknowledge the limitations that international law placed on the exercise of this
authority over denizens and other long-term resident aliens. 6"
Third, to the extent that the Court has invoked international law to support
broad governmental power, the Court at times has construed that power as
narrowing or overriding other constitutional protections. In such cases, invocation
of international law has been accompanied by a parallel unwillingness to respect
or enforce constitutional rights. The approach is visible in some war powers cases
as well as in the immigration and Indian inherent powers cases. In these areas, the
Court at times elevated international authority to a power so plenary that it
appeared largely unlimited by due process, equal protection, just compensation, or
other constitutional rights. Likewise, in the Insular Cases, although the Court
ultimately held that fundamental constitutional rights applied to territorial
governance, the Court nevertheless employed international rules regarding power
over territories to severely limit those constitutional protections.
Finally, where the Court has invoked international law and practice directly
in construing individual rights provisions, rather than in construing governmental
powers, the effect frequently has been to deny protection. One example is Justice
Brown's construction of the Thirteenth Amendment in Robertson v. Baldwin.
678
679In re Ross upheld application of the treaty power to establish consular courts
abroad, and then applied international principles of territoriality and international
practice to deny Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections. In the Takings cases,
680international law has been applied to deny payment of just compensation. In
Boos v. Barry,6 8' the government's claim was that U.S. international obligations
could warrant dilution of traditional First Amendment protections. Even in the
substantive due process cases, international and comparative practice has been
invoked to deny claimed individual rights as well as to protect them.68 2 This is due
in part to the Court's search for principles fundamental to free societies as the
674. See supra Part II.B.1.
675. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
676. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
677. See supra note 249.
678. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
679. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
680. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
681. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
682. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); cf Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) ("Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of
the life of Asiatic and of African people.").
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touchstone for defining due process rights. If the question whether a right is
fundamental turns on whether no fair system of government denies that right, as
suggested in Palko,683 then the existence of only a few contrary foreign examples
can undermine a claim of right, while near-uniform acceptance would be required
for the right to be recognized. The Court's substantive due process test, in other
words, places a finger on the scale in favor of denying rights.
The observation that the Court's approach to international law has
frequently been rights-diluting is subject to the caveat that many of the cases
examined here were decided when neither international law nor the constitutional
provisions at issue were understood to impose robust limits on governmental
power. The Court's older decisions, and particularly those decided before the rise
of the modem international human rights regime,68 4 were adopted during a time
when international law imposed substantially fewer limits on sovereign authority
over individuals than are recognized today. The older cases also were decided
during a period when the imposition of constitutional individual rights to
constrain governmental action was rare-outside the right of freedom of
contract.685 The modem development of concepts such as equal protection and
due process was still decades away. Thus, the older cases may reflect, not so
much abuse of international norms to dilute constitutional rights, as the overall
weaker state of individual rights in the era.
The observation is also qualified by the fact that, in some cases, Justices
have recognized the limitations imposed by international law and have enforced
686 gS687those limits. Holmes v. Jennison and De Geoffrey v. Riggs portrayed
international norms as limiting the scope of the federal treaty power. Brown v.
United States688 employed international law to limit executive war powers, at least
in the absence of specific authorization from Congress. Justice Story's dissent in
Brown likewise asserted in dicta that while the President could exercise all powers
authorized by the law of nations, he could not confiscate enemy debts, since this
was not allowed by international law.689 In short, the war powers imputed to the
President from international law were limited to the scope of those international
rules. The Cunard majority construed the Eighteenth Amendment in light of
international law principles of territoriality to deny the application of prohibition
683. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
684. It is important to note that international human rights are not a new endeavor, and that
international law has always imposed limits on governments' ability to act with regard to individuals,
particularly foreign nationals. However, the proliferation of international regulation in general, and of
international human rights norms in particular, in the post-World War II period have expanded the
constraints imposed by international treaties and customary rules on sovereign authority in a wide range
of areas, including treatment of a country's own nationals.
685. Justice Brown's opinion in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), for example,
becomes less surprising in light of the fact that Brown also was the author of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), and declined to find any applicable constitutional protections in Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901). Thus, Brown's tortuous interpretive approach in that case may have had less to do
with his theory of the relationship between international law and constitutional protection than with his
consistently restrictive view of the scope of individual liberties.
686. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
687. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
688. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
689. Id. at 145-46 (Story, J., dissenting).
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rules to U.S. vessels outside of U.S. territorial waters."' Perry v. United States691
looked to international rules to conclude that the national government could not
disavow its debts. Among the federalism cases, Pennoyer v. Nef 692 notably
limited the scope of state judicial authority based on international rules of
sovereign territorial jurisdiction.693 Courts have suggested that the concept of
"public use" under international law could limit the government's power to take
property. Other individual rights cases such as Trop v. Dulles,69 Thompson v.
Oklahoma,696 Lawrence,697 and Roper698 invoked international rules and practice
in support of constitutional constraints on governmental power. The inherent
powers cases rarely acknowledged limits on governmental power. However, in
Worcester v. Georgia,699 Chief Justice Marshall retreated from his broad
articulation of the discovery doctrine in Johnson v. M'Intosh700 and emphasized
the limits that international rules imposed-through the constitutional structure-
on Georgia's authority over the Native Americans.
To the extent that recognition of a rule in international law is used to
legitimate a parallel constitutional norm, principled application of international
law in constitutional analysis requires that a court also recognize the limitations
imposed by international law when it looks to international rules to derive
constitutional power. It also requires that international law should not be
employed to undermine or distort the individual rights and structural protections
that the Constitution was designed to preserve. These questions will be explored
further in Part V.
In sum, the Supreme Court's historical practices provide lengthy doctrinal
support for the relevance of international law to constitutional adjudication. Given
the Court's extensive reliance on international authority in certain areas, such as
war powers, it would be difficult to consider many modem constitutional
questions without resort to international norms. The content of other
governmental powers, such as modem powers over immigrants and Indians, also
substantially derives from international law. The cases also indicate that
international law has been treated as an evolving body of doctrine, in a manner
consistent with the Court's approach in the Eighth Amendment and substantive
due process cases.
However, the cases reveal no overarching principle governing when the
Court should resort to international law as an authoritative interpretive tool. Other
690. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). In Cunard, Justice Sutherland would
have applied international law under the Eighteenth Amendment to limit the government's authority to
subject foreign vessels to U.S. prohibition laws. See id at 132 (Sutherland, J. dissenting).
691. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
692. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
693. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
694. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
695. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
696. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
697. 539 U.S. 559 (2003).
698. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
699. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
700. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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than the justifications for the use of international law considered in Part II, the
cases also make no effort to reconcile the Court's use of international law with
principles of democratic governance. They leave unanswered the question of
when resort to international law is appropriate, and how relevant international law
principles should be properly reconciled with the nature, structure, and terms of
our domestic constitution. The remainder of this Article begins to address these
difficult normative questions by considering countermajoritarian criticisms of the
use of international law. It then offers four tentative principles to guide the
application of international law in constitutional interpretation, and illustrates the
operation of those principles with examples from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Roper v.
Simmons.
V. LEGITIMACY AND THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
The Court's decisions involving the use of international law make little or
no effort to explore concerns about the countermajoritarian implications of the
practice. A number of objections have been posed recently to the use of foreign,
comparative law sources in constitutional analysis, such as the difficulty of
drawing accurate comparisons across nations and concerns about selectivity and
expanding discretion in judicial decisionmaking. However, the primary objection
raised to consideration of international law in constitutional interpretation is that
the practice suffers from a democracy deficit.
This objection appears to have two dimensions: The first raises the classic
countermajoritarian concern, voiced prominently by Alexander Bickel, that
constitutional adjudication violates principles of democratic governance by
supplanting the majoritarian wishes of the people-expressed through their duly
elected representatives-with the views of unelected and unaccountable judges.70 '
Defenders of the domestic enforcement of international law through the common
law have bowed to this concern by emphasizing that judicial decisions enforcing
international law as federal common law may be overturned by the legislature.
70§
A congressional fix, however, is not available when courts rely on international
law in constitutional analysis. Nonetheless, this general countermajoritarian
concern is readily rebutted, since to the extent that the Constitution imposes limits
on legislative decisionmaking through individual rights provisions and the
structures of federalism and separation of powers, judicial enforcement of those
rights and relationships is necessarily nonmajoritarian. Courts engage in
constitutional analysis with caution, since their decisions bind the political
branches. But in this sense, constitutional analysis that con~iders international law
is no more, or less, countermajoritarian than any other. Moreover, the fact that
judicial review is nonmajoritarian does not mean it is undemocratic. As John Hart
701. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 20 (1962) (describing judicial review as the power to interpret the Constitution "against the wishes
of a legislative majority').
702. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE LJ. 1193,1210 (2005) ("[I]t
remains open to Congress to disagree with any judicial pronouncement of international law."); Gerald L.
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 371, 383-84 (1997) (responding to concerns about the undemocratic
character of customary international law by arguing that "federal common law decisions can be overturned by
Congress").
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Ely explained, structural divisions of governmental authority and protections for
individual rights are designed precisely to constrain raw majoritarianism to ensure
more effective democratic governance. °3
The second aspect of the "democratic deficit" concem regarding the use of
international law is more on point, but ultimately is equally unsatisfying. This is
the objection that international law is neither a product of American democratic
processes nor a part of American "traditions." Instead, so the argument goes, it is
created by foreigners through undemocratic processes and thus is alien to the
American constitutional tradition.70 4 The response to this concern is threefold.
First, emphasis on the "foreign" origins of international law overlooks the
fact that the United States is a major and active participant in the creation,
development, and interpretation of international law. The United States was the
primary instigator behind the establishment of the UN system and the creation of
modem international treaties ranging from human rights705 and humanitarian law
to international intellectual property and international trade. 70 6 In the post-9/11
world, the United States has maintained that the adoption of the Bush preemption
doctrine does not breach, but rather alters, traditional rules regarding the
international use of force. The familiar quip that 'other nations violate
international law while the United States just creates precedent' may overstate the
case, but it contains an important kernel of truth regarding the significance of U.S.
influence over the international legal system. Moreover, treaties that the United
States has ratified are consistent with any plausible theory of U.S. popular
sovereignty, since they are made by the President and Senate according to
constitutionally mandated procedures.
Second, the concern that international law is not the product of democratic
institutions, to the extent that it is correct, is a red herring, which rests on a
fundamental misconception of American lawmaking as purely majoritarian.
Justice Scalia perhaps stated the mischaracterization most succinctly in his
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which he unfavorably contrasted
international law with "American law-the law made by the people's
703. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
704. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 857; Paul B. Stephan, International
Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 237 (2000); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665, 721 (1986) ("[Ihf customary international
law can be made by practice wholly outside the United States it has no basis in popular sovereignty at
all. Many foreign governments are not responsive to their own people, let alone to the American
people."). Chief Justice John Roberts objected to the use of foreign law on these grounds in his
confirmation hearings: "If we're relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution
means, no president accountable to the people appointed that judge and no Senate accountable to the
people confirmed that judge. And yet he's playing a role in shaping the law that binds the people in this
country." Bazelon, supra note 18; see also Mark Sherman, Attorney General: Justices Are Wrong To
Cite International Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 15, 2005, available at
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 129626313552.
705. NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE 93 (1990) (discussing
U.S. influence over the drafting of the Human Rights Covenants and concluding that U.S.' "proposals
were for the most part accepted, and on the rare occasions when they were not, compromises protective
of the U.S. system were reached").
706. Chander, supra note 702, at 1227 (reviewing national influence over international
economic law and concluding that "international law permits the people (at least those of economically
powerful states) to review, revise, and reject its rules").
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democratically elected representatives. '707 But many forms of "American" law
are not made by elected representatives, notably including the common law and
federal and most state constitutional decisions. Furthermore, many sources that
jurists legitimately rely upon in interpreting the Constitution are not created
through democratic decisionmaking. Prominent examples include consideration
of the common law, historical sources, social science and scientific data, law and
economics theory, pragmatic policy concerns, and judge-made rules of
construction, including principles of stare decisis. All of these are interpretive
sources that are not produced by democratic lawmaking. Thus, it cannot be the
nondemocratic (or nonmajoritarian) process that creates international law that
renders it ineligible for use in constitutional analysis, when American judges
provide the filter for its domestication.
Ultimately, the democratic deficit criticism seems to boil down to a third
concern: that American law developed autonomously from the international
community and that international law simply is not part of American traditions.
As Jed Rubenfeld has urged, "the U.S. Constitution is supposed to reflect our own
fundamental legal and political commitments .... It is the self-givenness of the
Constitution... that gives it authority as law., 70 8 Under this concern, reliance on
examples from history, Anglo-American traditions, and practices under the
common law all could be distinguished from the use of international law on the
grounds that the former are at least the products of "We the People" and their
progeny, and reflect uniquely American values. International law, by contrast, is
viewed as an alien "other," which is not part of the American tradition.
The historical record regarding the use of international law in constitutional
interpretation, however, belies this final legitimacy concern. The record of
constitutional decisionmaking demonstrates that resort to international law to
inform constitutional meaning is one of many longstanding and accepted U.S.
interpretive traditions, and that international law has been considered a legitimate
source of law in constitutional analysis throughout the course of the nation's
history. International law has entered constitutional construction both as part of
the common law and as an independent source of interpretive authority. The
judicial practice of considering international rules, in other words, historically has
been a legitimate "rule of recognition" of the American legal system.709 Indeed, a
nineteenth-century judge would find the modem objection quite baffling, since in
the last century, international and public law was assumed to inform the meaning
707. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 751 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Young, supra note 12, at 162 (objecting to Roper on the grounds that "[tihe
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is meant to ground constitutional doctrine in evolving
democratic commitments.").
708. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 2006
(2004) (emphasis added).
709. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116 (2d ed. 1994) ("[R]ules of recognition
specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials."); see also Richard Fallon,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1787, 1805-1806 (2005). While Hart spoke of one
ultimate rule of recognition, Joseph Raz has recognized that a legal system may have many subordinate
rules of recognition, such as the principle of stare decisis in the Anglo-American tradition. JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 146-47 (1990). But see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and
the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621, 654-58 (1987) (exploring the difficulty of applying the concept
of rules of recognition to interpretive standards).
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of many constitutional concepts that are now presumed "domestic," including
concepts of commerce, freedom of contract, and eminent domain. 710 This does not
mean, of course, that a tradition once legitimate may not be later rejected or
unraveled, and the current challenge to the use of international authorities may be
seeking to accomplish just that. But the tradition does mean that the current attack
on the use of international sources cannot begin from the premise that the practice
is illegitimate because it is new. It must instead demonstrate why an accepted
practice of judges within the legal system should no longer be considered valid.
It is possible to imagine a relationship between international law and
constitutional interpretation that would raise valid concerns about popular
sovereignty and domestic control of the law-making process. If, for example, the
Supreme Court decided that U.S. constitutional law regarding a certain topic
should be determined entirely by international rules made by an international
body, without any intervening filtering through domestic U.S. legislative or
judicial processes, then, to paraphrase Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, "that
foreign judge... [would] bindf] us on key constitutional issues., 711 That would
constitute a basic abdication of the judicial function.712
But considering international values as one element in the test for
identifying cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment, or even
the Court's more robust use of international law to effectively provide the rule of
decision in constitutional contexts ranging from war to personal jurisdiction, does
not rise to this level. Ultimately, it is duly appointed domestic judges who make
the decisions about the Constitution's meaning and the relevance of international
law thereto. Democratic deficit objections accordingly appear to be based on
mistaken assumptions regarding both the nature of judicial lawmaking and the
role of international law in U.S. traditions.
V. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
So what is the appropriate role of international law in constitutional
interpretation? A complete exploration of this general topic is well beyond the
scope of this article. I instead offer here some threshold principles, as a
preliminary exploration of the considerations a court should confront in
examining the relationship between international law and any constitutional
question. These principles are informed by the problems with the Court's prior
application of international law in constitutional interpretation identified in Parts
II and Il, and the democratic legitimacy considerations confronted in Part IV. I do
not here, however, purport to resolve the appropriate application of international
law to any particular constitutional question, since that relationship must be
determined on a case-by-case basis by the specific constitutional provision and
710. Waldron, supra note 46, at 132.
711. Sherman, supra note 704 (quoting Attorney General Gonzales).
712. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and
the US. Constitution, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1989, 2002 (2004) (observing that a decision by Congress to




international rule at issue. Rather, I offer tentative preconditions for the objective
and normatively legitimate application of international law.
713
Under any constitutional regime, received international law principles are
necessarily filtered through the constitution's established distribution of powers
and prohibitions. As the nineteenth-century international law publicist Henry W.
Halleck observed, the fact that international law addresses an issue says little
about that norm's operation within the constitutional system. Instead, "[t]he
determination of these questions depends upon the institutions and laws of the...
sovereign, which... affect the construction and application of that [international
law] rule to particular cases. 714 Accordingly, although an international rule may
be relevant to a constitutional question, it is domestic law that determines the
extent to which any received international law principle operates within that
structure. International law alone cannot itself determine its relationship to
constitutional analysis, since even international law principles that are binding on
the United States do not compel their observance at the constitutional, as opposed
to sub-constitutional, level.
The point that it is the Constitution that determines the operation of
international law within our structure has often been missed by American jurists
on both sides of this issue. In the immigration inherent powers cases, for example,
the Supreme Court upheld a plenary federal power to exclude and expel aliens
based entirely on a perceived international law rule, but utterly failed to consider
whether, and how, that international authority had been incorporated into the
Constitution's structure. The Court simply assumed that because the rule existed
under international law, it must also exist, in its entirety, as a power under the
Constitution.
715
On the other hand, in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney made the opposite
mistake in rejecting the relevance of international law to the question whether
slaves constituted a property interest under the Due Process Clause.716 "[I]n
considering the question before us," Taney wrote:
[I]t must be bome in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the
United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each other.... [N]o
laws or usages of other nations.., can enlarge the powers of the Government, or take from the
citizens the rights they have reserved. 7
Taney's argument that the law of nations should not "enlarge" the powers of the
government, however, begged the question of the proper relationship between
international law and the Constitution on the specific issue before the Court.
713. Michelman, supra note 39, at 270 (arguing that in the American political system,
"objectivity" is "a necessary condition of legitimacy").
714. H. W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF
STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 825 (1861) (emphasis added). Halleck was rejecting Chief Justice
Marshall's suggestion in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton that international law rules of
conquest might definitively resolve the question of the Constitution's application to newly acquired
territories.
715. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.i.
716. Counsel for Scott apparently had relied on "the laws and usages of nations, and the
writings of eminent jurists" to argue "that there is a difference between property in a slave and other
property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United
States." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857).
717. Id.
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Arguing that constitutional powers should not be "enlarged" assumes that the
constitutional powers have a preexisting content that international law is altering.
It does not resolve the question of whether the constitutional rights and powers
themselves are informed by international norms.
Taney himself elsewhere recognized that international law could provide
substantive content for constitutional powers and that the Constitution determined
the operation of such international rules.718 In Holmes v. Jennison, for example,
he correctly argued that the scope of the Treaty Clause was defined by
international law, to the extent that the international rule was "consistent with the
nature of our institutions, and the distribution of powers between the general and
state govermnents. ' 719 The view asserted by Taney, 720 John Marshall Harlan, 721
Field,722 and others that the national government did not enjoy the full panoply of
powers held by sovereign nations, given the "peculiar" limited sovereignty of the
national government, also is fully consistent with this approach. Conceding that
the Constitution limits the national government powers to less than those enjoyed
by other eighteenth-century governments, even if true, says nothing about the
extent to which the powers conferred by the Constitution, or the limits imposed by
that instrument, remain informed by international rules. It simply recognizes that
the operation, if any, of the international rule is filtered through principles
established by the government's founding document.
Determining when it is appropriate to consider international sources and
what role they legitimately should play in relation to a given constitutional regime
raises difficult questions in any constitutional system. As Gerald Neuman has
observed, modem constitutions around the globe have taken a variety of
approaches to answering this question. 723 Some constitutions, such as that of
724 725 726Argentina, Venezuela, Austria,   and the Netherlands, explicitly allow
718. Taney invoked international opinion to deny citizenship status to Dred Scott, and looked
to sovereign international powers to recognize sweeping federal constitutional authority over Native
Americans in dicta in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). See supra Parts II.A.2.c &
II.B.2.b.ii.
719. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
720. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 401 ("[Allthough [the national government] is sovereign and
supreme in its appropriate sphere of action, yet it does not possess all the powers which usually belong
to the sovereignty of a nation. Certain specified powers, enumerated in the Constitution, have been
conferred upon it; and neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial departments of the Government can
lawfully exercise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the Constitution.") (emphasis added).
721. See supra note 465.
722. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757-58 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting) ("The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated powers. It takes
nothing from the usages or the former action of European governments.").
723. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1890-97 (2003).
724. The current constitution of Argentina establishes eleven specified human rights treaties as
having constitutional status, and authorizes the addition of other human rights treaties to this rank
through a supermajority vote in the legislature. CONSTITUCI6N [CONST. ARG.] (CONSTITUTION] art. 75, §
22. For an illuminating discussion of this provision and its application by the Argentine courts, see Janet
Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1999).
725. The Austrian constitution allows treaties to become part of the constitution if ratified by
the same supermajority required for constitutional amendment. Austria has given the European Human
Rights Convention constitutional status through this mechanism. See Neuman, supra note 723, at 1892
& n.88.
726. The constitution of the Netherlands allows the government to enter treaties inconsistent
with the constitution by supermajority vote in Parliament. Id. at 1891 n.82.
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certain international obligations to be given constitutional status. Others, such as
the constitutions of Spain727 and South Africa,728 expressly provide that
international law must be considered in interpreting fundamental constitutional
rights. In South Africa, for example, courts must examine the international norms
relevant to constitutional individual rights questions, even if the international
norms are not directly binding on South Africa. 729 But the courts are not obligated
to follow the international rule.
The foregoing constitutional systems address the relationship between some
international norms and constitutional principles more explicitly than does the
U.S. Constitution, which leaves the role of international law in constitutional
analysis largely to judicial interpretation. But even constitutions that expressly
address the question cannot avoid interpretive difficulties. In "consider[ing]
international law," for example, a South African court would confront the same
question as a court in the United States: how should a court decide what weight to
give the international norm, and how should that norm be related to the terms of
the domestic constitution?730 And while many constitutions require resort to
international law in construing individual rights, they too may leave it to the
courts to determine when international rules are relevant to other constitutional
questions. Discerning the appropriate role of international law in constitutional
interpretation in any of these contexts, accordingly, requires both a careful
examination of the international rule and an intensive, context-specific study of
the domestic constitutional question to which it relates.
The remainder of this section offers four principles for evaluating the
appropriate role of international law in constitutional analysis. This discussion is
premised on the threshold existence of a rule of international law-whether based
in treaty or customary international law73 '-that is relevant to the constitutional
question at issue. Many constitutional questions have no international legal
parallel. In those cases which do, however, I argue that in sorting out this
relationship, courts should consider the following general principles: (1) the
receptiveness of the constitutional system to consideration of the particular
international rule; (2) how well defined and universally accepted the international
norm is, including whether states comply with it in practice; (3) the extent to
which the international norm has been otherwise accepted or rejected by the
727. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides that "[p]rovisions relating to fundamental
rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain."
CONSTIrUcI6N [C.E.] [Constitution] § 10(2) (Spain). Columbia, Portugal, and Romania similarly require
that constitutional provisions involving fundamental rights be interpreted to be consistent with certain
national treaty obligations. Neuman, supra note 723, at 1895 n.101.
728. Section 39(1) of the South African Constitution provides as follows: "When interpreting
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law;
and (c) may consider foreign law." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1) (emphasis added).
729. South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Neuman, supra note
723, at 1897 & nn.107-08.
730. See Neuman, supra note 723, at 1897.
731. A complete exploration of this topic would include analysis of the operation of principles
of general international law or public law, which formed the international source for a number of the
cases examined in Part II. See supra note 44. However, both the under-development of modem
principles of general international law and reasons of space preclude consideration of the operation of
general law here.
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United States; and (4) any limits that international law imposes on operation of
the international rule. As noted previously, these principles cannot answer in the
abstract the precise role international law should play with respect to any
particular constitutional provision. They, instead, go to the threshold matter of the
legitimacy of its use. A focus on these considerations will encourage courts to
invoke valid international norms in a manner consistent with both the
Constitution's structural requirements and the basic values it embodies.
A. Constitutional Receptiveness
Because it is the Constitution that governs the operation of international law
in the domestic context, the first question a court must answer is whether, and to
what extent, a specific international norm may plausibly inform the constitutional
system. This inquiry breaks down into two separate considerations: the
receptiveness of the specific constitutional provision at issue to the international
rule, and whether some other aspect of the constitutional design, including
structure and individual rights protections, limits or bars operation of the
international rule. The existence of an international rule contrary to a domestic
constitutional principle is a reason to consider the international rule and to inquire
whether our own rules have become archaic. But it does not create an obligation
to follow the international rule, which may be rejected if a court finds our own
contrary tradition controlling. In short, international law should function in
constitutional interpretation much like the use of history or the common law, and
ordinary rules of constitutional analysis apply.
Sensitivity to the constitutional design is particularly important given the
mixed attitude of the Framers themselves toward prevailing international norms. It
is widely recognized that the Framers were "internationalists. 732 They had
carefully studied other republics and federal systems, and they surely intended
that the United States take its place among the community of nations by adhering
to international law.733 Indeed, compliance with international law was critical to
help protect the fledgling nation from retaliation by powerful foreign states. The
Framers' outlook toward international law thus was, in general, significantly more
"monist," in assuming that international law functioned as a fluid part of domestic
law, than the contemporary American view.
On the other hand, it is also true that the Constitution was deliberately
designed to reject many of the customary international rules and sovereign
prerogatives of the day-rules that had developed in the practices of authoritarian
states. Traditional powers of sovereign prerogative, such as law making or714
warmaking, were constitutionally abrogated, or limited and redistributed. The
732. See Koh, supra note 25, at 43-45 (discussing resorts to international authority in the
founding era).
733. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
734. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the
forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George Ill, and the description of its evils in the
Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt they were creating their new Executive in his image.");
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 610 (1850) (Constitution grants international powers of
territorial acquisition only to Congress); Henry Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1993) (observing that the Constitution transferred some traditional executive
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right to jury trial rejected European inquisitorial systems. Many provisions of the
Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment's free speech provisions and the
Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering of soldiers, were intended to
impose limits on governmental authority that were uncommon, or even unknown,
in the era. Some of the Constitution's federalism provisions, such as the Interstate
Extradition Clause, altered international practices. Any effort to determine the
appropriate relationship between international law and the Constitution
accordingly must recognize that that instrument both accepted and rejected
international rules.735
Determining the Constitution's receptiveness to any given international rule
clearly requires consideration of a number of factors, including the specificity or
generality of the relevant constitutional text; the historical interpretation given to
the provision; the traditional role of international law in its construction; the extent
to which the constitutional question is truly settled or unsettled; and the extent to
which international norms depart from the established constitutional rule and thus
would alter preexisting domestic interpretive approaches.
The textual inquiry would examine the specificity and clarity of the
constitutional provision. Thus, general clauses such as due process would be more
receptive to construction in light of international norms than more specific
clauses, the extreme example of which is the requirement that the President be
thirty-five years old and a resident of the United States for fourteen years.736 Clear
contrary text could bar consideration of an international norm. Thus, Chief Justice
Taney reasoned in Kentucky v. Dennison that although international law allowed
nations to decline extradition for political offenses, the words "treason" and
"felony" in the Article IV, section 2 Interstate Extradition Clause were intended
"to prevent this provision from being construed by the rules and usages of
independent nations. 737 Constitutional text, in other words, eliminated the
discretion traditionally recognized in international extradition and required
extradition between the states for all crimes. The term "state" in the Constitution
likewise has generally (though not always) been viewed as a term of art referring
specifically to the several states that does not incorporate the definition of a
"state" under international law.738 Likewise, in Robertson v. Baldwin, Justice
powers under the Crown, such as war-making and law-making, to Congress, and shared other such
powers, such as making appointments and treaties, with the Senate).
735. Cf Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574-75 (1880) (Swayne, J.) (citing Wheaton and
Vattel for the proposition that under the law of nations, a nation's jurisdiction over its own vessels is the
same at home port and at sea, but that the Constitution had modified this principle by granting Congress
power over commerce and to define and punish felonies on the high seas).
736. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
737. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 99-100 (1860). As Chief Justice Taney
observed: "[Because] the States of this Union, are ...separate sovereignties [with respect to their
internal governance] ... it was obviously deemed necessary to show, by the terms used, that [the Article
IV, section 2 Extradition Clause] was not to be regarded or construed as an ordinary treaty for
extradition between nations altogether independent of each other, but was intended to embrace [all
crimes] .... For this was not a compact of peace and comity between separate nations ... but a compact
binding them to give aid and assistance to each other in executing their laws." Id at 100. Taney also
relied on plain language, the underlying purpose of the Constitution in maintaining harmony among the
states, colonial practice and experience under the Articles of Confederation to conclude that the
Constitution had rejected the international rule. Id. at 100-02.
738. Compare Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting
that although Washington, D.C. was a distinct political society, and thus a "state," within the definition
under general law, here the term was used as in the Constitution and referred only to the several states of
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Harlan in dissent viewed the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on involuntary
servitude as setting forth a textual mandate that barred consideration of contrary
international practice.739
A longstanding and consistent judicial interpretation could raise barriers to
domestication of an international rule. Other accepted methodologies of
constitutional interpretation, such as history, doctrine, or prudential
considerations, also may weigh toward or against recognizing persuasive force for
an international rule in any given context. The fact that a constitutional clause
originally departed from then-existing international practices, however, would not
definitively resolve the question whether international law might have
implications for its construction today. There may be circumstances in which
international standards have caught up with U.S. practice, based, in part, on
principles drawn from the United States's own constitutional values.74 0 An
interesting example here is freedom of speech. The Constitution's protection for
free speech originally set the United States apart from global practices. Foreign
understandings of freedom of speech have evolved significantly since the First
Amendment was adopted, however, and contemporary international human rights
law now recognizes fairly robust protection for free speech, which itself was
drawn substantially from the American tradition. Nevertheless, U.S. and
international rules continue to diverge over the regulation of hate speech, since
international human rights treaties mandate governmental prohibition of hate
speech74 1 that is understood to be protected under the First Amendment. 742 It is
possible to imagine a scenario in which the U.S. government would attempt to
regulate hate speech more aggressively based on a claim that U.S. international
obligations established a governmental interest warranting the regulation (similar
to the government's assertion in Boos v. Bany 4 3), or in which a litigant seeking
to justify regulation of hate speech might point to the international rule as
persuasive regarding the scope of the individual right at stake (similar to the
Court's approach in Lawrence 744). In either scenario, however, whether or not
U.S. understandings of hate speech regulation under the First Amendment should
be influenced by the international position would turn not on any textual
"invitation" to consider international law, but on the extent to which the United
States is understood as having a contrary doctrinal rule of longstanding and
consistent judicial application, and the constitutional justifications for that distinct
position.
the Union), with De Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 268 (1890) (Field, J.) ("state" in a treaty refers to
a political sub-unit as understood under public international law, not a state of the United States).
739. 165 U.S. 275, 297 (1897) (noting that if the Thirteenth Amendment forbade the practice,
the laws of other countries were "of no consequence whatever").
740. Richard Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3
HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 53 (1990) (discussing contribution of U.S. Bill of Rights to human rights law).
741. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 UNT.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (requiring that states legally prohibit "[a]ny propaganda
for war" and "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility, or violence").
742. Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2341-48 (1989). For a discussion of U.S. opposition to the ICCPR's hate speech
clause, see KAUFMAN, supra note 705, at 164-70.
743. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
744. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Traditional modes of analysis may combine in some circumstances to
distinguish U.S. positions from an international rule. In the Court's holding in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark745 that persons of Chinese descent could be
natural born citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, much of the debate
between the majority and the dissent addressed questions of international law and
original intent-whether the Amendment's drafters had intended to incorporate
the British common law principle of citizenship based on place of birth (jus soli),
or the principle of citizenship based on descent or blood (us sanguinis), which the
U.S. government urged was the dominant international rule.746 The Court
ultimately concluded that the Constitution's explicit textual grant of citizenship to
"all persons" born "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States, together with
the history and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,747 barred resort to the
alleged international rule governing citizenship. 4
The presence of an established contrary domestic interpretation creates a
strong, but not wholly insurmountable, obstacle to domestication of an
international rule. Principles of stare decisis support adherence to established
doctrine. I say not wholly insurmountable, however, because judicial construction
of constitutional provisions does evolve. It is, after all "a constitution we are
expounding. '749 The persistent presence of a contrary international rule-such as
the hate speech rule-thus could, and perhaps should, raise the question of
whether a domestic practice should be reconsidered, though not definitively
resolve it. The court nevertheless may find the reasons for the international rule
unpersuasive and be more convinced by the justifications for the existing
constitutional practice.
The inquiry into the Constitution's receptiveness to an international norm is
concededly flexible. Jurists such as Justice Scalia who are widely understood to
believe that international law should always be irrelevant to constitutional analysis
745. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
746. Brief for the United States at 7-8, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(No. 904) (arguing that citizenship based on nationality was the prevailing international law rule); see
also VATTEL, supra note 46, at 101 ("[N]atural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents
who are citizens.") (emphasis added).
747. The Fourteenth Amendment's express application to all persons "born in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof," on its face, appeared to preclude resort to any international rule favoring
citizenship based on blood rather than place of birth, and the Court concluded that the Amendment's purpose of
overruling the Dred Scott decision and eliminating the existence of classes with permanent, inherited status as
non-citizens supported this analysis. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675-76 (discussing the Amendment's
text and purposes). The Court both concluded that the Amendment was intended to adopt the British common
law rule, and denied the existence of any settled international rule based onjus sanguinis. Id. at 667 (finding
"little ground for the theory that at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment ... there was
any settled and definite rule of international law generally recognized by civilized nations, inconsistent
with the ancient [common law] rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion").
748. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan dissented strenuously, arguing that nationality was
a question of "public law" and that the Amendment should be construed according to "the more general
principles of the law of nations." Id. at 708 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 242, 248 (1830) (Story, J.), and other international authorities). The dissenters justified their
desire to resort to the claimed international law standard on the grounds that the nation's definition of
citizenship implicated foreign relations. Id. at 707 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("Obviously, where the
constitution deals with common-law rights and deals with common-law phraseology, its language
should be read in the light of the common law; but when the question arises as to what constitutes
citizenship of the nation, involving, as it does, international relations ... international principles must be
considered .... ).
749. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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presumably would also find that interpretive barriers precluded consideration of
international norms in any particular circumstance. The question in Printz v.
United States7 5° was the relevance of comparative, rather than international, legal
sources, but the debate there illustrates the difficulty in resolving the
Constitution's receptiveness. The Constitution does not expressly address whether
Congress may "commandeer" state officers to implement federal laws, but Justice
Scalia concluded that structure, history, doctrine, and practice conclusively
established that respect for state sovereignty constitutionally barred such action.
For him, in other words, the constitutional question was settled. Justice Breyer, by
contrast, found structure, history, doctrine, and practice completely silent on the
question, and argued that in the face of such silence, the practices of other federal
systems could be useful in informing the Court's analysis.
751
The fact that determining constitutional receptiveness may lead different
jurists to different conclusions-that constitutional interpretation is an art, not a
science-however, does not mean that the effort is illegitimate or not worth
pursuing. Instead, the influence of an international rule will necessarily depend to
some degree on the ambiguity of a constitutional provision and its underlying
interpretation. The Court could not legitimately have invoked international law to
override the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of birthright citizenship, given
the clarity and specificity of the constitutional text and the history and clear
purpose of the citizenship provision. The question of commandeering may
approach the other extreme of the spectrum in terms of constitutional ambiguity.
If a court concludes that a particular constitutional provision is open to
being informed by an international principle, the court should then consider to
what extent other aspects of the constitutional design may nevertheless constrain
operation of the international rule. This is a standard question in constitutional
analysis which I emphasize only because the Court has neglected it in past cases
considering international law. It is entirely possible for other structural and
individual rights considerations to limit the domestic influence of an international
norm. Thus, the Fong Yue Ting dissenters contended that even if Congress
possessed authority to deport aliens deduced from international law, that power
must be exercised consistent with due process and other express protections in the
Constitution.752 Likewise, the Court in Ex parte Milligan concluded that whatever
power the laws of war might recognize to try individuals in military tribunals, the
Constitution prohibited exercise of that power over civilians in times when the
Article III courts were open.753 In Hamdi, the plurality understood the
Constitution as both receiving and qualifying the powers to detain enemy
combatants recognized under international law. Justices Scalia and Stevens, in
turn, read the Suspension Clause and other constitutional limitations as precluding
750. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
751. ld at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that foreign sources "may nonetheless cast
an empirical light" in constitutional interpretation, as one consideration among many). For an analysis of
the relevance of Justice Breyer's European examples to American federalism, see Daniel Halberstam,
Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213 (K. Nicolaidis & R.
Howse eds., 2001).
752. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738-40 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting).
753. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,29 (1866).
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the detention of U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, regardless what international law
authorized.754
Assuming the above analysis yields the conclusion that the Constitution is
receptive to domestication of an international rule in some fashion, a court should
also consider three aspects of the nature of the international rule: universal
acceptance of the norm, U.S. acceptance of the norm, and any limitations that
international law imposes.
B. Norm Universality
The second consideration in a principled approach to the relationship
between constitutional law and an international standard is how clearly defined
and universally accepted the standard is, and how widely actual state practice
conforms to the rule. This goes, of course, to the persuasive force of the
international rule. Clear definition helps ensure accurate application of the
international rule,755 and broad international support suggests a well-grounded
reason for the norm. 756 Thus, a norm set forth in a treaty may be more or less
persuasive depending upon how widely the treaty has been ratified and how
consistently states have, in practice, respected that treaty as imposing a legal
obligation. Widespread ratification that is also supported by near-universal state
practice, as was the case with the juvenile death penalty in Roper and the general
authority to detain combatants under the Geneva Conventions in Hamdi,
accordingly would be entitled to greater persuasive weight than equally
widespread ratification of a treaty norm to which states do not purport even
formally to legally adhere.757 Moreover, norms recognized as customary
international law, which reflect widespread and consistent state practice taken
under a sense of legal obligation, may have greater persuasive force than equally
widespread state practice that reflects the overlapping sovereign choices of
individual states rather than a binding legal obligation.
Regional international legal rules, such as those operative in the Inter-
American system or in the European Union, and more discrete multi-party or
bilateral agreements, raise special difficulties here. They reflect the consensus of
only a subset of the international community, and, accordingly, are less persuasive
than rules that have achieved more widespread acceptance. As noted with respect
to Lawrence, they also raise an additional set of thorny questions regarding
selectivity and cultural relevance in the use of international law. On the other
754. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
755. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machan, 542 U.S. 692, 736-37 (2004).
756. Id. Cf Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Jus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV.
129, 145 (2005) ("[A]s a dense and mutually reinforced consensus, [lus gentium] may have a pertinence
to our law that its individual constituents do not have.").
757. See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935
(2002) (examining, and critiquing, state compliance with human rights treaties). On the other hand,
states' failure to comply with a fundamental norm that they nevertheless accept as legally binding does
not necessarily undermine the persuasiveness of the norm. Simma & Alston, supra note 44, at 102
("[T]he concept of a 'recognized' general principle seems to conform more closely than the concept of
custom to the situation where a norm invested with strong inherent authority is widely accepted even
though widely violated."); cf Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The fact
that the prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a
norm of international law.").
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hand, the persuasive force of international rules that reflect the consensus of only
a subset of the international community is strengthened or weakened by whether
the United States adheres to the international rule and by whether the nations
adopting the rule share common characteristics with the United States (such as a
commitment to democratic constitutional governance) that make the rule
particularly persuasive. Thus, Lawrence followed a longstanding jurisprudential
tradition of looking to practices in Western Europe to help illuminate U.S.
understandings of "liberty."
Lack of international consensus on a particular question does not necessarily
render resort to international values irrelevant, though it may reduce the
persuasiveness of any particular rule. The United States's recognition of
constitutional protection for "tag" or transient jurisdiction based solely on service
with process in the forum 758 has been sharply criticized by European countries,
for example, which generally require a more substantial relationship between the
defendant and the forum for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction.759 In other
words, while there is a contrary regional rule, there is no established customary
international law prohibition against tag jurisdiction, except perhaps in its most
extreme form, and the practice is accepted by some Commonwealth countries.
The principle thus does not enjoy uniform acceptance by states. Although reasons
may exist to consider modifying the Court's approach to tag jurisdiction to
comport more closely with the regional foreign practice, the presence of universal
adherence to a contrary international rule would offer a more compelling case.
International norms regarding reproductive choice offer an additional
example. Justice Scalia and some scholars have observed that measuring U.S.
privacy protections against foreign practices could undermine domestic
constitutional protection for reproductive choice, since abortion is more strictly
regulated practically everywhere else in the world.760 There is, however, no
international legal consensus on this point. The American Convention on Human
Rights states that life begins at conception, 76' but the United States is not a party
to that Convention and other more widely ratified human rights conventions, such
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention To Eliminate All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, are silent or agnostic on the question.
758. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
759. Juenger, supra note 325, at 1037-39 (discussing European practice under the Brussels
Convention).
760. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1227 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Alford,
supra note 12; Larsen, supra note 12, at 1320; Christopher McCrudden, A Part of the Main? The
Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases and Comparative Law Methodology in the United States Supreme
Court, in LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 129-30 (Carl
Schneider et al. eds., 2000) (discussing citation of foreign authority by the executive branch in efforts to
overturn Roe v. Wade during the 1980s). The comparative claim that the United States is an outlier,
however, should not be exaggerated. While few European governments impose as few restrictions as the
United States, reproductive choice remains robust in most advanced industrial democracies. See Leslie
Pickering Francis, Virtue and the American Family: Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 469 (1988) (examining arguments about abortion practices in advanced industrial democracies);
see also Center for Reproductive Rights, The World's Abortion Laws, http://www.reproductiverights.
org/pub fac abortionlaws.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005) (noting that 54 countries, with 40.5 percent
of the world's population, allow abortion without restriction as to reason).
761. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNT.S. 123




While a court would be entitled to consider both regional rules and the absence of
any international consensus, for both tag jurisdiction and reproductive choice,
international law does not offer any universally accepted answer to the question.
C. Acceptance by the United States
In addition to questions of universal acceptance, the persuasiveness of an
international rule will turn on whether that rule has been accepted or rejected by
the United States. Acceptance could be expressed through a number of means,
including (1) treaty ratifications; (2) explicit acceptance of treaty rules as
customary international law (as the United States has done with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and aspects of the Law of the Sea
Convention); (3) principles of customary international law to which the United
States has not persistently objected; and (4)jus cogens, or peremptory rules of
international law which a state may not avoid through either persistent objection
or ratification of a contrary treaty. I would add here that a U.S. signature to a
treaty that has not yet been ratified does not constitute full U.S. consent to be
bound by the treaty, but does obligate the United States to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, unless and until the United
States formally expresses its intent not to ratify.763 A U.S. signature thus indicates
some level of support for the treaty, although it suggests something considerably
weaker than full acceptance.
Conversely, U.S. rejection of an international rule may be accomplished
either through (1) U.S. adoption of an effective reservation, declaration, or
understanding to a treaty provision that rejects or modifies the United States's
acceptance of the particular rule, or (2) the United States's persistent objection to
a norm of customary international law. The United States's failure to sign or ratify
764
a treaty, as with the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Roper, would be a
mixed factor in this context. It would, of course, indicate that the United States
had not consented to be bound by the treaty, and to that extent would count
against the treaty's use as an interpretive source. But failure to ratify would not
necessarily establish that the United States had rejected principles of customary
international law implicated by the treaty, at least absent other evidence that the
United States had persistently objected to the customary international law rule.765
The treaty would also retain persuasive force as embodying the consensus of the
ratifying states.
United States acceptance of an international principle is relevant to a court's
analysis for three reasons. First, U.S. international legal obligations may create
important governmental interests relevant to constitutional inquiry, as the Court
762. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNT.S. 331, 347
("If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict
with that norm becomes void and terminates.").
763. Id. art. 18(a); see also Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003).
764. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005) (citing the ratification status of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).
765. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, at intro.
note (1987), ("Even after codification ... custom maintains its authority, particularly as regards states
that do not adhere to the codifying treaty.").
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indicated in Boos v. Barry.766 The government may, therefore, invoke its
obligations as a treaty partner, or to the broader international community under
customary international rules, to support a claim that an exercise of power is
constitutionally legitimate. International law, however, would not automatically
establish the existence of a compelling governmental interest,767 nor would it
automatically constitutionally legitimate the exercise of government power. U.S.
international law obligations nevertheless are likely to be relevant to constitutional
analysis in such contexts.
Second, U.S. acceptance of an international legal principle strengthens
prudential reasons for respecting that norm. As the Court recognized in several
cases discussed in Part H, promoting U.S. compliance with and respect for the
international system, avoiding tensions with the international community, and
promoting parity of treatment for U.S. interests weigh in favor of aligning
constitutional construction with international rules.768 Accordingly, the fact that a
rule is binding on the United States does not compel incorporation of the rule at
the constitutional level, as discussed previously, but it does bolster the rule's
persuasiveness.
Finally, as discussed below, U.S. acceptance reduces possible concerns that
a court might improperly impose an international obligation on the United States
contrary to the views of the political branches. Consistent with the discussion in
Part IV, supra, U.S. acceptance significantly reduces any objections to
consideration of international law based on popular sovereignty.
On the other hand, U.S. rejection of an international norm, whether through
a treaty reservation, refusal to ratify, or persistent objection to a customary
international norm, weighs against relying upon the rule's persuasiveness in
constitutional analysis for reasons related to democractic governance, separation
of powers, and federalism. Under our constitutional system, both treaties and
customary international law enjoy sub-constitutional status.769 While norms from
both sources are binding on the states and subject to judicial construction,
Congress has the power to override customary international law and treaties
through positive legislation.770 This legislative check is removed, however, when
international norms inform constitutional analysis. Respect for the determinations
of the political branches thus acknowledges the legitimate role of the political
branches in shaping the extent to which the United States will accept international
norms into the domestic legal structure. It responds to the countermajoritarian
objection.
Taking into consideration the conduct of the political branches is also
consistent with the recognition that the executive branch and Congress, as well as
the courts, are interpreters of constitutional rules. Rejection of a norm by those
766. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
767. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). See supra notes 468-474.
768. Thus, in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-34 (1947), Justice Black invoked
the fact that U.S. government officials had embraced the international rule regarding the three-mile
territorial sea as support for considering the rule in his constitutional analysis. In United States v. Pacific
R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887), Justice Field noted that the President and Congress had acknowledged the
international rule that acts of military necessity did not require just compensation.
769. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (discussing status of customary
international law as federal common law).
770. For a critical analysis of this principle, see Henkin, supra note 56.
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branches suggests that they believed that the norm should not be considered part
of U.S. constitutional obligations, and a court should consider the reasons for that
conclusion. Finally, prudential arguments for placing the United States in
compliance with international rules are weaker when the political branches have
made a deliberate choice to place the United States in conflict with those rules.
Consideration of the views of the political branches in this context,
however, must be tempered by a competing separation of powers concern: the
courts' independent authority both to interpret international law and to determine
constitutional meaning. The Constitution invests the federal courts with authority
to construe that instrument, as well as treaties, statutes and federal common law.
In fulfilling this obligation, federal courts have the power to be informed by
international rules, 77 1 and have exercised this power for more than two centuries.
Principles of statutory construction, such as the Charming Betsy rule, explicitly
recognize this obligation.772 And while the national political branches have
authority to override judicial constructions of international law (by overriding
those interpretations with later-in-time statutes or otherwise terminating U.S.
treaty obligations), they do not have authority to override the courts' constitutional
determinations. Respect for judicial independence and principles of separation of
powers thus establish that while international law determinations by the political
branches are entitled to some weight, they are not determinative when the
judiciary engages in constitutional analysis.
Reconciling the competing separation of powers concerns in this context
suggests that greater deference is owed to the political branches' rejection of
international rules that would grant governmental powers, while less deference is
owed in the construction of constitutional limits on governmental authority and
individual rights. If the political branches have declined to accept a power allowed
under international law, judicial deference to the political branches' decision
supports principles of separation of powers.773 The political branches, of course,
remain free to embrace the international rule in the future, barring some other
constitutional obstacle.
Judicial deference to the political branches, however, is less appropriate in
construing limits on governmental power, including individual rights. Individual
rights provisions are generally understood as countermajoritarian constraints on
the political branches, and, as discussed in Part IV, supra, their construction
necessarily involves judicial second-guessing of actions of the political branches.
It is reasonable for a court to consider determinations by the political branches and
the reasons underlying their decision. But to the extent that the judicial role in
constitutional construction is to protect individuals from majoritarian action, or
even to protect one branch of government from another, deference to the political
branches is inappropriate.
The cruel and unusual punishment cases fall somewhere between these two
positions. Under Roper and Atkins, at least, the question whether a practice
violates "evolving standards of decency" requires judicial consideration of both
771. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
772. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
773. An example of such a situation might include the United States's recognition of absolute
immunity for sitting foreign heads of state, despite the fact that international law does not require such
immunity.
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(1) the extent to which the practice has been rejected by legislatures, juries, and
other expressions of the public sentiment, and (2) an independent judicial
determination of whether the practice is cruel and unusual. Persistent rejection of
an international norm by the political branches is clearly pertinent to the first
question, as Justice Scalia argued in Roper.774 If customary international and
treaty law prohibit a punishment, but the political branches have clearly rejected
the international rule, their determination is entitled to deference in identifying a
national consensus under the first half of the Eighth Amendment analysis. That
determination is not controlling, however, when a court is independently
obligated to decide what is cruel and unusual.
Two forms of modification of U.S. treaty obligations-non-self-executing
treaties, and reservations, declarations, and understandings-warrant further
exploration here, since both raise complex questions regarding U.S. "rejection" of
an international rule and how it should play out in constitutional analysis. Non-
self-executing treaties are international obligations that the United States has
accepted but that are not domestically judicially enforceable without legislative
sanction.775 They are less problematic for our purposes than substantive
reservations, declarations, and understandings, because the fact that a treaty is not
self-executing does not qualify the United States's international obligations under
the treaty. To the contrary, such a treaty clearly has been "accepted" by the United
States and imposes binding international legal obligations. Non-self-executing
treaties also are domestically effective in the sense that they can be the basis for
congressional implementing legislation, executive orders interpreting the treaty, or
the construing of a statute to comport with the United States's international
obligations. The question such treaties raise, then, is whether the fact that they
are not directly judicially enforceable affects their validity as an interpretive
source in constitutional analysis.
Senate declarations that a treaty is not self-executing 77 could be read as an
attempt to prevent U.S. international legal obligations from influencing domestic
law in any manner. The more generous interpretation of such declarations,
however (and the position commonly asserted by the United States in adopting
such measures), is that other provisions of U.S. domestic law already comport
with the treaty obligations, and thus, direct enforcement of the treaty itself is
unnecessary. To put it another way, because the United States has a fully
774. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1226 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
775. The term is applied inconsistently with sufficient frequency to warrant definition here.
See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695 (1995) (arguing that courts have applied four distinct interpretations to the concept of self-
execution). A finding of non-self-execution may mean anything from the view that the treaty, while
creating private rights, does not create a private right of action, to a conclusion that the terms of the
treaty are too vague or precatory to establish a judicially enforceable right. By non-self-executing, I refer
to treaties or treaty provisions that do not create a private right of action enforceable in domestic courts
absent congressional implementation.
776. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
777. I assume, for the purposes here, that such reservations are constitutionally effective. For
further discussion of U.S. treaty ratification practices, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000) (offering arguments
in support of U.S. reservation practices); Henkin, supra note 482, at 346-48 (critiquing, inter alia, U.S.
declarations that treaties are non-self-executing).
778. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (Exec. Rep.) (noting that "existing U.S. law
generally complies with the [ICCPR]; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated").
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developed domestic regime of protection, it does not need to adopt a new and
different legal vocabulary for accomplishing the same purposes. Furthermore,
regardless of the intended domestic effect of a non-self-executing treaty, the
United States intends to be bound by such treaties and affirmatively seeks for U.S.
law to influence their development. None of this suggests that non-self-execution
should be an obstacle to consideration of the treaty in constitutional interpretation
for either its persuasive or its legally binding character, although a court in
construing such a treaty should be sensitive to the reasons why the political
branches might have wanted to limit its domestic effect. 779 Treaties contain many
provisions, and a Senate declaration that a treaty is not self-executing may exist
for any number of reasons. Consistent with this approach, the Hamdi Justices
considered norms established by the Geneva Convention in defining both
constitutional powers and limits, 780 despite the aggressive argument of the
government, and findings in some lower courts, that the Geneva Conventions are
not self-executing.78'
Reservations, declarations, and understandings that control U.S. acceptance
of the substantive meaning of a particular treaty provision give rise to greater
interpretive difficulties. Unlike declarations that a treaty is not self-executing,
these provisions restrict the international obligations that the United States has
undertaken. They therefore constitute rejection of the international principle by
the political branches for the purposes of that treaty.
The United States's ratification of the Convention Against Torture is a
pertinent example. The concept of "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment"
under international law would appear highly relevant to judicial construction of
both the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause782 and the
concept of liberty under substantive due process. In consenting to the Torture
Convention, however, the U.S. Senate adopted a reservation providing that that
the United States understood "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" under the
treaty to be limited to practices prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.78 3 Such a pronouncement indicates that the
United States has accepted the treaty obligation only to the extent that it mirrors
779. Cf Waldron, supra note 46, at 141 (noting that the fact that Erie may have altered the
positive law status of the law of nations "says nothing about its status as a critical resource").
780. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 549-51
(Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
781. See, e.g., Harndan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Third Geneva
Convention does not create individual rights enforceable in court); Brief for the Respondents at 23,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
782. The Eighth Amendment has long been understood as prohibiting torture and related
forms of abuse. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (noting that "the primary concern of the
drafters was to proscribe 'torture(s)' and other 'barbar(ous)' methods of punishment"); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (affirming that "punishments of torture ... and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that Amendment"); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture .... ).
783. See 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html ("[T]he United States considers itself bound by the
obligation ... to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' only insofar as the
term . . . means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."). For a critical analysis
of this and other reservation practices, see Henkin, supra note 482, at 341. For an argument generally
supporting the practice, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52
DuKE L.J. 485 (2002).
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the constitutional meaning, and a court would be bound by any such valid
reservation in construing the treaty. The reservation might also be interpreted
more broadly as reflecting the sense of the Senate that U.S. constitutional doctrine
should inform the meaning of the treaty obligation, rather than vice versa. As a
matter of constitutional interpretation, the reservation would prevent the Court
from considering any principle under the treaty broader than the constitutional
prohibition as a legal obligation binding on the United States. The reservation
would not, however, obligate the Court to ignore the persuasive force of any
extant international consensus regarding what constitutes cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment.78 4 The Court's analysis should include consideration of why
the political branches imposed this definitional limitation on the Treaty Clause.
But it would also be entitled to look to the broader international understanding
when engaging in independent judicial construction of the constitutional
protection.
Moreover, neither reservations nor non-self-executing treaties alter rights
and obligations under other treaties, or rights and obligations that enjoy
independent status as customary international law (although a reservation can be
evidence of persistent objection). To the extent that the United States has not
persistently objected to the customary norm, efforts to limit or modify U.S. treaty
obligations do not bar judicial consideration, or constitutional absorption, of a
customary international law rule regarding cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, or any other. As the Supreme Court recently indicated in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, a declaration of non-self-execution may render a treaty
judicially unenforceable directly, but no reason exists to interpret such Senate
actions as obliterating whatever independent force widely accepted customary
international norms related to that treaty may have or even the role of that treaty in
contributing to the development of the customary international rule.785
Finally, the question of whether or not the United States is subject to a
customary international law rule or has rejected the rule through persistent
objection is not always clear-cut. As the Court observed in Roper, in ratifying the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United States entered a
reservation to Article 6(5), which prohibits the execution of persons under 18 at
the time of the crime. This reservation expresses a clear intent by the United
States not to be bound by Article 6(5) of the treaty.786 It is less clear, however,
whether the United States is nevertheless bound by a customary international law
784. Cf Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (finding that
"disorientation" techniques such as hooding and sleep deprivation constituted cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights).
785. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Court observed that a treaty
declared non-self-executing could not be relied on vel non as the source of an applicable rule of
international law regarding arbitrary detention for purposes of litigation under the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The Court nevertheless examined the status of arbitrary detention under customary international
law, and concluded simply that the facts presented did not present a violation of the customary
international law rule. Id. at 734-38.
786. A significant controversy nevertheless exists regarding the validity of the reservation
under international law. See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating
to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols
Thereto, or in Relation to Declaration Under Article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (Apr. 11, 1994).
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prohibition on the execution of juveniles.787 The treaty reservation may be
evidence that the United States has persistently objected to the customary
international rule. But the United States embraced the prohibition on the execution
ofjuveniles in wartime by ratifying the Geneva Conventions, and federal criminal
and military law conforms to the international norm. So the record on persistent
objection is not uniform. Furthermore, the United States is a party to the
American Declaration on the Rights of Man and a signatory to the American
Convention on Human Rights, both of which the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has construed as prohibiting the execution of juveniles as a jus
cogens norm.788 If the norm in fact enjoys jus cogens status, neither the United
States nor any other country can opt out of the international law obligation
through persistent objection.
It is interesting, though not surprising, that the Roper Court did not attempt
to confront these questions. The Roper majority has been criticized for
considering treaty provisions that the United States had either not ratified or had
affirmatively rejected.79° The Roper Court, however, did not argue that the
international prohibition on the execution of juveniles should be respected
because it was binding on the United States, by either treaty or customary
international law. The Court instead relied upon treaties such as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the ICCPR as evidence of the foreign consensus on
the question. The Court also found, consistent with the discussion above, that the
reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR did not undermine the Court's finding
that a national consensus now exists against the execution of juveniles, since the
reservation had been entered a decade ago, and subsequent state and national
practice reflected a trend toward abolishing the practice.79
The relationship between U.S. acceptance of international law and judicial
resort to international law in constitutional interpretation raises one final question,
which is what effect, if any, the practice will have on the United States's role in
international lawmaking and its future willingness to ratify international
agreements. Arguably, concern that treaty terms may subsequently inform
constitutional analysis could lead the executive branch to ratify fewer treaties,
enter more reservations, or even to aggressively oppose adoption by other states
of treaty provisions that any particular administration views as contrary to U.S.
interests (since the Court is willing to consider even treaty provisions that the
United States has not accepted). Such practices, of course, are already evident in
787. Evidence of the customary international law prohibition derives, inter alia, from the
prohibition on the execution of juveniles set forth in the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which has been accepted without reservation by every government in the world except the United
States and Somalia, and the fact that every state except the United States and Iran prohibits the practice.
For further discussion, see Brief of the European Union and Members of the International Community as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633).
788. Michael Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02,
OEAISer. L.N/II.177, doc.1 (2002), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2002engfUSA. 12285.htm.
789. For competing views on the status of the prohibition on the execution of juveniles,
compare Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085 (2002), and Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of
International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (1983), with
Bradley, supra note 64.
790. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1225-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
791. Id. at 1194.
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U.S. treaty making, particularly in ratification practices that seek to insulate
domestic law from international instruments. It is not clear that the remote
possibility that a treaty norm would some day find its way into constitutional
analysis will further chill U.S. treaty making practices. It seems more likely that
the U.S. interests that are served by participation in the international system would
outweigh such concerns. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that a
decision like Roper could spur at least the current administration to oppose some
future treaties.
D. International Law Limits Accompany International Powers
The last requirement for a principled approach to employment of
international law in constitutional analysis is that consideration of international
rules should include relevant limitations that international law imposes on the
same rule and should take into consideration adaptations in the international rule
as it evolves. Although the Court has recognized this obligation in principle, it has
not always complied with it.
A principled application of international law should generally require taking
powers with the accompanying constraints. The primary legitimating value that
international law brings to constitutional interpretation is the weight of the
considered judgment of the international community. But that legitimacy is lost if
powers deduced from international law are accepted into the domestic system
without the constraints that the same considered international judgment has found
it appropriate to impose. In the immigration example, if the government's
constitutional authority over aliens is based on powers allowed under international
law, then the government's constitutional authority logically also should be
limited by the constraints that international law imposes.
This argument necessarily raises questions regarding which limitations
under international law should accompany the constitutional embrace of powers
allowable under international law. A given exercise of state authority may
implicate many international rules, and it would be implausible to argue that
consideration of international law in construction of a particular constitutional
power should bring the entire body of international law with it. A complete
exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum,
however, a court should consider international limits that are directly linked to the
governmental power at issue. In the context of the power to detain enemy
combatants recognized by the Third Geneva Convention, this would include the
duty to provide a minimal proceeding to determine the status of individuals
detained. Justice Souter thus properly criticized the government in Hamdi for
invoking detention powers recognized in international law without respecting this
constraint.
Constitutional absorption of international norms also raises the question of
how the resulting constitutional principles should evolve as international law
develops. Where clauses of the Constitution have been read as incorporating
common law principles, some originalists have argued that the provisions must be
understood according to common law rules that prevailed when the Constitution
was adopted. As discussed above, however, the Court has adopted an organic and
evolutionary approach to international law. To the extent that it has embraced
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international law norms, it generally has embraced the evolved contemporary
norm, rather than the norm prevailing in 1789. An approach that did not allow
constitutional rules incorporating international norms to evolve over time would
freeze U.S. constitutional analysis in whatever particular moment the Court ruled.
Pennoyer and its successor cases underscore this point. The late nineteenth-
century international law principle of absolute territorial sovereignty adopted in
Pennoyer continues to influence, and complicate, U.S. personal jurisdiction
analysis. The international territorial norm incorporated in that case, however, has
evolved significantly. Indeed, the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty had
begun to erode even before Pennoyer was decided. The international law source
of the principle of territorial sovereignty in Pennoyer has been forgotten, however,
and the constitutional principle ofjurisdiction has developed subsequently without
reference to the international rule. Likewise, in the immigration context, after
constitutionally ratifying (and likely overstating) a late nineteenth-century
principle of sovereign power over aliens, the Court declined to acknowledge or
accommodate later developments in international law regarding the rights of
aliens, preferring to "leave the law on the subject as we find it."792
The better approach, it would seem, would allow a constitutional principle
to evolve with the international rule it embodies. When an international norm has
informed constitutional analysis, a court revisiting constitutional doctrine thus
should also take into account any evolution in the international rule. The
constitutional authority or limitation therefore could be allowed to evolve as
international law continued to develop.793 Such an evolution may raise objections
that tying constitutional analysis to a changing international doctrine violates U.S.
sovereignty, separation of powers, or other independent constitutional limits. The
argument has force. But domestic courts would retain control over this process,
and a court would not be obligated to rigidly follow any development in the
international rule. The court would also need to reconsider any evolved
international rule in light of all four principles set forth here. The point is simply
that where a constitutional principle has been construed in light of an international
rule, courts should remain conscious of those international origins and sensitive to
the rule's evolution.
Both the Roper and Hamdi majorities employed this approach. The Roper
majority was sensitive to changes in both national and international opinion
regarding the juvenile death penalty that had occurred since the Court had
addressed the question in Stanford.7  The Hamdi plurality, and the opinion of
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, suggested in dicta that both the President's war
powers and constitutional due process could be informed, and limited, by the
1949 Geneva Conventions and other modem developments in the customary laws
of armed conflict.795 Although Justice Souter would have gone further in applying
the constraints that international law imposed on powers deduced from
792. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952).
793. Cf Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court,
"It is not our point that the content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is governed by international
conflicts law, but only... that its original content was properly derived from that source. The conflicts
law embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows room for common-law development, just as did
the international conflicts law that it originally embodied." Id. at 723 n. 1.
794. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
795. See supra note 780.
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international law, O'Connor's opinion also recognized that the powers recognized
by the laws of war were limited by modem law of war principles. To the extent
that the President enjoyed powers derived from international law, in other words,
the Court suggested that he must take the bitter with the sweet.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public debate over the role of international law in constitutional
interpretation has focused on the threshold question of whether international
authorities can ever be relevant to constitutional analysis. This Article
demonstrates that that conversation is both ahistorical and misguided.
Specifically, the Supreme Court's historical record regarding the use of
international law refutes many of the objections raised to the use of international
law in the recent individual rights cases. Objection to the decisions in Roper,
Lawrence, and Atkins cannot be based on the irrelevance of international law to
the Constitution, given the rich historical relationship between the Constitution
and international law. Consideration of international law in the individual rights
cases also cannot be dismissed on the grounds that international law is appropriate
only for use in constitutional questions explicitly implicating foreign relations, or
that international law cannot legitimately limit governmental power or define
individual rights. Invocation of international norms in all of these contexts has a
lengthy historical provenance. The objection to the use of international law also
cannot rest on the fact that international law is not domestically or democratically
created, since many sources of law and interpretive tools are not the product of
majoritarian processes. Instead, objection to the use of international law in the
recent cases must turn on some aspect of the constitutional design that is specific
to cruel and unusual punishment or substantive due process. But the Court's
longstanding and accepted tests in both contexts are fully consistent with giving
some consideration to international values.
More broadly, the cases considered here require reconsideration of some of
our modem assumptions about the uniqueness of the American legal order.
Domestic conversations about the Constitution frequently emphasize its
distinctiveness, and both the fact and content of our written Constitution
historically has rendered the United States exceptional in many respects. But the
current debate also has failed to recognize the many respects in which the
Supreme Court traditionally has viewed the Constitution as incorporating, and
reflecting, common values drawn from the international legal system. Like the
common law, international law is given no explicit constitutional status in
interpretation of that document. And yet, just as "[t]he language of the
Constitution . . .could not be understood without reference to the common
law,, 796 much constitutional language cannot not be fully understood without
reference to international law.
The historical record establishes that our constitutional tradition is
significantly more receptive to international norms than is understood in the
current scholarly and judicial debate. It is the critics and detractors from the
practice, in other words, who are departing from tradition here. The rich dialogue
796. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907).
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between international and constitutional norms, however, has been largely
forgotten in contemporary constitutional discourse. A more complete and accurate
historical understanding suggests that U.S. constitutional doctrines should be
applied with greater sensitivity regarding international law. Justice Scalia has
argued that it is "a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding., 797 The cases demonstrate, however, that international law has been
a part of U.S. constitutional interpretation from the beginning and a principled
resort to international law is fully part of the American tradition.
797. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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